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The Informational Component
Abstract
Even though the relevance of non-truth conditional notions like ‘topic’ and ‘focus’ in sentence structure
and interpretation has long been recognized, there is little agreement on the exact nature of these notions
and their role in a model of linguistic competence. Following the information packaging approach (Chafe
1976, Prince 1986), this study argues that these notions are primitive elements in the informational
component of language. This component, informatics, is responsible for the articulation of sentences qua
information, where information is defined as that part of propositional content which constitutes a
contribution of knowledge to the hearer's knowledge-store. Informational primitives combine into four
possible distinct information packaging instructions, which direct hearers to retrieve the information of a
sentence and enter it into their knowledge-store in a specific way.
After a discussion of previous approaches to the informational articulation of the sentence, a hierarchical
articulation is proposed: sentences are divided into the focus, which is the only information of the
sentence, and the ground, which specifies how that information fits in the hearer's knowledge-store. The
ground is further divided into the link, which denotes an address in the hearer's knowledge-store under
which s/he is instructed to enter the information, and the tail, which provides further directions on how
the information must be entered under a given address.
Empirical support for this representation of information packaging comes especially from the surface
encoding of instructions in Catalan, which is then contrasted with that of English. Using a multistratal
syntactic theory, it is then proposed that information packaging is structurally and purely represented at
the abstract level of IS, which acts as an interface with informatics. Finally, in order to further argue for
informatics as an autonomous linguistic component, some proposals that attempt to include
informational notions under logical semantics are reviewed and countered.
This study is an effort to gain insight into one subdomain of pragmatics by integrating it into the larger
process of language understanding. This is done by giving otherwise elusive informational notions a
specific role in the component responsible for the entry of information into the hearer's knowledge-store.
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ABSTRACT
The Informational Component
Enric Vallduv
Supervisor: Ellen F. Prince
Even though the relevance of non-truth-conditional notions like `topic' and `focus'
in sentence structure and interpretation has long been recognized, there is little
agreement on the exact nature of these notions and their role in a model of linguistic competence. Following the information-packaging approach (Chafe 1976,
Prince 1986), this study argues that these notions are primitive elements in the
informational component of language. This component, informatics, is responsible
for the articulation of sentences qua information, where information is dened as
that part of propositional content which constitutes a contribution of knowledge
to the hearer's knowledge-store. Informational primitives combine into four possible distinct information-packaging instructions, which direct hearers to retrieve the
information of a sentence and enter it into their knowledge-store in a specic way.
After a discussion of previous approaches to the informational articulation of the
sentence, a hierarchical articulation is proposed: sentences are divided into the focus,
which is the only information of the sentence, and the ground, which species how
that information ts in the hearer's knowledge-store. The ground is further divided
into the link, which denotes an address in the hearer's knowledge-store under which
s/he is instructed to enter the information, and the tail, which provides further
directions on how the information must be entered under a given address.
Empirical support for this representation of information packaging comes especially from the surface encoding of instructions in Catalan, which is then contrasted
with that of English. Using a multistratal syntactic theory, it is then proposed that
information packaging is structurally and purely represented at the abstract level of
IS, which acts as an interface with informatics. Finally, in order to further argue for
informatics as an autonomous linguistic component, some proposals that attempt to
include informational notions under logical semantics are reviewed and countered.
This study is an e ort to gain insight into one subdomain of pragmatics by integrating it into the larger process of language understanding. This is done by giving
otherwise elusive informational notions a specic role in the component responsible
for the entry of information into the hearer's knowledge-store.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Goals
One of the major goals of linguistics is to explain how meaning is encoded in linguistic structure. Linguists try to understand and describe the process by which
the human mind takes a string of acoustic signals, interprets it, and turns it into
a conceptual structure. Indeed, we have gained a fair amount of understanding
about our linguistic competence. It is generally agreed that the physical reality of
an utterance's phonetic shape is mapped onto an abstract phonological representation where bundles of acoustic parameters are converted into bundles of distinctive
phonological features with inherent linguistic value. On the basis of this phonological representation, in turn, we are capable of capturing the syntactic structure of a
sentence, and once this syntactic object is available, we proceed to its interpretation.
But what does interpretation consist of? Traditionally, linguists have considered that meaning is abstractly represented in the semantic component of language.
Interpretation, then, can be viewed as a translation from syntactic objects into semantic objects or propositions, which will in turn be converted into more general
nonlinguistic conceptual structures in the mental knowledge store. We have relied
on truth-conditional logic to provide us with a way to formally represent meaning, and, since Richard Montague, in the late 1960s, we can also compositionally
translate syntactic objects into semantic formulae with extreme systematicity.
Truth-conditional semantics, however, while yielding important results, cannot
account for the entire range of phenomena we would normally include under the label
of meaning. In order to benet fully from truth-conditional semantics, we need an
1

additional sort of meaning interpretation beyond, or along with, truth-conditional
interpretation. In fact, and due mostly to the in uence of Paul Grice in his 1967
W. James lectures, such an assumption underlies much work in modern linguistics,
hence the methodological division of labor between the study of semantics and the
study of pragmatics.
The object of study of this dissertation lies outside the realm of truth-conditional
semantics and within the realm of pragmatics. The kind of non-truth-conditional
meaning we shall be concerned with is information packaging or, equivalently,
informational meaning.1 Even though information packaging is traditionally
regarded as just one subtype of pragmatic understanding, it is suciently distinct
and self-contained to warrant our studying it without considering other types of
pragmatic phenomena. Such an approach has led to the identication of two important primitives in the study of information packaging, the familiar notions of focus
and topic.
What sort of `meaning' is information packaging? It has long been noted by
linguists that di erent sentential forms can express the same propositional content,
or, inversely, that one and the same semantic proposition can be expressed by a
variety of constructions. For instance, (1)a and (1)b,
(1)

a. He hates broccoli.
b. Broccoli he hates.
are truth-conditionally equivalent, i.e., the same conditions that must be met for
(a) to be true must be met for (b) to be true. The di erence between (a) and (b),
therefore, is not in what they say about the world, but in how they say what they
say about the world. This non-truth-conditional di erence in sentence understanding that we observe in (1) is a di erence in information packaging. In other words,
(a) and (b) are equivalent logico-semantically but not informationally: while their
propositional contents are the same, they do not provide the same information,
where two sentences with the same propositional content may convey di erent information in di erent speaker-hearer interactions depending on how and how much
As a norm, the term `information packaging' will be used, but `informational meaning' comes
in handy especially when information packaging is contrasted with logico-semantic meaning and
when emphasizing the importance of information within the global process of interpretation (or
`meaning' in the wide sense of the word).
1

2

this propositional content contributes to the hearer's knowledge-store at the time of
utterance.
Indeed, speakers seem to structure or package the information conveyed by a
sentence at a given time-point (cf. Chafe 1976, Prince 1986) according to their
assumptions about their interlocutors' beliefs or knowledge and attentional state.
Hearers' knowledge and attentional state, due to the mere e ect of the discourse
input, change continually in a given linguistic encounter and, therefore, so changes
the way in which speakers package information. With this packaging speakers seem
to instruct hearers to retrieve the information carried by a sentence and enter it
into their knowledge-store in a particular way. Each one of this particular ways to
package information will be referred to as an instruction. Di erent packaging
structures license di erent sentential congurations like the ones in (1).
In this sense, then, information packaging is a very context-sensitive component
of language understanding, springing from each particular speaker-hearer interaction
and, furthermore, re ecting the changes in (the speaker's beliefs about) the knowledge and attentional state of the hearer that take place during this interaction.
Truth-conditionally equivalent sentences encoded in di erent information-packaging
instructions are, therefore, not mutually interchangeable in a given context of utterance, preserving felicity. It is this context-sensitivity that has traditionally placed
information packaging within the scope of pragmatic inquiry.
Example (1) showed that the same logico-semantic proposition may be encoded
in di erent packaging structures. The opposite is also true the same packaging instruction may be used to encode di erent logico-semantic propositions. In a sentence
like (2),
(2)

Broccoli he loves.

there is a certain interpretive equivalence with (1)b, having to do with the linear order of phrases2, which is absent from (1)a. Sentences (1)b and (2), while
truth-conditionally distinct, may be said to represent the same packaging instruction, i.e. their informational structure is identical. In these sentences there are two
overlapping elements that are simultaneously expressed in the sentence structure:
logico-semantic propositional content and information-packaging instructions. A
2

The syntactic conguration in (1)b and (2) is traditionally referred to as `topicalization'.

3

complete linguistic theory, of course, must ultimately explain what these elements
are, describe their representation, and study their interaction.
One way in which the issue may be addressed is by viewing logico-semantic
meaning and information packaging as belonging to two separate independent components of language. Although both components are interpretive in some sense, the
sort of `meaning' each component deals with is of a di erent nature. This is, in fact,
the thesis of this dissertation: that a complete model of linguistic competence must
include a component, which I will call informatics, that is merely concerned with
the interpretation and generation of information packaging. Even though informatics is an autonomous component, one expects there to be much indirect interaction
between it and other components of language, e.g. syntax, semantics, and phonology.
Interaction with syntax and phonology is the necessary result of having to express
information packaging through the structural components of language. Interaction
with logical semantics is the unavoidable consequence of a close coexistence within
the interpretive end of language.
Despite abundant research in the area, the exact nature of informational notions
remains evasive and controversial. This study shows that, by adopting a strict
literal interpretation of the notion packaging, originally Chafe's (1976), a more
explicit denition of information packaging and a clearer idea of what its niche is
within the larger linguistic apparatus can be o ered. Our theory, which builds upon
previous research in the area3, includes an informational ontology with four basic
primitive notions arranged in a hierarchical articulation S=ffocus, groundg and
ground=flink, tailg, the combinatorial rules by means of which the di erent
packaging instructions are obtained, and the interpretive rules by means of which
such packaging instructions are interpreted.
The mere availability of a coherent and comprehensive theory of informatics indirectly validates the tacit assumption that informatics is a well-dened, autonomous
component. Nevertheless, other approaches may be taken |and have been taken|
to attain the incorporation of informational meaning into a theory of language
competence. One may try to account for the facts discussed around (1) and (2)
Most notably, in this particular respect, in the work of Bolinger 1954, Kuno 1972, Dahl 1974,
Gundel 1974, 1988, Chafe 1976, Prince 1981a, 1986, Reinhart 1982, Ward 1985, Lambrecht 1987,
and Valimaa-Blum 1988, among others.
3
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di erently, for instance, by saying that all di erences observed between the three
sentences in question are all of the same kind. In fact, it has been argued that
the di erence between sentences like (1)a and (1)b is indeed truth-conditional (see
Szabolcsi 1981 and Svoboda & Materna 1987 for analyses along these lines). Some
plausibility for this claim comes from the fact that some informational notions seem
to have truth-conditional e ects, especially with sentential operators like negation,
the yes/no interrogative operator, and exhaustiveness (cf. Jackendo 1972, Horn
1981, Rooth 1985).
In order to show that informatics is indeed a distinct, autonomous part of linguistic interpretation, this study discusses some of these truth-conditional e ects
and o ers alternative analyses that account for the data without requiring direct interaction between logico-semantic operators and informational elements. It is shown
that sometimes the putative interaction is merely a pragmatically induced mirage|
in the case of exhaustiveness|and that at other times|in the case of negation
and interrogation|it is the result of the indirect interaction between parallel but
autonomous components.
Our theory emphasizes the autonomy of informatics not only with respect to
truth-conditional logico-semantic meaning but also with respect to other types of
non-truth-conditional interpretation. It is fair to say that we now know that BarHillel's (1971) `pragmatic wastebasket' is not just one basket but a cover term that
encompasses various distinct phenomena of a very di erent nature. While phonology, syntax, and semantics refer to both a linguistic area of inquiry and a component
in a model of linguistic competence, pragmatics has only a methodological connotation.
By providing a rigorous theory of informatics, we want to contribute to the enterprise of hooking up `pragmatic competence' to the larger linguistic apparatus,
following Prince 1988a. To do so one needs to identify the `real' linguistic components currently encompassed under the overarching label of pragmatics and nd
their place in the model. This study must be considered, then, a move towards
improving our understanding of some pragmatic phenomena in language and their
relationship with other types of linguistic evidence: if it is possible to come up with
a sound theory of informatics, another fragment of the reputedly `messy' pragmatic
mosaic will have become clearer.
5

Informational understanding and the packaging instructions that encode it must
obviously be recoverable from the overt structure of any language. Information
packaging is structurally represented by syntactic, morphological, or prosodic means,
or a combination of these, as is usually the case. It is well known that in English
information packaging may be expressed exclusively by means of prosody (cf. e.g.
Selkirk 1984, Rochemont 1986). Compare, for instance, (3)a to (3)b, where small
caps signal the constituent containing prosodic prominence:
(3)

a. The boss hates broccoli.
b. The boss hates broccoli.
Sentences (3)a and (3)b are logico-semantically equivalent, the truth-conditions that
must be met for them to be true are exactly the same. Still, the understandings
we obtain from them, their `meanings' in a wide sense of the term, are di erent
in some respect. As in the case of (1) above, the di erence between (a) and (b)
is a di erence in information packaging. These sentences embody two di erent
informational structures that represent two di erent packaging instructions, let us
call them and , with nevertheless the same propositional content.
Not all languages, however, represent instructions and as English does. In
fact, there is considerable crosslinguistic variation in this respect. Catalan, for
example, does not allow the equivalent of (3)b. In Catalan, prosody alone is not
enough to represent information packaging it must be accompanied by a syntactic
operation (cf. Vallduv 1988a). The Catalan equivalent to the contrastive pair in
(3), representing instructions and , respectively, is shown in (4):
x

y

x

x

y

y

(4)

a. L'amo odia el broquil.
the.boss 3s-hate the broccoli
`The boss hates broccoli.'
b. L'amo l1'
odia t1, el broquil1.
the.boss obj-cl 3s-hate
the broccoli
`The boss hates broccoli.'
We notice the similar prosodic pattern between (3) and (4), but also that (4)b
has undergone a syntactic operation absent in (4)a, a rightward detachment of el
broquil `broccoli', the syntactic evidence for which is the object clitic (l1 ) that must
be coindexed with an empty argument position (t1) (cf. Borer 1981, inter alia). In
6

other words, di erent languages choose di erent structural means to spell out the
same packaging instruction.
In order to gain insight into the exact nature of the syntax-informatics interface,
this study o ers a detailed analysis of the syntax of information packaging in Catalan. Catalan, as just mentioned, requires overt syntactic operations where English
requires only prosodic marking. By contrasting English and Catalan in this respect
some crosslinguistically valid generalizations regarding the mapping between syntax
and informatics may be attained.
While syntactic theory has long dealt with issues concerning the structural representation of theta relations, case requirements or logico-semantic structures, the
representation of informational structure has been generally neglected.4 Even most
of the work done in the functionalist tradition, where informational relationships
are the central concern, seems to view them as basically asyntactic, that is, untreatable in terms of a traditional syntactic analysis.5 This study takes the position
that information packaging, while part of an autonomous interpretive component,
is just another type of abstract structure that has to be represented at the surface.
In other words, the lexical item everybody, for instance, in a given sentence, must
be interpreted not only as a quantier over a proposition and as an argument of a
predicate, but also as having a particular standing in a packaging instruction. All
of these things must be recoverable from the surface shape of a sentence and it is
the job of a theory of syntax to explain how. This study, using one of the most
widely-accepted theories of syntax, the Principles & Parameters Theory (cf. Chomsky 1981, 1986 and subsequent work by his associates), suggests how this might be
done.

1.2 Contents
Beyond this rst chapter, where the general purpose and concrete goals of this work
is outlined, the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the place
Exceptions are Culicover & Rochemont 1983, Horvath 1986, and Rochemont 1986, inter alia.
Several others have dealt with some informational notions in isolation under the conviction that
they were dealing with logico-semantic elements.
5 A dierent perspective is found within the so-called `generativist' discourse analysis (Kuno's
(1978) term) approach, where the discovery and study of informational eects on syntactic structure is not seen as a substitute for this structure but as a complement to it.
4
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of informatics within the wider eld of pragmatics and its task within the model of
linguistic competence. The issue of what pragmatics is and what the eld covers as
an area of inquiry is brie y surveyed and then we consider di erent phenomena that
belong to linguistic pragmatics, both at the level of the sentence and at the level of
the discourse. Also in this chapter, information packaging is examined and dened.
The goal of this chapter is to clarify the relationship between information packaging
and other pragmatic but distinct phenomena and, at the same time, ascertain the
role of information packaging within the complex process of language production
and comprehension.
Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive critical survey of the previous literature
on information packaging, from the early Prague School proposals to the current
so-called `generative' functions-of-syntax analyses. We concentrate on two of the
approaches, namely the `focus-presupposition' approach and the `topic-comment'
approach, pointing out the advantages and the shortcomings of the binomial informational articulations they put forward. Finally, we present a trinomial hierarchical
articulation of the sentence based on the insights gained from the survey of the previous approaches.
In Chapter 4, building upon the trinomial hierarchical articulation and following
the notion of information packaging literally, we provide a coherent notation for
the representation of information packaging and propose a small nite inventory of
packaging instructions, i.e. speakers' instructions on how hearers must retrieve the
information carried by the sentence and enter it into their knowledge-store, stated
in procedural terms. This instructions are obtained from the arrangement of the
informational primitives in a given sentence in a compositional way.
Chapter 5 studies in detail the surface manifestation of information packaging in
one language: Catalan. Catalan surface syntax presents a straightforward encoding
of information packaging which provides empirical support for the representation of
informatics proposed in the previous chapter. The chapter includes a brief introduction to Catalan syntax, a discussion of the syntax of information packaging, and
a comparison between Catalan and English.
Chapter 6 focuses on the nature of the syntax-informatics interface. As mentioned above, the interpretation of information packaging must be guaranteed by
an appropriate and unambiguous representation in the structural component of lan8

guage. Within the multistratal framework of the Principles & Parameters Theory,
we suggest how information packaging can be connected to the syntax. It is proposed that an abstract level of representation|Information Structure|mediates the
mapping between informatics and the surface syntactic conguration of sentences,
in the same way the level of LF mediates between semantic interpretation and surface syntactic structure, thus o ering a pure structural representation of information
packaging. The proposal involves a discussion of the conguration of Information
Structure, the operations that map it to S-structure, and its independence from LF.
In Chapter 7 we return to the assumption that informatics and semantics are
two distinct interpretive components in our linguistic competence. This assumption is not universally shared and analyses are found in the literature than argue
or tacitly assume that certain informational notions have truth-conditional e ects.
This chapter contains counteranalyses of these putative truth-conditional e ects. In
particular, we concentrate on the interaction between focus and negative and interrogative sentences and the apparent dependence of exhaustiveness operators like
only on focus. Alternatives are provided that show that the truth-conditional e ects
are in fact the result of indirect interaction between the semantic and informational
components, thus avoiding the use of informational notions in a logico-semantic
representation.
Finally, in Chapter 8 we conclude by evaluating the ndings and proposals presented in this dissertation. These remarks are centered around the advantages of
our proposal, the place of informatics within the larger linguistic apparatus, and
its relevance within the general context of meaning and interpretation and in the
mapping between the structural and the interpretive components of language.
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Chapter 2
Pragmatics and Informatics
2.1 Scope of Pragmatics
As pointed out in the introductory chapter, this dissertation is meant as a contribution to our understanding of certain pragmatic phenomena in language. The scope
of pragmatic inquiry, however, is extremely wide, and, moreover, di erent scholarly traditions have di erent ideas about what this scope is. For instance, within
the Continental European tradition pragmatics includes the study of issues more
commonly studied within applied linguistics, sociolinguistics, ethnolinguistics, psycholinguistics, and the sociology of language.6 The term pragmatics is used here
as in the Anglo-American linguistic and philosophic tradition. Following Levinson
(1983), pragmatics is understood as being `the study of those relations between language and context that are grammaticalized, or encoded in the structure of language'
(1983:9).
Unfortunately, even after leaving social and applied pragmatics aside and concentrating on linguistic pragmatics, we still must deal with the very confusing array
of phenomena that Bar-Hillel (1971) called the `pragmatic wastebasket'. In fact, the
term pragmatics in current linguistic theory di ers from its sister terms syntax and
semantics in a crucial way. Both syntax and semantics refer to a methodological
area of inquiry within linguistics, but simultaneously they also refer to a coherent
and distinct part of our cognitive linguistic apparatus. Pragmatics, in contrast,
while used indeed to refer to an area of linguistic inquiry, lacks its other meaning as
See Levinson 1983 (Ch. 1) for a thorough discussion of the origins and use of the term `pragmatics' in the dierent traditions and the scope of pragmatics as an area of inquiry.
6
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a single coherent component of linguistic competence.
There exist, of course, works that argue convincingly that human linguistic abilities must include a pragmatic competence of sorts (e.g. Prince 1988a). But, even
accepting the reality of pragmatic competence, one serious question remains: What
kind of competence is a competence that includes knowledge of such diverse phenomena as illocution, discourse structure, reference resolution, implicature, empathy, and information packaging? It seems clear that we are not dealing with a single
component of our linguistic apparatus. It makes no sense to presume that, let us
say, the cognitive process responsible for illocutionary meaning interpretation is also
responsible for processing the segmentation of discourse chunks. There is no empirical or conceptual support for such a presumption, beyond the fact that both types
of structural phenomena involve contextual e ects of some sort.7
The `wastebasketness' of pragmatics is an artifact of our methodological division of labor. Lumping together all elements of linguistic structure that involve
contextual notions (Levinson 1983) or, similarly, all aspects of meaning that have
no truth-conditional e ects (Gazdar 1979) has been very useful in advancing our
understanding of the nonpragmatic phenomena of language. The result of such a
methodological approach, however, has been the enormous heterogeneity of pragmatics as an area of inquiry. Undoubtably, if we want to gain insight into the
pragmatic end of language, plausible subdomains of inquiry must be teased apart
and their role in the linguistic system and its relationship with other better-known
areas of linguistic competence must be studied. This is precisely what this study
attempts to do with respect to one such domain of inquiry: information packaging.
In what follows the pragmatic subdomain of information packaging will be introduced and dened. Also, it will be useful to give an overview of some of the di erent
domains of inquiry within current pragmatics, brie y outlining their object of study
and their relationship to information packaging.
Ward 1985:1, taking a pro-pragmatic-competence stance, also expresses his doubts about `a
unitary pragmatic competence' and states that `as research in pragmatics develops, it will become
increasingly possible to identify and classify the various types of extra-semantic contributions to
utterance interpretation'.
7
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2.2 Information Packaging
It has long been noticed that there are syntactic operations which are not triggered
by the need to satisfy any known `purely' structural requirements|like the Case
lter, agreement, or thematic structure|, and which are logico-semantically vacuous as well. These operations include topicalization, VP-preposing, left-dislocation,
right-dislocation, adverb-preposing, gapping, it-clefting, pseudo-clefting, heavy NPshift, and probably many others. A large number of studies, within the `functions
of syntax' approach, have pursued the task of establishing a raison d'^etre for all
these `non-structurally-motivated' syntactic operations. This raison d'^etre is generally called the `functional load' of a sentence. In fact, some of these studies claim
to have found functional loads for the existence of core syntactic operations like
passive, NP-raising, tough-movement, relativization, and so on. Among the many
valuable examples of this kind of work are Bolinger 1954, 1972, Hatcher 1956, Firbas 1964, Halliday 1967, Kuno 1972, 1987, Gundel 1974, 1985, Creider 1979, Wilson
& Sperber 1979, Green 1980, Prince 1978, 1986, Givon 1983, Silva-Corvalan 1983,
Ward 1985, Lambrecht 1987, 1988, and Valimaa-Blum 1988, even though the list
could evidently be much longer.8
Following many of these works (e.g. Halliday 1967, Chafe 1976, Prince 1981a,
1984, 1986, Ward 1985, Valimaa-Blum 1988), functional load may be viewed as a
packaging or structuring of the information contained in sentential structures. This
packaging re ects the speaker's beliefs about how this information ts the hearer's
knowledge-store. The term information packaging is used in this study to denote this nonsyntactic non-logico-semantic structuring of sentences. Information
packaging can be thought to be part of the `meaning' of sentences, if `meaning' is
understood in a generous way as encompassing several distinct types of interpretation necessary in achieving full understanding of sentences. In other words, the
successful interpretation of sentences requires not only the interpretation of logicosemantic meaning|generally referred to as just meaning in its narrow sense|but
Within a dierent linguistic tradition, there are a number of works that have looked at these
`functionally-motivated' constructions from a purely syntactic point of view: Akmajian 1979(1970),
Chomsky 1971, 1976, Gueron 1980, Kiss 1981, Williams 1981, Huang 1982, Culicover & Rochemont
1983, Selkirk 1984 (these two last works deal with the phonological interface as well), Solan 1984,
Horvath 1986, Rochemont 1986, 1989, inter alia.
8
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also, at least, the interpretation of informational meaning.
The notion of information packaging was explicitly introduced by Chafe 1976:
I have been using the term packaging to refer to the kind of phenomena at issue here, with the idea that they have to do primarily with how
the message is sent and only secondarily with the message itself, just as
the packaging of toothpaste can a ect sales in partial independence of
the quality of the toothpaste inside (1976:28).
Prince (1981a, 1986, among others) picks up Chafe's packaging idea and states
that speakers `tailor sentences in various ways to (their assumptions about) their
interlocutors' (1988:1) or, in more detail:
Information in a discourse does not correspond simply to an unstructured set of propositions rather, speakers seem to form their utterances
so as to structure the information they are attempting to convey, usually or perhaps always in accordance with their beliefs about the hearer:
what s/he is thought to know, what s/he is expected to be thinking
about. (1986:208)
Our use of the rubric `information packaging', however, di ers in some respects
from Chafe's and Prince's. Chafe 1976 uses the term in a generally vague way. It
comprises not only the notions dealt with here, but also other re exes of the speaker's
attitude towards the event reported in the sentence, i.e. empathy, contrast, and a
notion of `subjecthood'. Empathy is totally di erent from information packaging
as understood here. Hopefully this will become clear in the following discussion.
Contrast, following Prince 1984, is most likely a derived notion and not a primitive.
This issue will be addressed below in x 4.3.2. As for Chafe's subjecthood, it will not
be dealt with at all here.
The term information packaging as used by Prince has a wider coverage as
well (cf. Prince 1988c, for instance). Information packaging is used to designate
both the formal marking of sentences to indicate the speaker's beliefs about the
hearer's knowledge and attentional state|information packaging (her informationstructure)|and the formal marking of NPs to indicate the status of discourse entities with respect to the discourse model|referential status (her information-status).
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Prince, however, is careful to point out that `the two levels are mutually independent, though statistical relationships may exist between them' (1988c:1).
We have thus taken the term `information packaging' and reduced its coverage
to only one of the two `levels' in Prince 1988c, namely her `information-structure'.
The reason is twofold rst, the term `information structure' is used with a di erent
meaning in Chapter 6, and information packaging seems actually a better designator
of the phenomenon we are trying to account for second, in agreement with ValimaaBlum 1988, it seems that the use of the term `information' for both NP-level and
sentence-level phenomena is potentially misleading, especially when the phenomena
to be distinguished are so closely related (cf. x 2.3.2 for discussion).
Our conception of information packaging is a literal interpretation of the notion of `packaging'. Namely, information packaging|the structuring or packaging
of information|is taken to consist of a small set of instructions with which a
speaker directs a hearer to retrieve the information encoded in a sentence and enter
it into her/his knowledge-store. The purpose of information packaging is precisely
to optimize the entry of data into the hearer's knowledge-store.
Before moving on, the use of the term information in this study needs some
clarication. Information, quoting Dretske 1981, `is that commodity capable of
yielding knowledge, and what information a signal carries is what we can learn from
it' (1981:44). Dretske's view of information, taken from the notion of information in
information theory, will be adapted for our purposes: two sentences with the same
propositional content may carry di erent information in di erent speaker-hearer
interactions depending on how much of that propositional content is unknown by
the hearer at the time of utterance. Let us illustrate this with the following example.
Suppose a speaker has the knowledge represented by the proposition in (5) and
wishes to communicate it.
(5)

hates (broccoli, the boss)

The speaker will encode this proposition in a sentence and will utter it so that
the hearer may incorporate this knowledge into her/his knowledge-store. Suppose
further that the speaker, in separate occasions, communicates the proposition in
(5) to two di erent hearers: a) to a hearer H1, who at the time of utterance knows
nothing about or is not attending to the boss' relation to broccoli, and b) to a
14

hearer H2, who at the time of utterance knows that there exists a relation between
the boss and broccoli (and is attending to it) without knowing what the relation
is. A sentence encoding proposition (5) will carry di erent information in the case
of H2 than in the case of H1. In H1's situation, the information of the sentence is,
given the salient existence of the boss, that he hates broccoli. In H2's situation,
the information of the sentence is, given a salient relation between the boss and
broccoli, that this relation is `hate'. The contribution of knowledge to the hearer's
knowledge-store made by (5) is smaller in the case of H2, despite the fact that the
proposition is the same in both situations.
Information, as viewed in information theory, is by denition a reduction of
uncertainty: the information carried by two sentences with equal propositional content is di erent when the reduction of uncertainty they bring along to the hearer's
knowledge-store is di erent. The incorporation of the proposition in (5) into the
hearer's knowledge-store represents a greater reduction of uncertainty in the case of
H1 than in the case of H2. H2's uncertainty is reduced by (5) only with respect to
the exact relation that holds between the boss and broccoli, since, before the time
of utterance, H2 knew that a relation between the two entities in question existed.
In contrast, H1 was uncertain not only about the relation that holds between the
boss and broccoli but also about the actual existence of a relation at all.9
The information of the sentence (Is) is, then, the part of the propositional content
(ps) that makes a contribution of knowledge to the hearer's knowledge-store, i.e.
that is not part of the knowledge of the hearer (Kh) at the time of utterance (or,
in information-theoretic terms, the part of the propositional content that reduces
uncertainty in the hearer's knowledge-store). This may be schematically represented
as in (6):
(6)

Is = ps ; Kh

If the entire propositional content makes a contribution of knowledge to the hearer's
knowledge store, the information of the sentence is equivalent to the propositional
content:
See Pierce: `The more we know about what message the source will produce, the less uncertainty, the less the entropy, and the less the information' (1961:23).
9

15

'$

p K
&%
h

(7)

Is = ps ; Kh = ps
If the propositional content makes no contribution to the hearer's knowledge-store,
the information of the sentence is null:10
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(8)

Is = ps ; Kh = 
Finally, if some of the propositional content of a sentence makes a contribution of information to the hearer's knowledge-store, the information of the sentence coincides
only with a subset of the knowledge encoded in that proposition:
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h

(9)

Is = ps ; Kh = , where 
ps
Information, then, unlike propositional content, is crucially dened with respect
to the particular hearer a sentence is addressed to. As noted, the information carried
by a sentence encoding the proposition in (5) is, roughly, `hates broccoli' for H1, but
`hates' for H2. Speakers are sensitive to these di erences in the hearer's knowledgestore and thus encode information in the structure of the sentences they produce.
This encoding of information is `information packaging'. A speaker of English, for
n

< n <

In Ch. 3 it is pointed out that sentences with zero information do not occur. In other words,
if (the speaker assumes) there is no contribution of knowledge there is no reason for the sentence
to exist.
10
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instance, when wishing to communicate (5), might do so with sentence (10)a in case
(a) (to hearer H1) but with sentence (10)b in case (b) (to hearer H2):11
(10)

a. The boss hates broccoli.
b. The boss hates broccoli.
This adaptation of Dretske's notion of information is in agreement with Dahl
1976 and Lyons 1977:33, who characterize information as a hearer-based contribution to sentence production and understanding. In fact, this notion of information
has several precedents in the literature. The notions progression and marche parallele
in Weil 1844 and Gabelentz's (1868) psychological articulation of the sentence seem
to be analogous to the articulation of information. The notion of communicative
dynamism (Dane!s 1968(1957), Firbas 1964, 1971) is also similar in that it suggests
that di erent sentence elements `contribute to the development of communication',
`push the communication forward' to di erent extents (Firbas 1964:270), i.e. some
elements are more communicative than others. If `contribution of knowledge', i.e.
information, is substituted for `contribution to the development of communication'
in the above quote, communicativeness can be equated to information.12
Another notion that seems analogous to the view of information in this study
is Erteschik-Shir's (1973, 1979, 1986) dominance. Dominance, which is reviewed
below in x 3.1.5, is a property that a constituent has if the speaker intends to direct
the attention of his/her hearer to the intension of that constituent (cf. ErteschikShir & Lappin 1983:420). There is no further specication of what `directing the
attention of the hearer to something' is, but, in a sense, one may say that the
constituent that encodes the information in the sentence is `dominant' in that it is
singled out by the packaging instruction. The hearer's attention, in some way, is
directed to that constituent as the carrier of the information of the sentence. Finally,
there is Sasse's (1987) `expectation', which he uses to redene the thetic/categorical
distinction of Brentano and Marty (cf. x 3.2.3). What has been called information
here is identied by Sasse as unexpected or contrary to expectation. The connection
Of course, here and in the above discussions, what matters is the speaker's assumptions about
the hearer's knowledge and attentional state, not the hearer's actual knowledge and attentional
state.
12In fact, as will be seen below, Firbas' rheme is equivalent to the focus of information in our
proposal. Communicative dynamism, however, is a continuum, but informationand its complement
in the sentence are discrete notions.
11
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between the notions of information and unexpectedness is clear.13
Sentences, then, are packaged in di erent ways according to the di erent information carried by the sentence. But, as pointed out, they must also guarantee that
that information is retrievable. In other words, the informational articulation of the
sentence indicates not only the information but also how this information must be
entered into the hearer's knowledge-store. In fact, as will be discussed in Ch. 4, the
role played by information and its packaging in language understanding concerns the
entry of data into the hearer's knowledge-store. Therefore, a sentence must specify
how and where in the hearer's knowledge-store the information of the sentence is
entered. A compact denition of information packaging may be stated as in (11):
(11)

information packaging: A small set of instructions with

which the hearer is instructed by the speaker to retrieve
the information carried by the sentence and enter it into
her/his knowledge-store.
Chapters 3 and 4 contain a discussion of the informational primitives proposed
in the literature, a proposal for a revised set of primitives, and the development
of an account of information packaging following the denition in (11). In order
to develop this account a number of notational decisions had to be made. It is
clear that other alternatives may be possible or even superior to describe the facts
under discussion with accuracy. Unlike in other research (i.e. standard syntactic or
semantic theory), in this study there will not be a strong defense of some of the
notational choices made. The study of the representation of information packaging
is at too early a stage to be able to perceive the advantages or disadvantages of
di erent notational variants with detail. Before going into this, however, other
types of pragmatic understanding will be reviewed.
Apparently, the rst time the term `information' was used to refer to issues we are dealing
with is in Halliday's (1967) `information structure'. It must also be noted that information is used
in the philosophical and linguistic literature with dierent meanings. For instance, information in
Situation Semantics is used in a general and nonlinguistic sense. The information conveyed by a
(linguistic or nonlinguistic) event is what we learn about a situation from that event. Information
is prior to language and the purpose of language is to convey information (Barwise & Perry
1983:29.). Our use of information, although originating in the same tradition, has a smaller
coverage, since it was dened as that part of the knowledge represented in a given proposition that
is unknown to the hearer. Information in Situation Semantics is also the knowledge we gain by
means of a sentence, but it is not restricted to the proposition encoded in that sentence (e.g. the
sentence The boss is short, in a context where the hearer believes short men do not like broccoli,
conveys the information, in the Situation Semantics sense, that the boss does not like broccoli).
13
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2.3 Discourse Pragmatics
The denition of pragmatics as the study of the aspects of linguistic structure affected by context presupposes a previously agreed-upon denition of `context'. By
`context', in theory, one refers to extralinguistic elements|like the users of language
and the time and place of utterance|that are relevant for language production and
understanding. Interestingly, though, due to the prevalent methodological practice
of focusing on the study of sentential grammar, the term `context' is also used to
refer to anything beyond the sentential level. Thus, discourse, understood as a cohesive sequence of sentences, while in principle as purely linguistic as a sentential
syntactic object, is referred to as `linguistic context' or `discourse context'. Notice,
however, that the extralinguistic context may a ect both sentential structure and
discourse structure.
First, we will consider pragmatic phenomena that concern the linguistic or discourse context and, second, we will look at `sentential pragmatics', i.e. nonlinguistic
contextual phenomena that a ect the structure of the sentence regardless of linguistic context.

2.3.1 Discourse Structure
As Chomsky 1980 points out, `linguistic knowledge, of course, extends beyond
the level of the sentence. We know how to construct discourses of various sorts,
and there are no doubt principles governing discourse structure' (1980:225). Precisely, through the study of discourse structure|a.k.a. discourse syntax, discourse
grammar|linguists try to ascertain what are the principles that underlie the wellformedness of discourses or texts and which is the appropriate way to organize
discourses into constituent units.14
Among the important contributions in this area are Grosz & Sidner 1986, Polanyi
1986, 1988, and Webber 1988. These works independently propose similar ways in
which discourses can be segmented into hierachical constituent structures. The
result is a tree-like representation where constituency re ects the chunking of the
discourse into sequences of related units. What gives these chunks their unity is their
Discourse structure is not related in any direct way to information packaging. Its inclusion
here is meant to provide a complete picture of discourse pragmatics.
14
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sharing a common purpose with respect to the speaker's plans (Grosz & Sidner 1986)
or their representing a single state of a airs (Polanyi 1988).15
A theory of discourse segmentation is necessary to account for textual coherence
and the non-permutability of sentences in a given discourse and the intuition that
sentences group together in suprasentential units. It has also been shown that
some discourse particles or cue phrases|well, anyway, ok|are used to signal the
beginning and end of discourse segments (Hockey 1989, Polanyi & Martin 1989).
Webber 1988 provides a formal treatment of `discourse deixis', i.e. reference to a
discourse segment, as illustrated by the that in (12),
(12)

It's always been presumed that when the glaciers receded, the area
got very hot. The Folsum men couldn't adapt, and they died out.
That's what is supposed to have happened. It's the textbook dogma.
But it's wrong. They were human and smart. They adapted their
weapons and culture, and they survived. (Webber 1988:ex. 1)
that depends on discourse segments having their own mental reality. Moreover, discourse segmentation seems necessary to account for reference phenomena, as argued,
for instance, by Grosz & Sidner (1986), whose theory of the structure of discourse
includes also a discourse-model-like component of `focus of attention' where notions like reference are dealt with. Apparently, the position of an element in the
hierarchical discourse structure determines the choice of referring expression in the
consequent mention of that element. Reference phenomena are dealt with in the
following section.

2.3.2 Reference Issues
It is clear that, as Prince 1988c puts it, `if a speaker evokes an entity in a discourse,
s/he rst hypothesizes the information-status of that entity in the hearer's mind,
with respect to both familiarity and saliency' (1988c:1).16 In other words, not all
entities that enter a discourse may be encoded alike in the linguistic structure, since
there are crucial di erences in the referential status of these entities. Entities may be
known to hearers but not salient at the time of utterance, they may be salient at the
Polanyi (1988) calls her theory of discourse structure a `discourse model'. Obviously, her use
is dierent from the use of `discourse model' in, for instance, Prince 1981b or Webber 1982 as a
hearer's mental model of the ongoing discourse containing entities, attributes, etc.
16As noted above, in Prince 1988c `information-status' means what referential status means here.
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time of utterance, they may be completely new to the hearer, they may be inferrable
from what the hearer knows, etc. These di erences in referential status determine
the linguistic shape of the referring expressions that refer to these entities: speakers
may use denite NPs, indenite NPs, pronouns, zero anaphora in some languages,
and so forth, depending on the status of the entities they encode.
Prince (1981b, 1988b) o ers a taxonomy of referential status and its impact
on the choice of referring expression. Prince 1988b, recasting her own `assumed
familiarity hierarchy' (Prince 1981b), introduces the following distinctions in the
referential status of discourse entities. On the one hand, entities may be discourseold or discourse-new: they may or may not be linguistically or contextually evoked,
i.e. already introduced in the current discourse. On the other hand, they may be
hearer-old or hearer-new, where hearer-old means already present in the hearer's
knowledge-store via the current discourse or via previous knowledge. This distinction yields three possible referential statuses: discourse-new/hearer-new (new to the
discourse and new to the hearer's knowledge-store), discourse-new/hearer-old (new
to the discourse but known via previous knowledge to the hearer), and discourseold/hearer-old (evoked in the discourse and therefore in the hearer's knowledgestore).17 This categorization captures in a simple manner the many denitions
of givenness and newness that have haunted the linguistic literature for decades
(Chafe-givenness, Clark-givenness, recoverability, conceptual deniteness, and so
on, as proposed or discussed in Halliday 1967, Kuno 1972, Haviland & Clark 1974,
Chafe 1976, Clark & Haviland 1977, among others). Prince's (1988b) categorization will be used here to refer to the referential status of discourse entities when
necessary.
An intimately related|actually overlapping|issue is the continuation of reference to a given entity once that entity has already entered the previous linguistic
context. That is, given a discourse model with several discourse entities, how do
we encode each one of them? How do we keep track of which referential expression refers to which discourse entity? This was, as noted, one of the concerns of
Grosz & Sidner (1986) and the main concern of Centering theory (cf. Grosz, Joshi
The cell discourse-old/hearer-new is obviously empty. In Prince 1981b discourse-new/hearernew was called brand-new, discourse-new/hearer-old was called unused, and discourse-old/hearerold was called evoked. `Inferrable' entities represent another referential status, but will not be
referred to here.
17

21

& Weinstein 1987 and related research). These theories provide an account of the
di erent degrees of saliency of discourse entities in the discourse model across the
text, i.e. how entities maintain or change their degree of saliency and how that affects their encoding in the linguistic structure. Another approach to this very same
issue, stemming from a very di erent linguistic tradition, is found in the work of
Givon (1983) and associates. Where Centering talks about degree of saliency, Givon
talks about topicality or topic continuity, but both approaches are strikingly similar
and share similar goals.18
Referential status is an absolute property of discourse entities, which is re ected
in English and many other languages through the formal marking of NPs. It concerns
the status of a given entity with respect to its presence or absence in the previous
discourse or the hearer's discourse model or knowledge-store, depending on the approach. Several authors have made a point of noting that referential status must be
teased apart from information packaging (cf. Reinhart 1982, Prince 1988c, ValimaaBlum 1988, Horn 1989, etc.). Other authors, however, dene information packaging
in terms of referential status (e.g. modern Prague School, Rochemont 1986). This
approach is problematic. Let us consider the discourse in (13):
(13)

a. The boss hates broccoli.
b. But vegetables are important in a balanced diet,
c. so he'll have to eat some anyway.
The discourse entity `the boss' is introduced into the discourse in (a), so at the time
(c) is uttered its referential status is discourse-old, i.e. given, and, furthermore, since
it was just introduced, we may assume it is salient. That is why, most approaches
would say, `the boss' is encoded in a pronominal form in (c) (he). Now, the referential
status of `the boss' at the time (c) is uttered is absolute: it is independent of the
sentential context in which the referential expression he appears. Moreover, even if
no mention of `the boss' was made in (c), this discourse entity would still be salient
and discourse-old at the time (c) is uttered.
Similar observations apply to discourse-new and hearer-new entities. In sentence
(14)b,
Givon (1986) is addressed again in Chapter 3 (x 3.1.2) to dispel any potential confusion between
his use of the term topic and the use of the term topic in the topic-comment framework.
18
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(14)

a. I was lost in the Colombian jungle.
b. Suddenly, I stumbled onto a broccoli plantation.
The referent of the NP a broccoli plantation is neither previously mentioned nor
hearer-old, i.e. it is not yet in the discourse model or in the hearer's knowledgestore. The indeniteness of the NP marks it as encoding a hearer-new entity. Again,
the referential status of the entity `broccoli plantation' in the expression a broccoli
plantation in (14) as hearer-new would be the same regardless of the actual sentence
in which it occurs.
Information packaging, in contrast, is an intrinsically relational notion. A focus,
for instance, is a focus only by virtue of its standing in a given relation to the other
elements of the sentence in a packaging instruction. Let us consider (15) and (16):19
(15)

a. Q: What is he going to have?
b. A: He'll have "F a broccoli quiche ] tonight.

(16)

a. Q: Are you and John coming out to dinner?
b. A: Oh, no. He's cooking broccoli,
c. so I'll "F stay home with him ] tonight.

The constituents a broccoli quiche and stay home with him are foci, they are the
informative part of the sentence. In (15)b, the speaker assumes the hearer knows and
is attending to something like `he is (or isn't) going to have something tonight'. With
(15)b, the speaker singles a broccoli quiche out as the conveyer of information, while
the remainder of the structure indicates to the hearer how to enter this information
into her/his knowledge-store eciently. Similarly, in (16)c, the speaker assumes the
hearer knows and is attending to something like `she'll be doing something tonight'.
Therefore, the speaker singles out stay home with him as the conveyor of information
within this particular sentence, i.e. the speaker assumes in this particular utterance
that, out of the propositional content of the sentence, only the predicate (minus the
adverbial) makes a contribution to the hearer's knowledge-store.
In principle, referential status has nothing to do with this. Referential status is
a re ection of the status of a given discourse entity with respect to the discourse
model or the hearer's knowledge-store. Whether a discourse entity is old or new
In the following examples `F ]' signals the focus of the sentence, while small caps still indicate
the prominent element within it. Brackets will be used below in cases where the focus is larger
than the element receiving prominence.
19
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is independent of its ability to be informative within a given propositional context,
i.e., to increase the knowledge of the hearer as a result of its standing in a particular
sentence. In (15)b the focus a broccoli quiche encodes a discourse-new entity, but
in (16)c the pronoun him, part of the focus, encodes the discourse-old entity `John'.
If information packaging is divorced from referential status, the ability of foci to be
either given or new is not surprising. Further evidence is provided by examples like
(17), where the focus is just a pronominal form:
(17)

"At a grocery's cash register]
a. S1:It's $1.20 ok Here's your change and here's your broccoli.
b. S2:Thank you.
c. S1:Thank you.
Such cases, so-called `contrastive focus' (e.g. Rochemont 1986), are fairly common.
There is no sense in which you in (17)c can be considered hearer- or discourse-new,
but you is the focus nevertheless.20 The speaker assumes thanking (or not thanking)
somebody is already being attended to by the hearer. The information conveyed by
(17)c is exclusively located on you, which is thus properly singled out.
Consider also cases where the informative part of the utterance is not a referential
expression but a predicate:
:::

(18)

:::

The boss hates broccoli.

In what sense can one say that hates is hearer-new? If focus is dened in terms of
newness one is forced to state counterintuitively that hates in (18) is hearer-new (cf.
Ward 1985, where this is also pointed out). And compare minimal pairs like (19),
where the adverb tonight has a di erent information-packaging force in (a) and in
(b), although its referential status is presumably the same:
(19)

a. Guess what! John's coming tonight.
b. Guess what! John's cooking tonight.
In (a) the speaker presumably assumes that John's coming sooner or later is in
the hearer's knowledge-store and that tonight is informative with respect to this
It may be said, as in Prince 1981a, 1986 (see x 3.1.4), that the referent of you is not new in
absolute terms, but rather that what is new is the fact that you is what appears in the position of
in the context `thank ' in (c). This is correct and `newness' here is equivalent to `information'
in our analysis. `Newness' in this sense is denitely void of its meaning as a referential-status label.
20
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knowledge. In (b), on the other hand, John's engaging in some activity tonight is
presumably assumed to be uninformative, but cooking is assumed to be a contribution to the hearer's knowledge-store with respect to this knowledge about John and
tonight. This, of course, is independent of whether the speaker assumes the entity
`tonight' is in the hearer's knowledge-store or not (most likely s/he does). Clearly,
a referential view of information packaging is at a loss in both (18) and (19) and
the need for a relational notion becomes evident.
As noted above, von Stechow 1981 and Reinhart 1982 share the view that information packaging cannot be dened in terms of referential status.21 Reinhart
provides the following example:
(20)

a. Who did Felix praise?
b. Felix praised himself. (Reinhart 1982:ex. 37)
The referential expressions Felix and himself refer to one and the same entity `Felix'.
Nevertheless, Felix is, following Reinhart, the topic of (20)b, while himself is the
focus. It would seem, then, that the entity `Felix' is marked as being new just
after it has been introduced, but, as von Stechow points out, `the information of
a constituent like himself qua focus is not a referent' (1981:97). Identifying the
information-packaging force of a constituent cannot be done on the basis of the
referential status of the entity it represents.
Another well-known information-packaging notion is the topic. Reinhart argues
at length that topichood cannot be viewed as a property of referents either (1982:x5).
She says that, since elements other than the topic may encode discourse-old referents,
it is insucient to state that oldness is what identies topics. Furthermore, she
derives the fact that topics `strongly tend' to be discourse-old from independent
reasons having to do with discourse cohesion. Notice, though, that topics need not
be discourse-old in the strict sense of the word, as (21)b shows:
(21)

a. I can't nd broccoli anywhere.
b. Crack they sell at every corner,
but broccoli it's like they don't grow it anymore.
The topicalized NP crack in (21)b, while a topic, is not discourse-old in the sense
of being already evoked in the previous discourse. It is true that the entity `crack'
21

Von Stechow 1981 actually draws from a prepublication draft of Reinhart 1982.

25

acquires some discourse-oldness by virtue of its standing in some relation to the
discourse-old entity `broccoli', but the `discourse-oldness' of `crack' is quite peculiar
and clearly deviant from the traditional meaning of givenness.22
Whether topichood is a property of constituents or referents or both is actually
not very clear. What seems unjustied, following Reinhart, is to assume that the
discourse task of topics is to mark or signal the referents they encode as hearerold. The data, as viewed by Reinhart 1982, Valimaa-Blum 1988, Horn 1989, and
others, suggest that the hearer-oldness of a discourse entity encoded by a given
linguistic expression may be a necessary condition for that expression to become a
topic, but it is clearly not a sucient condition. If topics are hearer-old it is because
discourse-oldness is a pre-condition for topichood, not because topichood is a marker
of discourse-oldness in the strict sense.
Referential status and information packaging are distinct, i.e., the givenness/newness distinction and information-packaging notions like focus and topic are orthogonal to each other. However, given the nature of both phenomena and their intimate
relationship within the linguistic apparatus, there are clear correlations between the
two. Once the account of information packaging in Chapter 4 is introduced, the
distinction between referential status and information packaging will be discussed
further.

2.3.3 The Discourse Model
Pioneering work in this area was done by Karttunen (1971), where the idea of
`discourse referent'|later renamed discourse entity|was introduced as a mental
construct. This notion, as a mediation between referring expression and real-world
referents, is extremely useful in accounting for some long-observed problems in all
theories of reference encoding and resolution.
But the notion of discourse entity is generally not considered to be an isolated
mental construct. Many approaches to reference place the discourse entity within
a larger mental construct called the discourse model. A discourse model is a parWard 1985, and Ward & Prince 1986 identify the peculiar relation between `crack' and `broccoli'
as a partially ordered set (poset) relation. Identity|when the referent of a topic expression
is identical to a previously evoked entity, i.e. traditional givenness|is just one of many poset
relations. This approach will be discussed below in x 4.3.2.
22
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ticipant's evolving model of the discourse and contains a mental representation not
only of the entities involved in the current discourse but also of their attributes
and the links between them. Webber 1982, for instance, thinks of discourse entities
as mental hooks on which attributes are hung. Discourse models have been used
extensively to provide a formalization for the distinction between salient entities,
nonsalient entities, and discourse-new/hearer-old entities.
Another view of discourse models is found in the work of Kamp 1981 and Heim
1983. Their theories are a hybrid between a dynamic truth-conditional semantics
and a true theory of the discourse model. Kamp's discourse representation structures
(DRSs) and Heim's le-change semantics provide both a discourse-model account of
deniteness and a suprasentential method of truth-value computation. Despite this
hybrid character, Heim's les and le cards seem to be analogous to Webber's (1982)
discourse model and its hooklike entities. Each le card represents a discourse entity,
and attributes and links with other entities are written on the card in the same way
attributes are hung from Webber's hooks. Indenites cause hearers to open a new
le card (add a new hook) and denites to retrieve a di erent but already existing le
card (or hook). Heim's le card metaphor will be used in Chapter 4 to describe the
hearer's knowledge-store. Kamp's DRSs, however, cannot be equated with Webber's
hooks in any straightforward way but seem to be constructs that re ect some or all
of the functions assigned to a discourse model as viewed above, have some of the
characteristics of discourse segmentation and structure, and contain an alternative
notation to represent logico-semantic operators of the traditional type.

2.4 Sentential Pragmatics
The pragmatic issues discussed in this section are of a di erent type in that the linguistic unit they concern is not the discourse but the sentence. These phenomena|
actual-world felicity, empathy, illocution, and implicature|are pragmatic in that
they all involve the context of utterance in a crucial way,23 but the linguistic e ects
It is actually unclear whether all types of implicature involve the context of utterance. Conventional implicature and generalized conversational implicature, in particular, can be accounted
for independently of the language users and the time and place of utterance, but since their contribution to meaning is non-truth-conditional, they are traditionally considered part of pragmatics
(cf. Horn 1989:Ch. 2, Levinson 1983:Ch. 3).
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they have are primarily felt at the sentential level, both in sentence structure and
sentence in interpretation.
Some of these are more relevant to the topic of this dissertation than others.
The relevance of each of the issues will be noted in each section.

2.4.1 Actual-world Felicity
It has been traditionally considered one of the central tasks of pragmatic inquiry to
determine the set of contexts in which a given sentence may be uttered appropriately
or felicitously (cf. Austin 1962, Lyons 1977). The felicity or infelicity of a given sentence is the result of several di erent factors. For instance, it may be infelicitous due
to wrong referential encoding, the presence of contradictory empathy relationships,
the encoding of implicata that cannot coexist with certain truth-conditional readings, or the use of unwarranted packaging instructions. To obtain acceptable utterances, therefore, the satisfaction of these linguistically-motivated felicity conditions
is as important as the satisfaction of purely syntactic grammaticality requirements.
Nevertheless, there exists another kind of felicity condition which is clearly not
linguistically based. Sometimes, sentences that are syntactically, semantically, and
linguistico-pragmatically perfect still sound unacceptable when used in most contexts. The reason is that the contextual nonlinguistic conditions that we would need
to make the sentence felicitous are never or rarely present in the world as we know
it, which makes the sentence practically unusable or, equivalently, pragmatically
unlikely. This kind of felicity may be called `actual-world felicity'.
Actual-world felicity, in fact, has no bearing whatsoever on the structural properties of language. However, it deserves mention here because in Chapter 7 this notion
will be used in providing an account of the rarity of a certain type of sentences (sentences containing an exhaustiveness operator in non-association with focus) which
our analysis predicts are syntactically and informationally well-formed.
Interestingly, one can nd in the recent linguistic literature accounts along these
lines of several syntactic and semantico-pragmatic phenomena. For instance, Kroch
1989 argues that the putatively ungrammatical long wh-extraction from `non-referential' adjuncts (cf. Cinque 1989, Rizzi 1989), as in (22),
(22)

(*)How much money was John wondering whether to pay?
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is not ungrammatical at all. The reason for their awkwardness is that the existential
claim presupposed by this sentence|that there existed a sum of money about which
John was wondering whether to pay it|is possible but very odd, which renders the
question in (22) unusable under most actual-world circumstances.
Similarly, Searle 1989 o ers a radical revision of the traditional analysis of performative verbs, in which the infelicity of (23)
(23)

# I hereby fry an egg.

is not due to any inherent linguistic property of the verb fry, but to the fact that
in the world as we know it, we cannot fry an egg by just saying that we fry an egg,
even though an English-speaking almighty creature of sorts could clearly fry an egg
by uttering (23).

2.4.2 Empathy
Empathy as a pragmatic component or perspective is basically dened and studied in
Kuno & Kaburaki 1977 and Kuno 1987. Chafe 1976 also refers to this phenomenon
using the term `point of view', and his are the examples in (24), which illustrate the
kind of data empathy sets out to account for:
(24)

a. John hit his wife.
b. Mary's husband hit her. (Chafe 1976:54)
While (24)a describes the facts from John's side, (24)b describes the facts from
Mary's side. The speaker empathizes either with John (in (24)a) or with Mary (in
(24)b). Kuno denes empathy as `the speaker's identication, which may vary in
degree, with a person/thing that participates in the event or state that he describes
in a sentence' (1987:206), and along this denition he sets a number of constraints
to account for the infelicity of certain sentences like (25),
(25)

# Mary's husband hit his wife.

which violate his ban on con icting empathy foci within one sentence.
Kuno draws a convincing analogy between empathy and movie-making. The
speaker is like a lm director who can choose the location of the camera: given
a scene involving A and B, the director can choose a neutral angle, can place the
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camera closer to A (empathizing with A), or place it closer to B (empathizing with
B). This notion of empathy seems relevant even for the use of some contrasting
lexical items which re ect empathy relations, such as come/go and bring/take. Finally, choice of deictic elements (here/there or this/that) could also be thought of
as re ecting speakers empathy or, metaphorically, the positioning of a camera over
the event they report.
There is a denite intuitive appeal behind the notion of empathy and a lot of
lexical, morphological, and syntactic properties can be derived from it. Nevertheless, empathy falls outside the scope of this study. The reason for its inclusion
in this chapter is that Chafe, as noted in x 2.2, includes empathy under the label
`information packaging'. Information packaging as dened in this study excludes
empathy. Empathy, being the expression of speaker identication with a discourse
participant, is unrelated to information packaging as dened above.

2.4.3 Illocution
Beyond the mere locutionary act carried out in uttering a sentence with a given
meaning, there is always an illocutionary act. The illocutionary force conventionally
associated with a sentence utterance, i.e. what we do by means of a locutionary act,
clearly a ects sentence structure. Di erent illocutionary forces|announcements,
assertions, questions, commands, denials, requests, exclamations, etc. (cf. Levinson
1983: Ch. 5)|have di erent structural e ects on the syntax, the phonology, or both,
and must, therefore, be coherently represented at some level.
Pioneering work on illocution was done from within the philosophical tradition
by Austin (1962) and Searle (1969). A recent proposal by Jacobs (1984, 1986)
includes the addition of an interpretive level for illocutionary meaning to our model
of linguistic competence. In principle, illocution has very little in common with the
topic of this study, but it is precisely Jacobs' work which motivates the inclusion
of illocution here. Jacobs (1984, 1986) suggests that certain information-packaging
notions are represented at the level of illocution.
Illocution, however, has to do with what kind of speech act is performed when a
sentence is uttered. We may perform an act of commanding, requesting, denying a
previous statement, and so on. Information packaging has to do with the information
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carried by a given sentence at a given time-point. In principle, these two aspects of
sentential `meaning' appear to be mutually independent. Some confusion may arise,
however, from the ambiguity of the term `assertion' as used both with an illocutionrelevant sense and as an informationally-relevant notion. To `assert' as a speech act
is based on Russell's (1905) use of the term with the sense of committing oneself
to the truth of the statement one is uttering. Thus, when speakers Russell-assert
sentence (26),
(26)

The boss ate broccoli on Monday.

they commit themselves to the truth of the boss' having eaten broccoli on Monday.
Jacobs (1984, 1986) proposes that informational notions like topic and focus be
represented at the level of illocutionary meaning. He views the focus of a sentence
as the `focus of the assertion'. Whatever this means, it is obvious that Jacobs is
not using the term `assertion' in the Russellian sense of the word. When uttering a
sentence like (27), where broccoli is the focus,
(27)

The boss ate broccoli on Monday.

speakers carry out the same Russell-assertion they carried out in uttering (26).
When Jacobs states that (26) and (27) assert di erent things he is using `assert'
more in the sense of Stalnaker 1979. As will be seen below in x 3.1.4, for Stalnaker `assertion' is a reduction of the context set, i.e. a contribution of information.
Including Jacobs' notion of assertion into the list of speech acts, however, would signicantly stretch the denition of speech act, since it does not seem natural to view
information packaging as belonging to the same class of acts as requests, commands,
announcements, etc.24

2.4.4 Implicature
Ever since the seminal work of Grice (1975) implicature has enjoyed a central status
within the eld of pragmatics. In order to preserve the truth-conditional approach
Jacobs' line of argument is very interesting. He starts with cases in which focus is apparently
associated with a scalar particle like only or even and licenses these foci, his `bound foci', by virtue
of their being bound to the scalar particle (see Ch. 7, where it is argued that this kind of association
is only an epiphenomenon). He then needs to nd a binder to license his `free foci'|normal foci
that do not occur with a scalar particle|and he resorts to an abstract illocutionary `assertion'
operator to perform the task.
24
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to meaning that logical semantics had adopted, Grice suggests that the di erences
that exist between most logical operators in rst-order logic and their natural language counterparts are to be accounted for by additional pragmatic mechanisms that
operate above logical semantics. The gap between logic and natural language operators is bridged by a single principle, the Cooperative Principle, that comprises four
maxims of conversation: the maxims of quality, quantity, relevance, and manner.
See Levinson 1983, Green 1989, and Horn 1989 for surveys of the Gricean maxims and their coverage, and Horn 1984 and Sperber & Wilson 1986 for important
modications of Grice's original proposals.
Observance and deliberate outing of Grice's maxims is what generates all the
interpretive inferences above logico-semantic meaning that we call (conversational)
implicatures.25 Among the best studied cases (cf. Gazdar 1979, Atlas & Levinson
1981, Horn 1981, 1984, Hirschberg 1985, etc.) we nd scalar implicature (if speakers
assert that a given point in a given scale obtains, they also implicate that a higher
point does not obtain), clausal implicature (given the assertion of a weak claim,
we obtain the implicature that a stronger claim cannot be asserted at this point),
and exhaustiveness (if speakers assert, in certain contexts, that `something' about
a given entity is the case, they also implicate that the same `something' is not the
case about another entity in the same salient set).
Implicature is responsible for many linguistic contrasts at the lexical, morphological, and syntactic level (cf. Horn 1981, Rubino 1987), from the presence of
discourse particles like in fact to the morphology of re exives in some languages
and, partly, for the existence of constructions like it-clefts, under some analyses (cf.
Atlas & Levinson 1981). But our interest in implicature here stems from a crucial
di erence that exists between it and another area of pragmatic interpretation, information packaging. It has been argued (Atlas & Levinson 1981, Levinson 1983) that
implicatures cannot be obtained directly from uninterpreted surface syntactic strucConventional implicatures, in Grice's original formulation, are not obtained with the use of the
maxims but are attached by convention to particular lexical items. So, for example, the `contrast'
implicature in (i)
25

(i) He's poor but honest.
is conventionally attached to the lexical item but. With some additional assumptions, however,
conventional implicatures can be made to follow from the maxims in the same way conversational
implicatures do.
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tures but have to be derived from logico-semantic structures. If this is correct, the
interpretive component in which implicatures are computed and interpreted must
be linked, in the model of linguistic competence, not to the syntax but to the truthconditional, logico-semantic component. In fact, Atlas & Levinson 1981 suggest
that implicatures be consistently incorporated into the logical form of sentences.
As noted above, our working assumption is that logico-semantic meaning is relevant for information packaging only indirectly. Of course, there would be no information without the existence of propositional content. However, it is not necessary
that information packaging bleed logico-semantic meaning, since surface syntactic
structure may feed both information packaging and logical semantics in parallel. In
other words, the sentence is structured to encode both propositional content and
information simultaneously. If this approach is correct, there exists an important
di erence between implicature and information packaging: while the pragmatic understanding obtained from implicatures lies beyond logico-semantic meaning, the
pragmatic understanding obtained from information packaging is interpreted along
with, not after, logico-semantic meaning.

2.5 Summary
Pragmatics is a eld of inquiry with a very wide scope. Under the label `pragmatic
competence' linguists subsume phenomena that in fact belong to di erent modules
of our linguistic apparatus. When the phenomena surveyed here are incorporated
into our linguistic competence with precision, it is obvious that they cannot possibly
all t within one `pragmatic component'.
The focus of this study, information packaging, is just one of the linguistic modules currently studied under pragmatics. In consequence, the account of information
packaging presented here should not be expected to account for every pragmatic
aspect of language understanding. As dened, information packaging has a very
specic role in language understanding and production, and only matters relevant
to this role should be taken into account when building up a theory. Of course,
which matters are actually relevant is ultimately an empirical question.
Several other interpretive components of language will, of course, be in close relation to informatics, and all sorts of indirect interactions and statistical correlations
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should be expected. In particular, one should expect interaction between informatics and the referential status of discourse entities and logical semantics. The existing
literature on these issues conrms these expectations.
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Chapter 3
Informational Articulations: An
assessment
In x 3.1 the several informational articulations put forward in the literature are critically reviewed. The discussion in x 3.2 contains a global evalution of their insights
and shortcomings and, based on this evaluation, a trinomial hierarchical articulation is proposed. Finally, the di erences and similarities between the hierarchical
trinomial articulation and previous approaches are discussed.26

3.1 Previous Approaches
A number of proposals for the informational articulation of the sentence|sometimes
incompatible|are found in the literature. The di erences among them are significant but they can be grouped, as will be done below, in two larger approaches.
What all the approaches have in common is the recognition that in the sentence
there is some sort of informational split between a more informative part and a less
informative part. Where that split is and what kind of split it is|a continuum or
a dichotomy|is a matter of disagreement, but the split is nevertheless present. In
our terms, it could be said that information is concentrated on a subpart of the sentence, while the remainder is licensed only as an anchoring vehicular frame for that
informative part to guarantee an optimal entry into the hearer's knowledge-store.
In the next sections, the following approaches will be reviewed, pointing out their
di erences, their similarities, their insights, and their shortcomings:
Some of the issues discussed in this chapter were the topic of a paper presented at the 1990
International Pragmatics Conference in Barcelona, July 9-13.
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 theme-rheme (Ammann 1928, Dane!s 1968(1957), Firbas 1964, 1971, 1975,
Halliday 1967, Contreras 1976).

 topic-comment (Mathesius 1915, Hockett 1958, Strawson 1964, Gundel 1974,

1988, Dahl 1974, Li & Thompson 1976, Kuno 1980, Reinhart 1982, Davison
1984).

 topic-focus (Sgall & Haji!cova 1977-78 and many others by them and their
associates (cf. Haji!cova 1984 for a relation), von Stechow 1981).

 focus-presupposition or focus/open-proposition (Akmajian 1970(1979), Chom-

sky 1971, Jackendo 1972, Dahl 1974, Rochemont 1978, 1986, Wilson & Sperber 1979, Williams 1981, Prince 1981a, 1984, 1986, Selkirk 1984, Ward 1985,
Lambrecht 1987, 1988, Valimaa-Blum 1988).

 dominance (Erteschik-Shir 1973, 1979, 1986, Erteschik-Shir & Lappin 1979,
1983).

The shortcomings these proposals contain can be classied into two types: denitional problems and incomplete empirical coverage. Both types are discussed for
each one of the approaches.

3.1.1 Theme-Rheme
The terms thema and rhema, according to Haji!cova 1984:190, were introduced by
Ammann 1928. In the theme-rheme perspective, the rheme is the informative part
of the utterance, and the theme is the anchoring or vehicular part. While the
authors that work in this framework, listed above, agree in this respect, they also
use the term `theme' is di erent ways. There are, at least, two `themes', that will be
called Firbas-theme and Halliday-theme. Firbas 1964, 1971 and Dane!s 1968(1957)
operate with the notion of `communicative dynamism' (cf. x 2.2 above) dened as
a continuum into which all sentence elements fall. Firbas asserts that `the theme is
constituted by the sentence element (or elements) carrying the lowest degree(s) of
communicative dynamism within the sentence' (1964:272). It is, therefore, the least
informative part of the sentence. The rheme pushes the communication forward the
most and may be viewed as the informative part of the sentence. Contreras' (1976)
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theme-rheme articulation is taken directly from Firbas', although he does away with
the continuum in favor of a discrete dichotomy.
For Halliday, the theme `is what is being talked about, the point of departure
for the clause as a message', and it is `what comes rst in the clause' (1967:212).
Halliday illustrates this with the three sentences in (28) (1967:212),
(28)

a. John saw the play yesterday.
b. Yesterday John saw the play.
c. The play John saw yesterday.
where, in his view, the themes are, respectively, John, yesterday, and the play. In
Halliday's system, the rheme is dened merely as the complement of the theme.
Firbas-theme and Halliday-theme may coincide in a given sentence, but they need
not. Firbas, for example, is careful to remark that it is wrong to consistently associate the theme with the beginning of the sentence (1964:274), which enters in clear
con ict with Halliday's assumptions.27
Even without understanding the full implications and technicalities of Firbas's
and Halliday's theories, one can appreciate the di erence between their two interpretations of the notion theme. Interestingly, a Firbas-theme is more or less analogous to the topic in the topic-focus framework, while a Halliday-theme is almost
equivalent to the topic in the topic-comment framework. Given these equivalences,
then, we will subsume the discussion of theme-rheme under the discussion of each
of these, pointing out the relevant di erences between either theme and either topic
as needed.

3.1.2 Topic-Comment
Along with the focus-presupposition approach, it is one of the most widely found
in modern American linguistics. They are mutually (partially) incompatible. Unfortunately, the term `topic' has been used in the literature with a multiplicity of
denotations. This has led to important misunderstandings. Before moving on, in
order to try to avoid confusion, some uses of the term `topic' that will not be dealt
with here should be mentioned.

Halliday's (1967) system is extremely complex. He also invokes the notions `given' and `new',
and develops a theory of information units that interact with the syntactic structure of the sentence
in intrincate ways.
27
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First, there is the notion of discourse topic (Keenan-Ochs & Schie elin 1976,
Bayer 1980): a given text is understood as being about a certain proposition or a
certain discourse entity, which is the topic of that text. This is a suprasentential notion, with no relevance for sentential structure, even though the topic of a discourse
may be linguistically represented in one or more of the sentences in that discourse.28
Second, there is Givon's (1983) topicality. Topicality is a property that all
participants in a discourse possess to a larger or a lesser degree. The degree of
topicality|also called continuity|of a referent will determine the way it is encoded by referential expressions as well as, Givon claims, word order. In Chapter 2,
Givon's topicality was included in x 2.3.2, since the theory of topic continuity actually deals with referential status of entities with respect to their presence in the
previous discourse and not with information packaging of propositions as dened
above.29 The most topical referents need the `weakest' encoding|zero-anaphora or
pronominalization|and the least topical the strongest|indenite NPs. Comparisons with Givon's topic will be drawn as needed through this discussion.
Let us now focus on the topic-comment articulation. Mathesius 1915, one of
the precursors of the notion of `aboutness', articulates the sentence into what the
speaker wants to speak about, the topic, and what is to be said about this topic (cf.
Haji!cova 1984). About four decades later, Hockett 1958 arms that `the most general characteristic of predicative constructions is suggested by the terms \topic" and
\comment" for their ICs "immediate constituents]: the speaker announces a topic
and then says something about it' (1958:201), and illustrates it with the sentences
in (29), where the vertical line (j) separates the topic from the comment:

a. John j ran away.
b. That new book by Thomas Guernsey j I haven't read yet.
It is precisely the shared notion of `aboutness' which underlies these two views that
is crucial in the make-up of the topic-comment approach. The topic is what the
sentence is about the comment what we say about it. Example (29)a is about
(29)

See Valimaa-Blum 1988 for discussion of the dierence between sentential topic and discourse
topic and an interpretation of the latter as a psychological Gestalt.
29Amidst the terminological maze around `topic' and the inescapable confusion that comes with
it, it is nice to observe that while Givon and associates talk about the `topicality' of a constituent,
the workers in the topic-comment framework talk about its `topichood', reecting the fact that
they are talking about two dierent things.
28
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John, i.e. John is the topic, and the comment is that he ran away.
This notion is extremely widespread and is used in many accounts of word order
variation in the most diverse languages (cf. Gundel 1987 and Herring 1990 for a
crosslinguistic survey). Pragmatic aboutness, as we know it now, is rst outlined
within the philosophical tradition in Strawson 1964 and rst adopted into linguistic
research in a systematic way by Gundel 1974.30 Up to this point, however, the only
denition available for aboutness was that of Mathesius and Hockett or variations
on it.31
Reinhart 1982 notices that the notion of pragmatic aboutness needs explication. She adopts Strawson's (1964) insights, but she further combines them with
the pragmatic analysis of assertions in Stalnaker (1978), incorporating his idea of
`context set' into her explication of aboutness. She suggests that the context set|
Stalnaker's set of propositions accepted to be true at a given time by speaker and
hearer in common|is organized and classied in some way by speakers and it is
in this classication that topics play a role: `sentence-topics, within this view, are
one of the means available in the language to organize, or classify the information
exchanged in linguistic communication|they are signals for how to construct the
context set, or under which entries to classify the new proposition' (1982:24). For
Reinhart, then, a topic represents an address or a le card|she explicitly uses this
metaphor|under which the oncoming information, i.e. the comment, is stored or
classied in the context set.32
In the sentences in (29), for instance, the propositions John ran away and I
haven't read that new book by Thomas Guernsey yet would be classied in the context
set under John and that new book by Thomas Guernsey, respectively. Notice that
Reinhart's system, within which topics play a role, is, in a sense, reminiscent of
Independently, and stemming directly from Mathesius', Firbas', and Halliday's work, the notion of `theme' or `topic' is found in Kuno 1972 and Dik 1978, for instance.
31See, for example, the denition of topic in Gundel 1988:210, an elaboration on the notion of
`aboutness':
`An entity, E, is the topic of a sentence, S, i in using S the speaker intends to
increase the addressee's knowledge about, request information about, or otherwise
get the addressee to act with respect to E.'
30

Reinhart's adaptation of Stalnaker's context set substantially alters his original conception of
the notion.
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the approach to information packaging presented in this dissertation. Both analyses
use the idea of information retrieval and entry and both make use of the vision of
`topic' as an address of sorts. The di erence between the two analyses are several
and important and will become apparent as our analysis is developed (cf. x 3.2).
Despite these di erences, however, Reinhart's contribution provides us with a more
explicit denition of what topichood is.33
All the cases of topic seen so far have in common that the topic phrase is sentenceinitial: it is either the subject or a preposed, `topicalized' phrase. In fact, the
sentence-initial position for preposed constituents is called the `topic slot'. According
to Gundel 1988, for instance, any constituent found in this slot must be interpreted
as the topic of the sentence. It is not the case, however, that the topic of the sentence
has to be encoded in sentence-initial position. Any (referential) phrase in a sentence
is allowed to be the topic of that sentence, depending on the interpretation intended
(cf. Reinhart 1982, Davison 1984, Gundel 1988).34 In a sentence like (30),
(30)

Rosa is standing near Felix. (Reinhart 1982, ex. 24)

the topic could be, depending on the context, either Rosa or Felix (even though
Reinhart points out that Felix is an `unexpected' topic).
Now, the main problem with the topic-comment approach is precisely that of
identifying what the sentence is about, i.e. identifying the topic. If we are forced
to take the sentence-initial phrase as a topic, sentence-initialness can be used as
an operational criterion to identify topics. If we take the position that the topic
can be encoded in any position in the sentence, identication becomes problematic.
The authors working in the topic-comment framework, especially Gundel (1974)
and Reinhart (1982), have set a number of tests for topichood which are meant to
provide an operational tool to identify the topic of a sentence: the `as-for' test, the
`what-about' test, and the `said-about' test. The rst one determines that an NP is
There is one further dierence between Reinhart's and Gundel's topics. For Reinhart topichood
is a property of constituents (which encode a given discourse entity), but for Gundel it is a property
of entities (which are encoded in a given constituent).
34Gundel 1988 actually states that `a pragmatic topic is not always encoded as a syntactic topic
=in the sentence-initial topic slot] in fact, a pragmatic topic does not have to have overt expression
in the sentence at all' (1988:211). It seems odd to assume that the informational articulation of a
given sentence may contain a topic if this topic is not represented in the structure of the sentence at
all. It seems that Gundel's view of topic here has been modied to include aspects of the discourse
topic and Givon's topic.
33
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the topic of a sentence if it can be left-detached and preceded by as for. The second
one establishes that an NP is the topic of a sentence if this sentence can answer the
question What about ?, where is the topic NP. The third one identies the topic
with the NP that can be inserted as in the frame She said about that `comment'.
Unfortunately, these tests are problematic, as Gundel herself indirectly suggests
(1974:110) and as Prince 1984, Ward 1985 and Vallduv 1988a argue with examples
from English and Catalan. For example, many examples of `topicalized' phrases,
which are, following Gundel, necessarily topics, fail to pass the tests, rendering
these tests too strong. In particular, 69% of the topicalizations in Ward's corpus
fail the `as-for' test and 53% fail the `what-about' test (Ward 1985:23). The tests,
furthermore, are too weak in that they identify as topics of the sentence more than
one element. Let us take the sentence Linguistics fascinated me. In the discourse in
(31) the topic of this sentence would be, following Reinhart's and Gundel's criteria,
linguistics.
x

x

x

x

(31)

She told me I needed a change in my life, like getting a new
job. It was to no avail. Linguistics fascinated me. Wall Street
would have to wait.
But both linguistics and me seem to pass the aforementioned tests:
(32)

a. i.
I said about linguistics that it fascinated me.
ii. (?) As for linguistics, it fascinated me.
iii. What about linguistics? It fascinated me.
b. i.
I said about myself that linguistics fascinated me.
ii.
As for myself, linguistics fascinated me.
iii. What about myself? Linguistics fascinated me.
The conclusion that the notion of topic used in the topic-comment framework, as it
stands, is not operationalizable seems unavoidable.
As noted above in x3.1.1, Halliday 1967 also denes his Halliday-theme in terms
of aboutness, so he should run into the same problems as the workers in the topiccomment framework. Halliday, however, is very strict in requiring that the Hallidaytheme be sentence-initial. This is a positive move in two respects: rst, with this
requirement we regain the operationability lost in letting any constituent be the
topic and, second, it is more consistent to use `topic' to designate only those phrases
that intuitively feel like they are directing the hearer to some element about which
41

the speaker will consequently assert something. This is actually the spirit behind
Mathesius' and Hockett's notion of `aboutness'.35
Unfortunately, Halliday's strictness about sentence-initialness leads him to state
that all sentence-initial elements are a Halliday-theme. This is a counterintuitive
position, as seems clear from his sentence in (33) (1967:222),
(33)

What j did John see yesterday?

where he claims that what is the Halliday-theme of the sentence. In a sentence of this
type Gundel and Reinhart would choose the subject John as the topic. Furthermore,
and this applies to Reinhart as well, it seems extreme to claim that all sentences have
a topic. Both Gundel (1985:94) and Valimaa-Blum (1988:21) argue that topicless
sentences exist and so do, in a di erent vein, Kuroda 1972 and Sasse 1987|their
thetic-judgment sentences. If this position is correct, Halliday's sentence-initial
requirement, while positive in certain respects, is too strong in at least two counts.
It is not just the denitional problems around the notion of aboutness that
weaken the solidity of the topic-comment approach. The incompleteness of empirical
coverage of the topic-comment articulation is also an important shortcoming that
must be resolved. This incomplete empirical coverage is due to the fact that a mere
division between topic and comment does not suce to capture all the informational
distinctions detected in a sentence. This becomes clear in sentences like (34):
(34)

a. She gave the shirt to Harry. (Prince 1986:ex. 1)
b. To Harry she gave the shirt.
The two sentences in (34) represent one and the same logico-semantic proposition,
but they also re ect two di erent information-packaging structures. Within the
topic-comment framework, the contrast between these two sentences can be accounted for by saying that the phrase to Harry is a topic in (b) but not in (a) and
that that is why it is preposed in the former but not in the latter. In (a) the topic is
most likely she and the comment gave a shirt to Harry. This is indeed intuitively
plausible and accounts for one of the informational splits of this sentence.
See, for example, the denition of topic in Bland 1980 (in Ward 1985:33): `The Topic] provides
a way for the Speaker] to retrieve something from previous discourse in order to indicate what s/he
is going to talk about before s/he actually does talk about it' (1980:3) emphasis not in original].
35
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However, there is another clear informational split, especially in (a), that the
topic-comment framework has nothing to say about. In (a) there is a clear informational distinction between the prosodically-prominent a shirt and the nonprominent
to Harry, even though they are both within the comment. This distinction within
the informationally-complex comment is left unaccounted for. The binomiality of
the topic-comment articulation is not enough to capture the informational subtleties
of both (34)a and (34)b. The prosodically-prominent part of the comment in (34)a
is what the focus/open-presupposition approach calls `focus', and the nonprominent
part of the comment that follows the focus is part of the open-proposition (along
with the topic). The focus corresponds to only a segment of the comment. Focus,
therefore, must be invoked to complement the topic-comment division if we wish to
account for the information-packaging articulation of the sentence.
Before concluding this section on the topic-comment articulation, it is worth
speculating on the source of the denitional problem described above. There is
a clear intuitive notion that the sentence-initial `topic' phrase has some special
informational standing within the sentence. This is the original intuition behind
the notion of topic as found in Mathesius 1915 and Hockett 1958. The problem
arises when one tries to extend this notion to other sentences, so as to force the
topic-comment articulation onto all structures.
This extension is done, it seems, at the cost of causing the pervasive confusion and
amalgamation of three phenomena labeled topic: ) the original topic, a sentenceinitial phrase that acts as an address for the appropriate entering of information and
becomes a topic only relationally with respect to the comment|a true informationpackaging primitive ) topicality as a measure of the salience of a discourse entity,
as in Givon 1983, that re ects the status of that entity with respect to its presence
or absence in the previous discourse. This is most obvious in the variants of the
theory that suggest topichood is a property of discourse entities, and especially in
Davison 1984 and ) the suprasentential notion of discourse-topic, referring to an
entity, proposition, or event that is felt to be the topic of a discourse, i.e. what
that discourse is about, which may or may not be structurally encoded in all of
the sentences contained in the discourse in question. This is especially so in the
literature on topic in some Asian languages (e.g. Li & Thompson 1976 cf. ValimaaBlum 1988:18-27) and in Gundel 1988, where she states that topics need not be
a

b

c
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expressed in the sentences they are topics of.
Let us compare Givon's topicality with standard topichood with example (35):
(35)

a. Does he want mustard on his broccoli?
b. i. I don't think so, thanks. Brown mustard he likes,
ii. but this yellow stu he doesn't touch.
The Givon-topic of sentence (b.ii) is he. It is the most salient entity and is therefore
`weakly' encoded in a pronominal form. The topic in Hockett's sense is clearly this
yellow stu: it announces a topic about which we then say something. These two
notions of topic, as pointed out, are clearly distinct. Some workers in the topiccomment framework, having tried to con ate the two into one overarching `topic',
have lost consistency and operationalizability in the process.36
Summing up, the topic-comment articulation introduces a useful notion to account for the existence of a sentence-initial constituent in many clauses (especially
Reinhart's explicit characterization of it). It is sucient to capture the informational
split of the sentence in simple cases where there is a leftmost `topic' phrase|be it
an overtly topicalized phrase or a topical subject|and a noncomplex comment. Unfortunately, it seems inadequate to deal with all sentence types, given the common
occurrence of complex comments like the one in (34)a.

3.1.3 Topic-Focus
The topic-focus articulation is the one defended by most present-day Prague School
linguists (cf. Sgall, Haji!cova & Panevova 1986) and other European scholars like
von Stechow (1981). Within Prague School linguistic theory, informational considerations are just one of several that constitute the underlying or tectogrammatical
representation of the sentence. In contrast, von Stechow (1981) views the topic-focus
articulation as a structuring of logico-semantic propositions.
The denitions of topic and focus are phrased in terms of contextual boundedness
or contextual freeness, respectively, where contextually bound means `accessible in
the hearer's memory, i.e. salient, activated over a certain threshold in the stock of
Even when the two notions are conated, their disparate structural behavior requires some
terminological means to distinguish between `contrastive or shifted topics' (=sentence-initial aboutness expressions) and `continuous topics' (=Givon-topics) (cf. Herring 1990).
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shared knowledge' (Haji!cova 1984:193). A sentence like (36), with prosodic prominence on dams,
(36)

Beavers build dams. (S., H. & P. 1986:57)

is claimed to display, in isolation, an informational three-way ambiguity: ) beavers
is the topic and build dams is the focus ) beavers build is the topic and dams is the
focus and ) the entire sentence is part of the focus and the topic is null.
Notice from this example that `topic' here is not analogous to `topic' in the
topic-comment framework. The latter kind of topic for sentence (36) would be
invariably beavers. The Prague notion of topic encompasses the topic-comment
notion of topic and a part of its comment. In the next section it will be noted that
the Prague School topic is equivalent to the open-proposition in the focus/openproposition approach. Similarly, the Firbas-theme discussed above in x 3.1.1 is also
equivalent to the Prague School topic, even though the former is dened in terms of
communicative dynamism (`pushing the conversation forward') and not in terms of
contextual boundedness (`salience in hearer's memory'). Contextual-boundedness
is indeed a property of the nonfocal part of the sentence (cf. x 2.3.2, x 3.2), but
this is an artifact of its informational role in the sentence. More problematic is the
denition of focus as contextually free, since in x 2.3.2 it was noted that a focus
constituent may encode discourse-old, even salient, entities.
The focus-topic articulation is, for all intents and purposes, equivalent to the
focus-open-proposition articulation. Discussion of its advantages and shortcomings
is therefore subsumed under the discussion of the latter articulation undertaken in
the next section.
a

b

c

3.1.4 Focus/Open-proposition
The focus/open-proposition articulation or focus-presupposition articulation has a
strong history in modern linguistics. The term `focus' has its origin in Halliday
(1967), who uses it to designate a subset of the rheme in his theme-rheme articulation which he calls the `informative part'. While focus is the informative part
of the sentence, the open-proposition is just the anchoring or vehicular part. It is
important to point out that (a subpart of) the focus constituent is always marked
by prosodic prominence, which happens to be a valuable operational criterion to
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identify the focus in a given sentence. The term `focus' soon made its way into
generative grammar, due mainly to its role in the battle between interpretive and
generative semantics (cf. Chomsky 1971, Jackendo 1972). Sometimes it is also
called, somewhat misleadingly, `focus of new information'. Although there does
not seem to be as much terminological confusion around `focus' as there is around
`topic', a couple of paragraph's worth of clarication is in order.
In the last decade the term `focus' has been introduced into computational linguistics with a very di erent denotation. This use of `focus' originates in the work
of Grosz and Sidner (Grosz 1977, Sidner 1979, 1981, Grosz & Sidner 1986) and is
found in much work in articial intelligence (AI). This `focus' is of no direct relevance for information packaging. As mentioned above, the notion of a `focus stack'
is used in Grosz & Sidner's (1986) theory of discourse-entity salience and encoding.
All discourse entities are ranked for salience in the focus stack. The most salient
entity at a given point, which is generally encoded in a pronominal form, is called
the (AI-)focus. The AI-focus is the equivalent of the backward-looking center (BLC)
in the Centering approach, and, ironically, it also corresponds to the most topical
element, i.e. the topic, in Givon's (1983) framework37
Another less common use of the term `focus' is as `focus of contrast'. Contrast is
yet another term which is used ambiguously in the literature, there existing both a
contrastiveness of sentence-initial topics and a contrastiveness of foci. Chafe (1976)
uses `focus of contrast' to refer to both types of contrast with unfortunate results,
since he ends up referring to some topics as foci (of contrast). This confusion seems
to have been inherited by a few studies like Diesing 1988, where contrastive topics
are equated to (narrow) foci of new information. Some issues regarding contrast
will be discussed below in x 4.3.2.38
In modern American linguistics the focus of new information, or just `focus',
See Hajicova 1987 for a comparison of AI-focus and focus. This paper also contains a discussion
of how information packaging and entity salience may interact.
38An extreme case of misguiding terminology is found in the literature on Philippine languages,
where, according to Herring (1990:fn.1), `topic' designates the focus and `focus' designates the
topic. Just in case the reader has lost count of the dierent types of topic and focus, here is a brief
list: discourse-topic, Givon-topic, sentence-initial topic (or topic-topic, if we may put one over the
others), and Prague-topic (= topic-topic + part of the comment), and AI-focus (= Givon-topic),
focus of new information (or focus-focus), and focus of contrast (= sometimes a focus-focus and
sometimes a topic-topic).
37
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was introduced as a complement of the presupposition in the focus-presupposition
articulation (Akmajian 1970(1979), Chomsky 1971, Jackendo 1972, inter alia).
The presupposition, following Jackendo , `denote"s] the information in the sentence
that is assumed by the speaker to be shared by him and the hearer' (1972:230).
For Prince (1981a, 1984, 1986)|Prince uses the term open-proposition instead
of presupposition|the presupposition is also `shared knowledge', which in most
cases is salient (i.e. currently in the discourse model or consciousness of the hearer),
and Chafe 1976, analogously states that the presupposition represents background
knowledge. In Wilson & Sperber 1979 it corresponds to a logico-semantic background entailment of the actual sentence. More recently, Culicover & Rochemont
1983 and Rochemont 1986 have dened the presupposition of a sentence as that
which is c-construable, where c-construable means having a `semantic' antecedent
in the previous discourse.
The focus, then, is generally dened negatively as the complement of this presupposition it is, respectively, that which is not shared by the speaker and the
hearer, that which is not background knowledge, that which is not part of the (rst)
background entailment, or that which is not c-construable. This is generally represented as follows: the presupposition is equated to the sentence (or proposition)
with a variable substituted for the focus. So, for instance, a sentence like (37)a has
the `presupposition' in (37)b, with the shirt as focus:
(37)

a. She gave the shirt to Harry.
b. She gave to Harry. (Prince 1986:ex. 1)
In other words, sentence (37)a `presupposes' She gave something to Harry and the
focus says that that something is the shirt.
Although this articulation has great intuitive appeal and has proved useful in
the description of information packaging, most of the particular proposals just mentioned are problematic in some way. First, as pointed out already by Jackendo
(1972:246), analyses that assume that the `presupposition' is entailed or presupposed in the traditional sense of the word (e.g. Wilson & Sperber 1979) run into
immediate trouble when dealing with examples like (38)a:
x

(38)

a. I saw nobody at the party.
b. I saw at the party.
x
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If (a) were to entail or presuppose (b) we would run into a logical contradiction: if
it is true that I saw nobody at the party then it is true that I saw somebody at the
party (entailment), or that seeing nobody at the party presupposes seeing somebody
at the party (presupposition). Clearly, the `presupposition' can be neither entailed
nor presupposed by a given focus-presupposition sentence.39 This has led several
authors to abandon the unhappy term `presupposition' and adopt Prince's (1981a,
1986) open-proposition (cf. Ward 1985).
Prince's view of the open-proposition as salient shared knowledge is less problematic as far as this issue is concerned. If `shared knowledge' is understood as the
set of propositions believed to be true by both speaker and hearer at the time of
utterance, as Jackendo 1972 did, using shared knowledge is no less problematic:
the open-proposition in (38)b, being shared knowledge, would have to be believed
true by the speaker. This cannot be the case here, since the speaker of (38)a cannot
believe (38)b to be true. But if shared knowledge is viewed, as in Prince's work, as
`what the speaker assumes about the hearer's beliefs' (Prince 1985:65), we do not
run into the problem of assigning contradicting beliefs to the speaker. Speakers can
utter (38)a if they assume that the hearer believes (38)b to be true, even when they
themselves do not believe it to be true.
Culicover & Rochemont's (1983) c-construability is not free of problems either.
C-construable means `having an antecedent in the previous discourse' and focus is
described as not being c-construable. In many cases, however, the focus of a sentence
refers to an entity already introduced into the previous discourse, i.e., the focus is
as c-construable as its corresponding open-proposition. Rochemont (1986) calls the
cases in which the focus is c-construable `contrastive focus' and stipulates a rule
by means of which c-construable contrastive foci are allowed. In this case it is the
fact that the focus is the focus of a particular focus/open-proposition structure|
and not of some other|which is not c-construable. Although this takes care of
the facts, a unied characterization of focus is lost in the process. Rochemont's
problem stems from the unwarranted assumption that information packaging can be
explained in terms of the absolute referential status of discourse entities as observed
A misunderstanding based on this misleading ambiguity was at the root of a controversy
between Chomsky 1971 and Lako 1971 and is the main reason for which Erteschik-Shir (1973,
1986) rejects the notion of focus in favor of dominance (cf. x 3.1.5).
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in the previous linguistic context.
In fact, Prince (1981a, 1984, 1986) points out that it is always the case that the
`new information' carried along by the focus is not a discourse-entity-based notion.
What constitutes new information is the fact that a particular focus instantiates
the variable in the open-proposition. For example, in example (37) above, repeated
here as (39),
(39)

a. She gave the shirt to Harry.
b. She gave to Harry. (Prince 1986:ex. 1)
the new information is not the shirt per se, i.e. the discourse entity represented by
the NP the shirt, but the fact that the constituent the shirt is what instantiates the
variable in the open-proposition she gave to Harry. Prince's account, therefore,
is equivalent to a generalization of Rochemont's proposal for just contrastive foci to
all cases of focus. Thus, the need to state two separate c-construability conditions
for two putatively di erent kinds of foci is avoided.
Besides, Prince's analysis of focus/open-proposition informational relations
makes crucial use of a relational view of focus and open-proposition. A given constituent is the focus of a sentence by virtue of its being in a particular relation with
the open-proposition in that sentence. This is in accordance with the fact that focushood cannot be an absolute property of constituents/referents, the way newness
or givenness is. The notion of focus cannot be dened in terms of c-construability,
contextual-freeness, or hearer-newness.
There is another bit of terminology that must be introduced regarding the
focus/open-presupposition articulation. Chomsky 1971, Jackendo 1972, von Stechow 1981, and Lambrecht 1987, 1989 state that the focus is the `assertion of the
utterance'. This use of `assertion' must not be confused with the use of assertion
as found in the philosophical writing of Russell (1905) in the sense of commitment
to the truth of a statement, which is an illocutionary notion. Rather, it is based on
Strawson's (1950) adaptation in the sense of `to give information of some kind to
an audience' (cf. Kempson 1975:101), and, especially, on Stalnaker 1978, for whom
x

x

`to make an assertion is to reduce the context set "= set of possible
worlds compatible with what is accepted to be true by both speaker and
hearer at a given time-point] in a particular way "...]. The particular
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way in which the context set is reduced is that all the possible situations
incompatible with what is said are eliminated.' (1978:323)
This denition of assertion is similar to the denition of information as a reduction of uncertainty introduced above in 2.2. The di erence is that while `information' was dened as a reduction of the uncertainty in the hearer's knowledgestore at a given time-point, Stalnaker denes his assertion as a reduction of uncertainty in the set of common beliefs shared by both hearer and speaker. Some
authors have adopted Stalnaker's assertion to dene the notion of focus in the focuspresupposition articulation (e.g. von Stechow 1981, Lambrecht 1987, 1988). These
authors state that sentences assert their focus and that the open-proposition is not
asserted. As noted in the discussion regarding (38), Stalnaker's asertion cannot be
taken to dene the focus/open-proposition distinction or the informativeness of the
focus, since it is incorrect to assume that the open-proposition represents a `shared
belief'. It is the hearers' belief (at least the speaker assumes so), but clearly it is
not a shared belief. Despite this observation, one can easily see that, when these
authors say that the focus is the Stalnaker-assertion of the utterance|a reduction
of the context set, they are close to saying that it is the informative part of the
utterance|a reduction of the uncertainty in the hearer's knowledge-store at a given
time-point.
Finally, before discussing the incompleteness of empirical coverage of the focusopen-proposition approach, the work of Valimaa-Blum (1988) must be mentioned.
Valimaa-Blum's informational articulation is identical to the focus/open-proposition
articulation discussed here. In general, the discussion in this section is applicable
to her approach. Her terminology, however, is quite di erent from the standard
one in an unfortunate way. She calls the focus `NewInfo' and the open-proposition
`OldInfo'. We share her use of `info(rmation)' to refer to the component of language
understanding under study, but the use of the terms `old' and `new' is, again, misleading in the sense that it is reminiscent of the old/new distinction regarding the
referential status of discourse entities. The problem is only terminological, however,
since she states very clearly that NewInfo and OldInfo must be viewed as relational
notions among constituents and not as a property of entities in a discourse (1988:5).
Valimaa-Blum, along with the NewInfo-OldInfo articulation, also makes use of a
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sentential sentence-initial topic. Her topic (S-topic) is based on `aboutness' a la
Reinhart 1982, but, unlike it, it is restricted to sentence-initial position (1988:18 .).
Below it will become clear that our proposal is very similar to Valimaa-Blum's in
this respect.
Despite its advantages and sound position in current work, the focus/openproposition articulation is not empirically adequate to cover all possible sentence
types. Interestingly, it appears that what this articulation fails to account for, the
topic-comment articulation takes care of, and vice versa. Let us consider the same
example discussed in reference to topic-comment:
(40) a. She gave the shirt to Harry. (Prince 1986:ex. 1)
b. To Harry she gave the shirt.
Sentences (40)a and (40)b, while representing the same logico-semantic proposition,
represent two di erent packaging instructions. The topic-comment framework fails
to account for the informational split within the comment in, for example, sentence
(a), between the shirt and to Harry. It has nothing to say about the fact that
the shirt is focal, while to Harry is not. Obviously, the focus/open-proposition
framework does have something to say about this split: the shirt is the focus that
instantiates the variable in the open-proposition She gave to Harry, thus capturing
the fact that the shirt and Harry belong to two di erent informational units.
Now, there is one further di erence between sentences (a) and (b): the position of
the phrase to Harry it is postfocal in (a) but sentence-initial in (b). This di erence
is captured by the topic-comment framework, as noted, by saying that to Harry is a
topic in (b) but not in (a). In contrast, the focus/open-proposition approach is at a
loss here, since from its perspective the two sentences are the same: a focus, a shirt,
and an open-proposition, she gave to Harry. Why is then to Harry preposed in
(b)?
This fact has not gone unnoticed. In fact, Valimaa-Blum, as already noted,
incorporates an S-topic into her description of information packaging, presumably,
because she noticed a gap in the empirical coverage of her OldInfo-NewInfo distinction. Furthermore, there exists a proposal within the focus/open-proposition
approach to account for topic preposing in the work of Prince 1981a, Ward 1985,
and Ward & Prince 1986. Basically, these authors suggest that topic-initial constructions perform two `discourse functions' or informational tasks: one, marking
x

x
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the sentential focus/open-proposition structure|the packaging instruction in our
terms|and, the other, marking the preposed NP as encoding an entity that stands
in a particular referential standing with another entity already introduced in the
previous linguistic context. In particular, it is argued, drawing on work on linguistic
scales by Hirschberg 1985, that the entity encoded in the preposed phrase `must be
related, via a salient partially ordered set "poset] relation to one or more entities
already evoked in the discourse model' (Ward & Prince 1986:4). As will be shown
in x 4.3.2, our proposal indirectly incorporates the main insight of Ward & Prince's
proposal.
Summing up the review of the focus/open-proposition articulation, it must be
pointed out that the distinctions it makes are necessary for a complete theory of
information packaging. Several problems arise, however, when attempting to dene
the notions involved, especially when using traditional semantic terms like entailment and presupposition. Prince's proposal in terms of salient `shared knowledge',
with the understanding that shared knowledge is not really `shared' (it's what the
speaker assumes are the hearer's beliefs, in Prince's terms), is unproblematic. A
di erent kind of problem, which it shares with the topic-comment approach, is the
incompleteness of empirical coverage concerning the existence of sentence-initial
preposed elements. Empirically thorough solutions to this void have been proposed
(Ward 1985, Ward & Prince 1986, Valimaa-Blum 1988) and will be taken into consideration in our account.

3.1.5 Dominance
One further approach to information packaging is found in Erteschik-Shir 1973,
1979, 1986 and Erteschik-Shir & Lappin 1979, 1983: the notion of `dominance'.
Dominance, in contrast to all the approaches seen above, does not come in a bipartite
structure, but is rather a discourse property which is assigned to a constituent
according to the intentions of the speaker. Dominance is dened as follows:
DOM: A constituent , of a sentence , is dominant in if and only
if the speaker intends to direct the attention of his/her hearer(s) to the
intension of , by uttering . (Erteschik-Shir & Lappin 1983:420)
c
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As noted in x 2.2, in a sense, one of the things the packaging instruction does is
single out the informative part of the sentence, i.e. the focus. One could say, a la
Erteschik-Shir, that the speaker directs the hearer's attention to this focus (although
it also provides detailed instructions about how to retrieve the information embodied
in that focus and enter it into her/his knowledge-store eciently).
In fact, Erteschik-Shir herself states that `dominance is meant to cover those
cases for which focus is generally used' (1986:120), even though she lists two differences between a dominant constituent and a focus. First, she rejects `presupposition' as the complement of dominant constituents. Presupposition, she argues,
does not exclude dominance, since presupposed material can be dominant, as in (41)
(Erteschik-Shir 1986:ex. 11):
(41)

A: John regrets that he quit his job.
B: Yes I know. It has been lled and he can't go back.
The italicized portion in (41)A is the dominant constituent of the sentence. But,
as complement of regret, the embedded sentence is also presupposed|in the traditional meaning of the word|by (41). Her objection to presupposition, however, is
based on a misunderstanding of the sense in which the practitioners of the focuspresupposition framework use the term. As mentioned above, a sentence does not
actually presuppose its `presupposition', but the ambiguity of the term has led to
this same equivocation in several occasions. And second, she claims that, while
focus is dened in terms of `nuclear stress assignment', in her framework `stress'
pattern follows from the assignment of dominance. For most workers in the focusbackground framework, however, including this study, intonational prominence is
just one of the structural manifestations of focushood.
For all intents and purposes, then, the dominant constituent is equivalent to the
focus of the sentence. Even though Erteschik-Shir's proposal is thorough (she even
sets an operational test|the lie test|to determine what constituent is the dominant
one in the sentence), her notion of hearer's attention seems less transparent than the
notion of information packaging. Since most of the insights gained by the dominance
approach are also captured by the focus-background approach, the former is included
in the discussion of the latter.
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3.2 Proposal
In this section an informational articulation meant to incorporate all the insights of
the approaches just surveyed, while avoiding their shortcomings, is presented. First,
however, we shall provide a global assessment of these previous approaches.

3.2.1 Assessment of Previous Approaches
As noted, there are two kinds of problems with the approaches available in the literature. On the one hand, there are some denitional problems, especially concerning
the notion of topic and the exact nature of the open-proposition. On the other,
both articulations|topic-comment and focus/open-proposition|are incapable of
accounting for all the possible informational splits of the sentence.
The rst problem will be avoided by staying away from the problematic denitions. For the open-proposition, which is adopted in our system with the name
of `ground' (cf. x 3.2.2), Prince's analysis in term's of `hearer's knowledge' will be
adapted, avoiding any denitions of this informational notion in logico-semantic or
traditional presuppositional terms. We also adopt a topiclike sentence-initial phrase,
under the name of `link', modifying Reinhart's analysis in terms of a `cataloguing
address or le card'. By restricting the `link' to be sentence-initial one can elude the
problematic extension of topichood to other elements of the sentence. It was with
this extension that rendered topichood a nonoperationalizable notion. Finally, the
`givenness/newness paradox'|how can the `focus of new information' be discourseold?|is avoided by making clear that referential status is a property of discourse
entities and the phrases that encode them and information packaging is a relational
property that constituents have by virtue of their standing in a particular relationship with the other element of the sentence.
The second problem, the incompleteness of empirical coverage which both these
informational articulations su er from, is due to the fact that a binomial informational division of the sentence is simply not enough. The topic-comment framework
cannot account for the informational split within the comment, and the focus/openproposition framework fails to provide an explanation for the existence of sentenceinitial topiclike phrases. This, in fact, has been noticed by several authors in the
Praguean tradition (cf. Haji!cova 1984) and by Dahl 1974, and, tacitly but clearly by
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Valimaa-Blum 1988 and Prince & Ward (Prince 1981a, Ward 1985, Ward & Prince
1986).
The Prague School nds a potential solution to this insuciency in the articulation of the informational structure along a continuum of communicative dynamism
that involves notions from the thematic structure of the predicate. In other words,
the informational split within the open-proposition|their topic|is accounted for
not in informational terms but in terms of a communicative hierarchy of thematic
roles that determines word-order changes within the otherwise monolithic Praguetopic of a sentence. Presenting the details of this proposal is impossible here, although it must be pointed out that it violates any autonomy-of-levels hypothesis,
since it brings along a direct interaction at the same level between thematic and
informational considerations.
Dahl's (1974) position is more germane to the proposal of this study. He suggests
that sentences must have two distinct articulations, namely, topic-comment and
focus-background (= focus/open-proposition), `if for no other reason because longer
sentences may exhibit a tripartite structure' (1974:2). His example of a tripartite
structure is (42) (Dahl 1974:ex. 3), in which the narrowest of the possible readings
of focus is assumed.
topic comment
(42) What does John drink? - John drinks beer.
background focus
His proposal, however, is somewhat redundant in that the two articulations in question partially overlap. The verb drinks, for instance, is both comment and background. While it is indeed necessary to make the distinction between information
and ground, it is less clear that it is useful to group the nontopical elements together into an informational primitive. As will be seen below, it is unnecessary to
preserve two superordinate informational units (the ground and the comment), since
the same empirical ground can be covered with a simpler ontology. One can indeed
divide the sentence in (42), for instance, into three parts within one single articulation instead of having Dahl's two redundant partially-overlapping ones, but this
is done at the cost of foregoing both the superordinate units, the comment and the
background (gt=background-topic, gc=background-comment, fc=focus-comment):
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(43)

J ohn

| {z }

drinks

| {z }

beer

.

| {z }

gt
gc
fc
This consequence is too strong in that the distinction focus-ground seems to be a
basic one, since it re ects the core distinction between information and anchoring
material. In order to obtain a tripartite division, and respect at least one of the
superordinate informational units, a hierarchical articulation must be used.
The articulation presented in the next section is a tripartite hierarchical articulation that captures the appropriate divisions of both the topic-comment and
the focus-background frameworks while digesting them into one single structure.
This trinomial structure is empirically equivalent to Dahl's parallel articulations
(but see the observations about redundancy above) or Valimaa-Blum's (1988) OldInfo/NewInfo plus S-topic. The main di erence between our proposal and ValimaaBlum's is that the trinomial articulation presented below integrates all the informational primitives into the purpose of information packaging, unlike Valimaa-Blum's.
In her account the S-topic has an independent existence of its own totally unrelated
to the OldInfo/NewInfo split. It is clear, however, that the S-topic does perform
some specic task in the accommodation of information (NewInfo) in the hearer's
knowledge-store. The articulation proposed in the next section captures this by
incorporating the S-topic, the link, as part of the ground and giving it a specic
subtask within the larger information-retrieval task of the ground. Similar comments
about unintegration could be made about Dahl's parallel articulations.
Before moving on to the next section, let us summarize the positive aspects to be
preserved and the negative aspects to be avoided in the approaches to information
packaging reviewed above:

- To be avoided:

 nonoperationalizable criteria (for topic)
 incomplete empirical coverage
 semantic and (real) presuppositional accounts and nonrelational deni

tions (for focus-presupposition)
redundant or unintegrated informational articulations

- To be preserved:
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 an optional sentence-initial topiclike expression
 the focus-background distinction
3.2.2 Trinomial Hierarchical Articulation
A sound account of information packaging must provide a clear representation of
the informational split of the sentence incorporating all the informational units
observable. Furthermore, it must describe in detail the combinatorial operations by
means of which the informative and the noninformative part of the utterance are put
together to yield packaging instructions, and a specication of the interpretive rules
that lead to their interpretation. This section is devoted to the rst task. Adopting
several insights inherited from previous work, the primitives that constitute the
informational articulation of the sentence will be established. The description of the
combinatorial and interpretive rules that build on these primitives is undertaken in
Chapter 4.
It is proposed that the sentence is informationally articulated into a trinomial
hierarchical structure consisting of the focus and the ground, while the latter
is further subdivided into the link and the tail. This partition is represented in
(44):40

S=ffocus, groundg
ground=flink, tailg
It re ects both the focus-background split and the fact that within the ground
there often is a `special' topiclike element, the link, which appears in sentenceinitial position. The informational unit `comment' is foregone, since it is rendered
unnecesary in the account presented below (cf. Ch. 4).
The focus corresponds exactly to the focus in the frameworks reviewed above
(the topic-focus and the focus/open-proposition or focus-background approaches).
It constitutes the only informative part of the sentence, as in Halliday 1967, i.e.,
the segment of the sentence in which all the information is encoded. It is, therefore,
the only nonelidable part of the sentence, since it is the only contribution to the
(44)

The hierarchical nature of this representation does not automatically imply continuous constituency. No claim is made with respect to linearization, since, in particular, the two parts of the
ground may or may not constitute a linear unit at the surface.
40
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hearer's knowledge-store at the time of utterance (or so the speaker assumes). The
name focus is preserved due to its widespread use in the American, Hallidayan, and
Praguean traditions. Also, the other main use of the term, the AI-focus, appears
to be distinct enough to permit the existence of a healthy homonymity. The focus
of a sentence is operationally identied by context|with the now habitual warnings about givenness/newness|and thanks to its invariably being intonationally
prominent.
The ground is the complement of the focus and is equivalent in coverage to the
presupposition, the open-proposition, the Prague-topic, or the background in the
approaches reviewed in x 3.1.4. The term `ground' is taken, as a terser version, from
Dahl's (1974) and Chafe's (1976) background, moving away, as many other authors
before, from the con ictive term `presupposition', but also from `open-proposition'
due to its semantic connotation. The term `ground' is free from any connection to
logico-semantic meaning.
The informational force of the ground consists exclusively of acting as a vehicular frame for the informative focus, i.e. it guarantees an appropriate entry of
information into the hearer's knowledge-store, indicating to the hearer where and
how the information must be entered. Since the focus is the information in the
sentence, it follows that the ground does not make any contribution to the hearer's
knowledge-store. The knowledge encoded in the ground portion of a communicated
proposition is knowledge the speaker assumes that the hearer already possesses. It
is also the case, however, that the ground must, in some sense, be `relevant' enough
to perform the anchoring task it is assigned, i.e., it is licensed only to guarantee that
the information carried by the sentence is entered into the knowledge-store appropriately. If (the speaker assumes) hearers can gure out how the information in the
sentence contributes to their knowledge-store, the sentence may not have a ground.
The focus is the only nonelidable segment of the sentence and may exist by itself,
either as an all-focus sentence or as a sentence-fragment utterance. The ground is
divided into the link and the tail, each performing a particular task within the more
general anchoring role of the superordinate unit.
The link in this articulation is analogous to the sentence-initial topiclike expression found in some of the theme-rheme and topic-comment approaches discussed in
x 3.1.1 and x 3.1.2. The term `topic' is avoided due to its multiple ambiguity and
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choosing `theme' to designate the sentence-initial topiclike expression is not any better, owing especially to the use of `theme' and `thematic' in a completely unrelated
but central component of linguistic structure.
Moreover, the notion of link does not match one-hundred-percent the `topic' in
the topic-comment articulation on which it is based. It does match the topic as
originally presented in Mathesius 1915, Hockett 1958, and Halliday 1967, as noted,
but it does not incorporate later extensions of topichood to elements other than the
sentence-initial topic-announcing phrase, as in Reinhart 1982 and Gundel 1988. The
label `link' is used in order to avoid possible misunderstandings in what the term is
meant to cover. A notion of `linking up' is found here and there in the literature,
as in Travn!cek 1962, for instance, where his theme (akin to a Halliday-theme) is
described as `the sentence element that links up directly with the object of thought,
proceeds from it and opens the sentence thereby' (1962:166).41
The link in the trinomial hierarchical articulation performs precisely this task
of `linking up with the object of thought'. This linking-up is expressed by means
of a Reinhart-like view of links as designating an address of sorts under which the
oncoming information is classied (cf. Reinhart 1982 and x 3.1.2). A link is an
address pointer in the sense that it directs the hearer to a given address (or le card
in Reinhart's (1982) or Heim's (1983) terms) in the hearer's knowledge-store, under
which the information carried by the sentence is entered. Pointing to this address is
part of the information-anchoring role of the ground. By starting a sentence with a
link speakers indicate to hearers that the focus must be entered under the address
denoted by that link, i.e. that hearers must go to that address (or pull out that le
card), and enter the information under its label.
Links, as noted, must be sentence-initial, following the restriction required by,
for example, Travn!cek 1962 and Halliday 1967. Using the denition of link as
an address pointer, a practical processing reason for their sentential-initialness is
automatically obtained, since an address must be pointed to before the information
to be entered under it is spelled out. Herring 1990, a crosslinguistic study of topic
and focus encoding, states that `languages of all types are consistent in putting
The term `link' is also used by Fowler 1927 to describe some sentence-initial phrases (Catherine
Ball, p.c.). Fowler's use of the term, however, is based on the idea that these phrases constitute a
`linking' with the previous discourse, not a `linking with the object of thought'.
41
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shifted topics "=links] rst' (1990:9).42 If the view that links are address pointers is
correct this is not surprising at all. Dening links as address pointers also derives,
as Reinhart 1982 does, the aboutness feeling that is central to the topic-comment
approach. In contrast with Reinhart, however, in this study aboutness is treated
as an epiphenomenon resulting from the very relation of links as address pointers
with the informative part of the sentence: if the information is retrieved and entered
under a given address, that information will be felt as being about the denotation
of that address.
Even though links appear only in sentence-initial position|and this is their
main structural characteristic, which can be used as an operational criterion for
identication|not all sentence-initial elements have to be links. The link is part
of the ground and, as noted, the ground exists only if necessary to guarantee a
successful retrieval of the information encoded in the sentence. Therefore, linkless
sentences are also possible in situations in which the address under which information must be entered is already established or in which, for whatever reason, there
is no particular address for the information encoded in the sentence.43
The denition of links as sentence-initial must be understood as including the
case of multiple links. Sentences may have more than one link, as in the Catalan
example (45):
(45)

El broquil a l`amo l'hi van regalar.
the broccoli to the.boss obj.iobj 3p-pst-give
Approx.: `The broccoli the boss (they) gave it to him (for free).'
In these cases the speaker directs the hearer to go to two addresses and enter the
information under both. The second link in example (45) is not sentence-initial.
Instead of having each link be sentence-initial, it should be made clear that it is the
link string (link ) that is sentence-initial.
The tail, the last informational primitive, is the complement of the link within
the ground. The term `tail' is borrowed from Dik's Functional Grammar theory
It is clear from Herring's paper that her `shifted topic' is analogous to the link, while her
`continuous topics' refer to something akin to a Givon-topic.
43Even though the link points to an entity in the knowledge-store (an address), it is not the
case that the link is marking the discourse entity it represents as hearer-old. The fact that the
entity must be hearer-old is an artifact of the informational task of the link: in general, an address
cannot be pointed at unless it exists already (even though in some cases the creation of an address
and the pointing to it can be simultaneous).
42
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(1978). Like its synonym `antitopic' (Chafe 1976, Lambrecht 1981), it has been
used to describe right-detached constituents, especially in languages like French,
but it has never been dened except by its structural position (cf. Lambrecht 1981
for discussion). The original use by Dik and his associates, however, describes only
a subset of tail elements of this proposal. Right-detached constituents, at least in
some languages, are indeed part of the tail, but the tail may also be encoded in
other positions within the sentence structure as, for instance, in English (see Ch. 5).
Within the vehicular, anchoring informational force of the ground, the tail performs a more specic task regarding the exact way in which information is retrieved
and entered under a given address. It would take us too far aeld to describe the
exact mechanics of the tail here. First, the combinatorial rules by means of which
the aforementioned informational primitives interact must be introduced. This is
done in the next chapter. Pretheoretically, the tail may be viewed as an element
that acts as a signalling ag to indicate exactly how the information carried by the
sentence must be entered under a given address.
The position of the tail within a sentential structure is not universally constant.
While, as noted, both link and focus have some universal structural characteristics (sentence-initialness and intonational prominence, respectively) there is no such
correlate in the case of the tail, although it is true that it is never marked with
prosodic prominence. Structural properties of each individual language (basic word
order, basic intonation contour, verb-secondness, etc.) may determine the position
in which tails end up surfacing in a sentence. The tail, therefore, must be negatively identied as the nonfocal nonlink part of the sentence, although within each
language particular informational/structural correlates should be found. As with
links, more than one element may constitute the tail.

3.2.3 Application of the Articulation
Given the trinomial hierarchical articulation presented in (44), repeated here as (46),

S=ffocus, groundg
ground=flink, tailg
and its characteristics, i.e. non-elidability of the focus, optionality of the ground
elements and sentence-initialness of the link, one is led to expect four possible in(46)
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formational structures for a sentence: link-focus sentences, all-focus sentences, linkfocus-tail sentences, and focus-tail sentences. These expectations are empirically
met, as attested by the literature on informational sentence types. In this section,
these four informational structures will be illustrated and the correspondences with
their equivalents in the literature pointed out.

Link-focus
In this type, the only ground is the link. Hearers are instructed to go to a given
address and enter the information of the sentence under that address. The speaker
directs the hearer to enter the information by merely adding it under the relevant
address. The following are some examples in English and Catalan:44
(47)

a. The boss called.
b. L'amo "F ha trucat ].

(48)

a. The boss "F visited a broccoli plantation in colombia ].
b. L'amo "F va visitar una plantacio de broquil a colombia ].

(49)

a. The boss1 "F I wouldn't bother t1].
b. L'amo1 "F no l1'emprenyaria t1].

(50)

a. Broccoli1 the boss "F doesn't eat t1].
b. De broquil1 l'amo "F no en1 menja t1].

These examples illustrate the two standard cases of link-focus structure, with the
link being either the subject in (47) and (48), a preposed complement in (49), and
a case of multiple links in (50).
The link-focus structure corresponds to the typical topic-comment articulation
(with a noncomplex comment) of the topic-comment framework (cf. x 3.1.2 above).
It is also equivalent to the categorical judgment in the thetic/categorical distinction
of Kuroda 1972 and Sasse 1987. This distinction, originating in the writings of
the nineteenth-century philosophers Franz Brentano and Anton Marty, was meant
as an alternative to the unique Aristotelian bipartite judgment. Categorical judgments consist of two acts: a naming of an entity and an expression of a statement
Since the Catalan examples are equivalent to the corresponding English ones, no translation
is provided.
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about it. It corresponds to the traditional Aristotelian judgment and to the topiccomment articulation. Thetic judgments merely express an event or state, and they
correspond to our all-focus structure, as will be pointed out below.45
Link-focus sentences are also equivalent to the predicate focus structure of Lambrecht 1987, 1988. He considers it the `unmarked' type of informational structure
and denes it as a structure `in which the subject "or a topical non-subject constituent] is the topic, thus in the domain of the pragmatic presupposition, and in
which the predicate expresses a "Stalnaker-]assertion about this topic' (1988:6). In
other words, the entire sentence, except for the link sentence-initial constituent, lies
within the scope of his Stalnaker-assertion.

All-focus
All-focus structures correspond to sentences where the ground is null. In such cases,
speakers assume that hearers are capable of retrieving the information carried by
the sentence without any need for a vehicular anchoring frame: information can be
entered into the knowledge-store without the need for an address pointer, and there
is no need for a tail to indicate how the information ts under an address. There
are two reasons for the existence of linkless sentences: ) the information of the
sentence must be entered under a particular address, but the speaker assumes that
the hearer knows which one already from context, i.e., does not have to go to it
because s/he is already there, or ), no particular address is relevant for the entry of
information. A temporary all-purpose `situation address' may be used (cf. Ch. 4).
The following are some examples. They include general descriptions (51), pure
existential sentences (52), and sentence fragments (53):
a

b

(51)

a. "F The boss called ].
b. "F Ha trucat l'amo ].

Two points about the thetic/categorical distinction. One, categorical judgments are thought
to represent a predication. The topic-comment articulation and our link-focus structures have
nothing to do with syntactic or semantic predication. And two, Sasse 1987 explicitly states that
`the thetic/categorical distinction is not a matter of information structure, as is often assumed,
but can be explained in terms of expectation' (1987:511). It seems clear, though, that `information
structure' in his discussion designates referential status of discourse entities and not information
packaging. That being the case, his position is in agreement with this study. In fact, his `hearer's
expectation' seems analogous to what is called `information' here.
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(52)

a. Waiter! "F There's a y in my cream of broccoli soup ]!
b. Cambrer! "F Tinc una mosca a la crema de broquil ]!

(53)

a. What doesn't the boss like?
broccoli.
b. Que no li agrada, a l'amo?
el broquil.

Some all-focus structures (at least those in (51) and (52)) correspond to Kuno's
(1972) neutral descriptions (`sentences that represent nothing but new information'
(1972:298)), Schmerling's (1976) news sentences or all-new utterances,46 and other
labels like event-reporting sentences (cf. Lambrecht 1987).
In the thetic/categorical distinction, they correspond to the thetic judgment, as
dened above. Sasse 1987 lists the following types of thetic judgments: weather
expressions, existence, presence or appearance, description of situations, and in
response to a question like `what happened?' (1987:547). Lambrecht 1988 refers to
these sentences as sentence-focus structures, `sentences in which the focus domain
is the entire sentence' (1988:11), involving no `pragmatically presupposed openproposition'.

Tailful Structures
Both the link-focus-tail and the focus-tail structures are included here. The tail,
as noted, is an indication that further instructions are needed to guarantee the
felicitous entry of information under a given address. The following are examples of
link-focus-tail structure (54) and focus-tail structure (55). The tail in these examples
is the material following the focus:
(54)

a. The boss hates broccoli.
b. L'amo l1'odia, el broquil1.

Schmerling 1976 oers a nice minimal pair between a link-focus sentence ((i)) and an all-focus
sentence (ii):
46

(i) Truman's died.
(ii) Johnson's died.
Both sentences, she reports, were reactions to the news about their deaths, but (i) was uttered
after several days of discussion about whether and when Truman would die and (ii) was uttered
as an out-of-the-blue report.
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(55)

a. I can't believe this! The boss is going crazy!
broccoli, he wants now.
b. No m'ho hagues cregut mai! L'amo esta ben boig!
broquil, vol ara.

(56)

a. The farmers "F already sent ] the broccoli to the boss.
b. Els pagesos "F ja l1'hi2 van enviar t1 t2], el broquil1, a l'amo2.

Both the link-focus-tail and the focus-tail structures correspond to Prince's (1981a,
1986) focus/open-proposition sentences (cf. x 3.1.4).47 These sentences have also
been referred to as `narrow focus', `constituent focus', or `contrastive focus' sentences by many of the workers in the focus/open-proposition framework. In fact,
for nonlinguistic historical reasons, the unmodied term `focus' is understood many
a time as referring exclusively to the focus in tailful sentences, i.e. narrow focus.
Having introduced, dened, and illustrated the informational primitives that
constitute the informational articulation of the sentence, we are now ready to discuss
how these are combined into packaging instructions and what the interpretation of
each of the di erent packaging instructions is. This is the subject of the next chapter.

A subset of the sentences Prince discusses under this rubric are treated as link-focus structures
(e.g. Beer I like). This discrepancy is actually an artifact of the way in which the tail is analyzed.
47

65

Chapter 4
A Theory of Informatics
In x 2.2 information packaging was characterized as a non-logico-semantic type of
sentence `meaning' concerned with the retrieval of information and its entry into the
hearer's knowledge-store. Information packaging was dened as in (57) (=(11)):
(57)

information packaging: A small set of instructions with

which the hearer is instructed by the speaker to retrieve
the information carried by the sentence and enter it
into her/his knowledge-store.
where information is dened as that part of the propositional content which constitutes a contribution of knowledge to the hearer's knowledge-store. These instructions are meant to optimize the update of the hearer's knowledge-store by singling
out the informative part of the sentence and articulating the ground in such a way
as to indicate how this information ts the hearer's knowledge-store.
It was already pointed out in Ch. 2 that information packaging is suciently
distinct from other types of pragmatic understanding to grant it autonomous status
and, despite its close coexistence with logico-semantic meaning within the interpretive end of language, they also remain independent.48 Therefore, it was suggested
that the generation and interpretation of information packaging must be dealt with
in an autonomous module, i.e. informatics.
This chapter provides an account of the exact nature of the role of informatics
in the larger language apparatus. If building a coherent and comprehensive theory
As noted in Ch. 1 this belief is not universally held, and proposals that try to reduce information packaging to logico-semantic meaning exist, as well as proposals that, despite recognizing a
dierence between the two, require the presence of informational elements in the logico-semantic
representation. These proposals are addressed in Ch. 7.
48
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of informatics independent of these other interpretive modules proves feasible, it
constitutes indirect validation of the autonomy hypothesis assumed. This account
is based on the informational primitives discussed in x 3.2.2. It describes the means
by which this primitives interact to yield the information-packaging intructions and
the exact interpretation of these instructions.

4.1 The Role of Informatics
4.1.1 The Knowledge-store

The denition of information-packaging presented in Ch. 2 presupposes the existence
of a hearer's knowledge-store with a given structure. In order to be able to describe
the role of information-packaging in language understanding, it will be necessary rst
to discuss how the hearer's knowledge-store might be structured. To this purpose,
the le metaphor in Heim's File Change Semantics (Heim 1983) will be adapted.
Heim views discourse referents as le cards in a le. Before the beginning of a
discourse the hearer has a le with zero le cards (F0). As the discourse progresses
le cards are added and updated. For instance, after the utterance of (58), the
hearer puts the cards (59) in her/his le (ignoring the speaker's own le card):
(58)

Pat told me a weird story today.
addr.: pat

(59)

addr.: story( )
z

told to
speaker (pat)

weird( )
told by pat( )

z

z

z

In Heim's terms, the hearer has gone from an F0 to a given F1. As the discourse
continues, every utterance will cause a change of les from Fn to Fn+1. Given
the following three-utterance continuation to the discourse started with (58), the
hearer's F4 will contain the le cards and the entries in (61) (ignoring the le card
for `a story'):
(60)

She saw this man with a broccoli stalk.
Well, the guy starts munching on it,
and, lo and behold, he's arrested right away.
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addr.: pat
(61)

told to
speaker (pat)
saw (pat)
z

x

addr.: man( )
x

seen by pat( )
has ( )
munch on ( )
arrested( )
x

y x

y x

addr.: br. stalk( )
y

had by ( )
munched on by ( )
x y

x y

x

File F4 has three cards which list all the attributes and relations between them
specied by the propositional content of the sentences in (58) and (60). The le
change from F1 to F4 involved the update of Pat's le card and the addition of
cards for the man and the broccoli stalk and their update.
Heim's le, as pointed out in x 2.3.3, is akin to the notion of discourse model
viewed as a mental representation of the entities involved in a discourse and their
attributes and the links between them. For our purposes here, however, Heim's le
metaphor will be applied to the hearer's knowledge-store. The knowledge-store is
taken to be a large le with a number of le cards or addresses. Each address
denotes an entity and under each address there are a number of entries specifying
attributes and relations pertaining to that entity. Unlike in Heim's, there is no le
F0 before the beginning of a discourse, since the hearer's knowledge is not null at the
start of an interaction, i.e., at the start of a discourse the knowledge-store contains
addresses denoting hearer-old discourse-new (`unused') entities. So, for instance, in
(58) the hearer would not add a le card `Pat' because it would already be there
from previous shared knowledge.
How is the knowledge-store modied and updated? The referential status of
entities (cf. 2.3.2) plays a crucial role in this process. According to Heim and others,
an indenite NP will cause the hearer to start a new le card or create a new address
and a denite NP will indicate that an already-existing address must be activated. In
example (60) above, the indenites this man and a broccoli stalk instruct the hearer
to create a new address and the pronominal forms she, he, and it indicate that the
address they denote has been already created.49 The relations and attributes that
Actually, to be exact, there is a further dierence between denites in general and pronouns in
particular. Both denote preexistent addresses but dier in that pronouns denote salient preexistent
addresses (cf. Chafe 1976, Prince 1988b) and other denites nonsalient ones. In other words,
denites trigger an activation of a dormant preexistent address. Pronouns simply indicate that
their referent is in activation at the time of utterance.
49
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make up the propositional content of the utterances in (60) are then entered under
each one of the addresses involved in those utterances. In (61), the address for `man'
contains the knowledge that he was munching on a broccoli stalk and the address
for `broccoli stalk' contains the knowledge that it was being munched on by the
man. This re ects the fact that, after the discourse in (60), one knows ) about the
broccoli stalk that it was munched on, and ) about the man that he was munching
on a broccoli stalk.
The role of referential status marking in language understanding, then, is the
management of addresses in the hearer's knowledge-store: creation and activation
of addresses or le cards. This is not only the view in Heim 1983 and Prince 1988b,
for instance, but it agrees with the observation made repeatedly in the literature
(cf. x 2.3.2 above) that referential status is a property of NPs and/or referents
independent of the sentential context in which they occur.
This schematic view of the knowledge-store will be enough to allow a description
of the role of information packaging. Information packaging is concerned precisely
with the update of the knowledge-store only with respect to the entry of information.
In other words, while referential status marking is responsible for the creation of new
addresses or activation of existing addresses, information packaging is responsible
for the actual update of these addresses. It indicates what part of the utterance
constitutes information and, furthermore, it shows where this information goes and
how it ts under a particular address. This will be discussed in what follows.
a

b

4.1.2 Redundancy in the Entry of Data
In spite of its advantages and intuitive appeal, the le metaphor has an important
drawback: its ineciency. This ineciency is due to two charateristics of the le
metaphor: ) it does not take into account the knowledge already existent in the le,
and ) it requires multiple entry of the same propositional content. Let us discuss
them in this order.
a

b

Preexistent Knowledge
Suppose a speaker has just uttered sentence (62)a with the propositional content in
(62)b.
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(62)

a. The boss hated the salty broccoli quiche.
b. hated (the salty broccoli quiche, the boss)
Referential-status marking indicates, in this case, that no addresses need be created,
only that two already-existing addresses, `the boss' and `the salty broccoli quiche',
must be activated. Then the hearer must perform her/his ling task and must enter
this data into her/his knowledge-store. After this task is performed, a partial view
of the hearer's knowledge-store may be represented as in (63):
addr.: boss( )
addr.: br. quiche( )
x

(63)

y

hated ( )

salty( )
hated by ( )

y x

y

x y

There are two addresses, one for `the boss' and one for `the broccoli quiche', and
under each of them the relevant attributes, i.e. that the quiche was salty, and the
relations that hold between the two addresses, i.e. that the boss hated the quiche
and that the quiche was hated by the boss, are recorded.
Returning to the two hypothetical hearers H1 and H2 introduced in x 2.2, let us
again assume that H1 knows nothing about the existence of a connection between the
boss and the broccoli quiche and that H2 knows of the existence of such a connection
but does not know which one it is. The following is what their knowledge-store might
look like before proposition (62) is communicated, (64) for H1 and (65) for H2:
(64) H1:
addr.: boss( )
addr.: br. quiche( )
x

y

salty( )
y

(65) H2:
addr.: boss( )

addr.: br. quiche( )

x

y

()

salty( )
by ( )

y x

y

x y

The di erence in what H1 and H2 know is represented in the di erence between the
content of the le cards in (64) and (65). In (64) there is no information about the
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connection between the boss and broccoli, but in the case of (65), both the knowledge
of the connection and the fact that the nature of this connection is unknown must
be represented. This is done by means of the blank ( ).
Within the le metaphor, however, there is no way to take this di erence into
account. Propositional content is entered in the same way independent of what the
hearer may or may not already know. This process is not very ecient given that
some of the entry of data in the case of H2, for instance, is totally redundant and
unnecessary. What is needed to avoid the redundant entry of data is the notion
of information. A view of data entry in terms of propositional content does not
allow us to take into account the distinction between H1's knowledge-store and H2's
knowledge-store. Information does, since it is dened precisely with respect to the
hearer's knowledge-store. As noted above, it is information that is responsible for
the di erent structural encodings of the proposition in (62) when addressing H1,
shown in (66)a, or when addressing H2, shown in (66)b:
(66) a. The boss hated "F the salty broccoli quiche ].
b. The boss hated the salty broccoli quiche.
Speakers are sensitive to the di erent make-ups of di erent hearers' knowledgestores and package the proposition they want to communicate in di erent packaging
instructions accordingly. Even though the propositional content of (66)a-b is the
same, the information they carry is di erent. The marking of information allows for
a more ecient process of data entry, since the hearer need not re-record knowledge
s/he already has.

Multiple Entry
In the discussion around the discourse in (60) it was pointed out that in Heim's
approach|and indeed in any other discourse model account|the propositional
content encoded in a given sentence is recorded on every le card whose referent is evoked in the discourse. Under the address for `man', for instance, it was
entered that he was munching on a broccoli stalk, and under `broccoli stalk' it was
entered that it was being munched on by a man. This means that the same knowledge is entered into the hearer's knowledge-store twice or more depending on how
many participants are involved in a given utterance. The updating of the hearer's
knowledge-store after sentence (67),
71

(67)

The boss gave Mary a broccoli stalk.

would require that the same propositional content be entered three times, one for
each address involved in the sentence.50 As noted, this seems to be a necessary
process to guarantee that all the knowledge one has about a given entity is available
when evoking that entity.
There is, however, another way to achieve the same results. The traditional
le metaphor is based on a now `old-fashioned' ling system. Let us consider the
following example: in 1950 Smith's Body Shop from Anytown, a new customer,
purchased 25 alternators from Jones Auto Parts. Mrs. Jones kept a customer le,
where she kept track of their purchases, a stock le, where she kept track of the
inventory, and a third le containing le cards for each city in her business area,
where she listed all customers from that city. After Smith's purchase Mrs. Jones
had to update three le cards. She had to create a le card for Smith's Body
Shop and enter that he had purchased 25 alternators, update the `alternator' card
by registering Smith's purchase and subtracting 25 alternators from the stock, and
update the `Anytown' card by adding Smith's Body Shop to the list of customers in
Anytown. This process is parallel to the process assumed to take place in the entry
of data into the hearer's knowledge-store from the perspective of a traditional le
metaphor.
Suppose now the same purchase takes place in 1990. Mrs. Jones abandoned her
les and acquired a computer where she still keeps track of the same data. After
Smith's purchase, Mrs. Jones enters the following data into her database: Smith's
Body Shop from Anytown, 25 alternators. She only enters the data once, probably
under the `Smith's Body Shop' card, but if she wants to check her stock, she can
call up the `alternator' card and will nd that the sale of 25 alternators to Smith's
Body Shop has been registered there too, and if she wants to see which customers
she has in Anytown, she may call up the `Anytown' card and Smith's Body Shop
will be there.
This, of course, is how any current database or hypercard program works. It is
clearly less costly and it achieves the same results. This hypercard eciency can
be applied to the le-structured knowledge-store quite straightforwardly. Let us
Independently, the hearer is instructed here, via referential-status marking, to activate the
preexistent addresses `the boss' and `Mary' and create a new address for `a broccoli stalk'.
50
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consider sentence (67) again. The updating of the hearer's knowledge-store need
not require that the data be entered three times. It may be entered only under, let
us say, `the boss' and is then made available somehow to the other two addresses
corresponding to the other participants in the sentence. This availability may be
achieved in two ways. The data may be entered under the other addresses at a later
stage, or the other addresses may get a crossreference index corresponding to the
address `John' through which the relevant knowledge stored under `John' becomes
accessible. The second option is chosen for expository purposes, but the implications
of each option are left unexplored:
addr. 153: boss( )
addr. 212: mary
addr. 10007: br. stalk( )
x

(68)

gave Mary
a br. stalk( )

y

"cf. 153]

"cf. 153]

x

The information-packaging articulation of the sentence is also responsible for the
entry of data in this hypercard fashion, thus avoiding the redundancy that would
otherwise arise. As noted, a packaging instruction does not merely signal what the
information of the sentence is, it further species how this information contributes
to the hearer's knowledge. This is the role played by the ground, with specic
subtasks for both the link and the tail. First, given a certain information, where in
her/his knowledge-store must the hearer enter it? Taking the discussion above into
account, it is proposed that the particular task of the link as an address-pointer is
to `point to' the address in the hearer's knowledge-store under which information
is entered. In example (67) the boss is the link. This means that the address `the
boss' in the hearer's knowledge-store is designated as the address under which the
oncoming information of the sentence must be entered. This avoids the need for
multiple entry under several addresses, thus improving in eciency the necessary
task of knowledge-store update.
Second, there are cases where knowledge communicated to the hearer in a
given proposition partially overlaps with knowledge already present in the hearer's
knowledge-store. Without the notion of information, the entry of propositional content becomes redundant in this respect as well. The ground, and specically the tail,
allows the hearer to relate the information in the sentence with the relevant knowledge already present in her/his knowledge-store in the way to be detailed below.
73

This potential second source of ineciency is avoided as well, thanks to information
packaging.

4.1.3 Information Packaging as Data Entry
Information packaging must be viewed then as being responsible for the entry of
data into the hearer's knowledge-store. If propositional content were entered into
the hearer's knowledge-store without any further articulation, as in the traditional
le metaphor, the result would be a very inecient system of data-entry. The
role of information packaging is to achieve an ecient and nonredundant update of
the hearer's knowledge-store. By representing not only propositional content but
also information, natural language improves the overall eciency of the process of
communication.
The role of informatics as a linguistic component, then, is to generate and interpret packaging instructions. Structuring sentences into information-packaging intructions is as fundamental a part of language production as encoding propositional
content in sentence structure, and interpreting these instructions is as important
as decoding propositional content. Information is superimposed on or represented
in parallel with propositional content. The interpretation of both types of `meaning' must remain independent. The propositional content of a sentence represents
knowledge that speakers have and wish to communicate to hearers. This knowledge
speakers have is, in principle, denable independently of the hearer that will benet
from receiving it. Information is a re ection of the speaker's assumptions about the
hearer's knowledge-store. When speakers wish to communicate a proposition they
take into account how much of the knowledge represented in that proposition will
actually contribute something to the hearer's knowledge-store. Information packaging is crucially a ected by the linguistic context by virtue of this dependence on
the speaker's assumptions about the hearer's knowledge and attentional state, but
propositional content is constant across speaker-hearer interactions.
Information is a notion relevant for the entry of data into the heare's knowledgestore. What is entered in the knowledge-store is information what is in the knowledge-store is knowledge. In other words, the knowledge-store contains knowledge
but receives information. The speaker's knowledge must be `squeezed' into informa74

tion in order to be transferred to the hearer's knowledge-store. Squeezing propositions into instructions increases the ecency of the transfer by avoiding all redundancy in the process of data entry into the hearer's knowledge-store. Informatics,
then, is not concerned with the interpretation or the representation of meaning in the
sentential structure, but with the interpretation and representation of information
for the purposes of data entry into the knowledge-store.
Having stated what the exact role of informatics is within the larger task of
language production and understanding, let us now proceed to a description of the
manner in which this role is carried out by discussing the elements of the theory.

4.2 Elements of the Theory
4.2.1 Primitives

The primitives of the theory and their hierarchical conguration were introduced
and discussed in x 3.2.2. It is the trinomial hierarchical articulation in (69) (=(44)):

S=ffocus, groundg
ground=flink, tailg
This articulation is based on the insights of the proposals previously made in
the literature. In particular, it re ects both the focus-ground split (i.e. focuspresupposition, focus/open-proposition, or focus-background) and the fact that within the ground there generally is a `special' topiclike element, the link, which appears
in sentence-initial position (analogous, with the provisos noted in Ch. 3, to the topic
in the topic-comment framework or the theme in the theme-rheme approach).
These primitives and their arrangement in a given sentence make up the information-packaging instruction represented by that sentence. The instruction is the
central object in the informatics, much in the same way the proposition is the
central object in the semantics. In order to represent these packaging instructions,
we will need to introduce some notation. The notation used may resemble on some
occasions the language used in representing logico-semantic meaning. It must be
emphasized, though, that the instructions spelled out in this manner evidently do
not represent logico-semantic meaning but information packaging. Any similarity
between the two is, therefore, purely notational.
(69)
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Before starting the discussion of the di erent instructions that can be construed
with these atomic primitives, one notational detail must be introduced. Information
packaging, as noted, is concerned with the representation of information and the
directions needed to enter that information into the hearer's knowledge-store. It
was also noted that every uttered sentence must provide some information since
otherwise there is no raison d'^etre for the sentence to exist in normal communication.
Let us represent the (variable amount of) information that all sentences must
provide as in (70):
(70)

+ " information ]

The symbol + (capital phi) stands for an informational one-place operator. It will be
called `focus operator'. Everything within its scope (the clause) is informative, i.e.,
the scope of + constitutes all the information provided by the sentence. Given that
packaging instructions are a speaker-designed information-retrieval mechanism for
the hearer, the operator + may be read procedurally as `retrieve', and the instruction
in (70) as `retrieve information', whatever the value of this information may be.
The structure in (70) is the simplest of information-packaging instructions, where
an entire sentence is information, corresponding to the all-focus sentences seen in
x 3.2.3. Many times, however, not all of the sentence is information: a ground is licensed to indicate how the information must be entered into the hearer's knowledgestore. Sentences with a ground correspond to the link-focus, link-focus-tail, and
focus-tail structures discussed in x 3.2.3. Let us now turn to the structure of these
more complex instructions.

4.2.2 Packaging Instructions and Interpretation
The information carried by the sentence is encoded by the focus constituent, even
though its informational force is a relational property crucially dependent on its
relation with the ground. This means that the focus will always be within the scope
of +, but, as will be seen in a moment, the focus, strictly speaking, is not all there
can be within the scope of +. The ground, in contrast, is not information, its only
informational force being to permit the appropriate entry of information into the
hearer's knowledge-store. Therefore, it cannot appear within the scope of +.
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Let us start by looking at the informational value of links. Links, as part of
the ground, play the anchoring role in the instruction. It was noted in x 3.2.2 that
the link was an address pointer of sorts. In the previous section, it was concluded
that links point toward the address in the hearer's knowledge-store under which
the information of the sentence must be entered. It instructs hearers to `go to' the
address it denotes in their knowledge-store and then enter the information provided
by the sentence under that address. Links, therefore, are informationally interpreted
as a bipartite element: the instruction `go to' and the address hearers are instructed
to go to.
This interpretation may be represented with a quantier-like element that will
be called , (capital lambda): , is read `go to ' and the address denoted by the
link constitutes the range of . The representation of the link is, then, as in (71)a
(for an address ), while (71)b is the representation of the link expression the boss
in the link-focus sentence The boss called, which is read `go to address `the boss' ':
(71) a. , = .
b. , =the boss.
The fact that the information of the sentence is to be entered under the address
denoted by the link is represented by the latter taking scope over this information.
The informational task of the link|pointing to a given address|is independent of
the referential status of the NP that acts as link. A denite NP instructs the hearer
to activate a preexisting address whether the NP is a link or not. But only if it is a
link will the hearer be instructed to go to that address and enter information under
it. Links tend to be denite NPs becuase, as a default, the speaker cannot point to
an address in the hearer's knowledge-store if that address is not there already. It
is not impossible, however, to instruct the hearer to create an address and to point
to that address simultaneously. This is the case in sentences where the link is an
indenite NP. The exact way in which the link takes scope over the information of
the sentence will be discussed further after the notation for focus is introduced.
The focus, which must be entirely within the scope of +, will be represented by
simply writing it in boldface within that scope. The actual formalization of an allfocus sentence, therefore, will not be as in (70) above, but as in (72)a. A particular
instantiation of this instruction, for the all-focus sentence F The boss called ] is
(72)b:
x

x

x



x x



x x
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a. + " focus ]
b. +" the boss called ]
Taking this into account, a link-focus sentence may be represented in the following
manner. The link's relation to the information of the sentence is represented through
a quantier-variable structure, i.e. the quantier , binds a variable in the clause, as
shown in (73)a. In (73)b, this abstract instruction is illustrated with the particular
instruction for the link-focus sentence The boss called:
(72)

a. , = " + " focus ]]
b. , =the boss " +" called ]]
The instruction in (73) is the instruction encoded in all link-focus sentences. It
combines the interpretation of the link with the interpretation of the focus operator.
From a speaker's point of view, it may be procedurally read as follows: `I instruct
you to go to address in your knowledge-store and then retrieve the information
of the sentence by adding focus under .' Or, in the case of (73)b, `I instruct
you to go to the address \the boss" in your knowledge-store and then retrieve the
information of the sentence by adding under \the boss" that he called.' It is clear
now why it was noted that the focus is not all that stays within the scope of + the
variable bound by the link-operator is also found within that scope. As will be seen
below, the fact that this variable bound by the link remains within the scope of +
is actually quite important for the interpretation of information packaging.
Finally, the notation for the tail must be introduced. The tail, being part of the
ground, must escape the scope of +. This may be represented by abstracting the
tail away from the clause, leaving a variable behind within the scope of +. This
`abstraction' will be represented by means of a lambda-like construct. The graph
will be borrowed from the lambda-calculus used in logical semantics. Again, it must
be pointed out that all that is borrowed is the symbol, but none of the semantics of
the lambda-calculus. The notation for tails is illustrated in (74) for a given tail :
(73)

x x



x

x x

x









(74)

" +" focus ]] ( )

x

x



The tail's task, as noted above, is to further specify how the information must
be entered under a given address. If the ground contains a tail it means that the
information of the sentence cannot be simply added under the address denoted by the
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link. Instead, it indicates that part of the proposition communicated is knowledge
already contained under that address and that the information of the sentence must
be construed in some way with that knowledge instead of merely added.
But how exactly does the presence of a tail a ect the nature of the packaging instruction? The operator + instructs the hearer to retrieve the information contained
in its scope, but in the discussion on the representation of link-focus sentences, the
operator + was read as `retrieve information by adding focus'. This is because the
operator + actually comes in two brands: `retrieve information by adding focus'
and `retrieve information by substituting focus for the blank in the ground \link
tail" (which is already under the address denoted by the link)'. These may be
abbreviated as `retrieve-add' and `retrieve-substitute'. What the presence of the
tail does in a given packaging instruction is alter the nature of +, turning it from a
`retrieve-add' to a `retrieve-substitute'.
Let us see this by comparing the link-focus sentence in (75) with the link-focustail one in (76). The (b) examples are the representations of the packaging instruction they encode (instruction (76) represents both the link-operator and the tail in
one instruction):
(75)

a. The boss "F hates broccoli ].
b. , 1, 1 = the boss " +" 1 hates broccoli ]]
x

(76)

x

x

a. The boss hates broccoli.
b. , 1, 1 = the boss " 2" +"
x

x

x

1

x

hates

2

x

]] (broccoli)

Both (75) and (76) have the same link. The representation of the link is, therefore,
identical in both sentences, and can be read as `I instruct you to go to the address
\the boss" and then ' Once the address denoted by the link is `gone to', the hearer
is in a position to retrieve the information provided by the sentence, at least in the
case of (75). In the case of (76), the hearer needs to know more about the way in
which the information must be entered.
This di erence is re ected in the distinction between `retrieve-add' and `retrievesubstitute'. In (75), the instruction continues ` and then retrieve the information
of the sentence by adding under \the boss" that he hates broccoli'. In the tailful
(76), the instruction continues ` and then retrieve the information of the sentence
by substituting hates for the blank in he broccoli, which is already under \the
:::

:::

:::
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boss" '. In other words, in (75) the information `hates broccoli' is merely added
under `the boss', while in (76) the information `hates' is taken to ll the gap in the
knowledge already existent under `the boss', since under this address there is already
an entry for ` broccoli'. This lling of the gap is represented by the tail's triggering
of the retrieve-substitute brand of +. The tail, then, in the fashion discussed above,
prevents the hearer from redundantly treating part of the proposition communicated
by the hearer as information. A tailful instruction directs the hearer to some entry
under a given address and indicates that the focus completes or alters in some way
that entry.
The previous discussion shows how informational primitives interact and combine
to form packaging instructions. The number of possible packaging instructions totals
four, corresponding to the four informational articulations discussed in x 3.2.3. The
following is a list of the four possible informational articulations of a sentence and
the packaging instructions associated with them. Their interpretation is discussed
in detail immediately below:
1. Link-focus: , 1,
x

1

x

= " +"


1

x

focus ]]

2. All-focus: +" focus ]
3. Link-focus-tail: , 1,
x

4. Focus-tail:

2"

x

1

x

= "

+" focus

2 " +" x1



x

2

]( )

x

focus 2 ]] ( )
x





The basic constant informational operator is the one-place +, which takes scope over
the clause. In the informatics, every sentence is interpreted as having the minimal
structure `+" information ]', i.e., it is interpreted as `retrieve the information carried
by the sentence'. This is a mere representation of the fact that all sentences must
carry information. More complex instructions are derived from this basic skeleton.
Their purpose, as noted above, is to assure a nonredundant entry of information
into the hearer's knowledge-store.
All-focus sentences represent the simplest of instructions, their structure being
identical to the basic skeleton `+" information ]'. The information in the sentence
is carried by the entire structure, i.e., the focus is the entire sentence. This was
represented as in (77):
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(77)

+" focus ]

The following sentences are the examples of all-focus structure that were seen in
x 3.2.3, and (c) represents the instruction each sentence encodes):
(78)

a. "F The boss called ].
b. "F Ha trucat l'amo ].
c. +" the boss called ]

(79)

a. Waiter! "F There's a y in my cream of broccoli soup ]!
b. Cambrer! "F Tinc una mosca a la crema de broquil ]!
c. +" (there's) a y in my cream of broccoli soup ]

(80)

a. What doesn't the boss like?
broccoli.
b. Que no li agrada, a l'amo?
el broquil.
c. + " broccoli ]
Their interpretation is as follows. Sentence (78), already seen in (72), is interpreted
in the following terms (from a hearer's point of view): `I am instructed to retrieve
the information of the sentence by adding to my knowledge-store that the boss
called'. Similarly, in (79), the waiter informationally interprets the sentence as `I
am instructed to retrieve the information of the sentence by adding to my knowledgestore that there is a y in the speaker's soup'. Basically, what this instruction says is
that the entire propositional content is a contribution of knowledge to the knowledgestore, i.e., that the information of the sentence is equivalent to its propositional
content. Sentence (80) is of a di erent kind and will be discussed in a moment.
The linkless sentences just discussed are peculiar in that no particular address
in the hearer's knowledge-store is specied for the subsequent entry of information.
These all-focus sentences have been described as portraying a state of a airs or
event (cf. e.g. Sasse 1987), i.e., contrary to link-focus sentences, all-focus sentences
are not `about' a specic entity. This intuition is captured by having the information
of the sentence be entered under a temporary or situation address. The contents
of this situation address are not meant to be permanent the way the content of
regular addresses is. Before the contents of the situation address are deleted they
are transferred to the addresses of the entities that participate in the discourse by
means of the mechanisms described in the previous sections.
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The link indicates that information must be entered under the address denoted
by the link. Links are interpreted as `go to address (the range of being determined by the denotation of the link phrase) and under +'. The following are the
interpretations for some of the sentences in x3.2.3 (the example The boss called
has been discussed already):
x

x

x

(81)

a. The boss "F visited a broccoli plantation in colombia ].
b. L'amo "F va visitar una plantacio de broquil a colombia ].
c. , 1, 1= the boss " +" 1 visited a broccoli plantation in Col. ]]
x

(82)

x

x

a. The boss1 "F I wouldn't bother t1].
b. L'amo1 "F no l'emprenyaria t1].
c. , 1, 1= the boss " +" I wouldn't bother 1]]
x

x

x

A hearer interprets the instruction encoded in (81) as `I am instructed to go to the
address \the boss" and then retrieve the information of the sentence by adding under
\the boss" that he visited a broccoli plantation in Colombia', and the one encoded
in (82) as `I am instructed to go to the address \the boss" and then retrieve the
information of the sentence by adding under \the boss" that the speaker wouldn't
bother him'.51
The discussion around example (76) showed already how tailful sentences are
interpreted, but they will be reviewed here as well for the sake of completion. While
the presence of a link indicates that information must be entered under a given
address, the presence of a tail indicates that, under the address denoted by the link,
the information lls a gap in some partial entry instead of being a mere addition.
This property of tails was captured by saying that it alters the nature of + from
a `retrieve-add' to a `retrieve-substitute'. Let us illustrate this with the following
examples:
(83)

a. The boss hates broccoli.
b. L'amo l'odia, el broquil.
c. , 1, 1 = the boss " 2" +"
x

x

x

1

x

hates

2

x

]] (

broccoli

)

In the sentence representing this instruction there is a subject pronoun I which is not part of
the focus, but still appears within the scope of . The role of pronouns in information packaging
will be discussed in x 4.3.3 below.
51
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(84)

a. I can't believe this! The boss is going crazy!
broccoli, he wants now.
b. No m'ho hagues cregut mai! L'amo esta ben boig!
broquil, vol ara.
c. 1" +" he 1broccoli ] (wants)
x

x

Sentence (83), as mentioned, is interpreted as `I am instructed to go to the address
\the boss" and then retrieve the information of the sentence by substituting hates
for the blank in the boss broccoli which is already under \the boss" '. `Hates' is
not merely added, but substituted for the gap in the entry ` broccoli( )' under
boss( ). This is what distinguishes (83) from its corresponding tailless sentence.
Example (84), in contrast, has no link, since it is assumed that the hearer is
already at the address under which information must be entered. As noted, links
are pointers. They are only necessary if the hearer needs to go to a given address
to enter the information of the sentence under that address. At the time a sentence
Sn is uttered, the hearer is located at a given address , under which s/he was
entering the information of sentence Sn;1. If Sn is a linkful sentence, the hearer is
instructed to move to another address before proceeding to enter the information
carried by Sn. However, if the information in Sn is to be entered under , there is
no need to instruct the hearer to move to a di erent address, since s/he is currently
at already. Therefore, the presence of a link is unnecessary in Sn, which will be a
linkless sentence.
Therefore, the hearer would interpret the instruction of sentence (84) as `I am
instructed to retrieve the information of the sentence by substituting broccoli for
the blank in he wants under the current address.' Example (80), the all-focus
sentence fragment seen above, is parallel to (84) in that a link is rendered unnecessary. But, in addition, (80) requires no tail either, since (the speaker assumes) the
hearer needs no ground at all to enter the infromation of the sentence appropriately.
The instruction encoded in (80) is then `I am instructed to retrieve the information
of the sentence (fragment) by adding broccoli under the current address'.52
The instruction interpretations discussed in this section have been spelled out in
a rather cumbersome way. For convenience, the following shorthand notation will
also be used:
x

x

a

b

a

a

What gets added is not actually `broccoli' but ` 1 v broccoli', where the free variables are
independently identiable. See x 4.3.3 and x 5.3 for discussion.
52

x

83

x

1. All-focus (+A): retrieve-add(focus)
2. Link-focus (,, +A): go-to(link), retrieve-add(focus)
3. Link-focus-tail (,, +S): go-to(link), retrieve-substitute(focus)
4. Focus-tail (+S): retrieve-substitute(focus)
The account of informatics presented in this chapter explains how from the informational articulation of the sentence, encoded by syntactic and prosodic means, one
may derive the packaging instructions that indicate to hearers what the information
of the sentence is. The four instructions proposed are derived in a systematic way
from the informational primitives of the sentence. Moreover, these four instructions
seem to cover most, if not all, the informational articulations described in the literature. In the remainder of this chapter, some further features of this theory of
informatics will be discussed.

4.3 Features of the Theory
4.3.1 Motivation

The account of informatics presented in the previous section is empirically based on
the informational primitives identied in the literature as revised above in x 3.2. It is
further validated by its wide coverage, attained with only a very small set of instructions. Nevertheless, there are other motivations, both empirical and conceptual, for
the particular representations chosen. These further motivations are discussed in
this section.
One of the features of the theory is the representation of links as informational
quantiers in quantier-variable structures. There is an additional clear empirical
motivation for viewing links as quantier-variable structures. Links, given their
informational task, are inherently sentence-initial. Now, if the link phrase is a
complement or an adjunct|or a subject in a VS language|it must move from its
postverbal thematic position to the sentence-initial slot leaving a gap behind. The
result is clearly a surface conguration where the link c-commands the clause and
binds its trace. This syntactic conguration, is matched, in the informatics, by a
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quantier-variable structure where the link-operator takes scope over the clause and
binds a variable in it.
A putative exception to this syntactic conguration is the case of the subject
in languages with basic SV order. Subjects in English, for instance, tend to be
interpreted as links, given their default existential force (cf. Horn 1989), but there
is no movement and trace-binding structure to represent it. In the last few years,
however, a number of proposals for both Romance and Germanic languages have
appeared that suggest that the surface sentence-initial position of the subject is a
derived one.53 If these proposals are correct, even preverbal subjects would t the
pattern. In any event, the quantier-variable structure in the informatics matches
a generalized XP1-t1 structure in the syntax.
In packaging instructions, tails, like links, are removed from the scope of + to
re ect the fact that they are part of the ground and, therefore, not informative.
This characteristic of tails was formalized by abstracting the tail phrase from the
scope of +. It is interesting that in several languages, including Catalan, French
and Italian, the phrases that make up the tail are found in a derived position as
well. Thus, in these languages, tail phrases are removed from the clause by means
of a right-detachment, as in Catalan (85) (=(4) in Ch. 1) and Italian (86) (the (b)
sentences are the corresponding canonicals):
(85)

a. L'amo l1' odia t1, el broquil1.
the.boss obj 3s-hate the broccoli
`The boss hates broccoli.'
b. L'amo odia el broquil.

(86)

a. Il capo li1 odia t1, i broccoli1.
the boss obj 3s-hate the broccoli
`The boss hates brocccoli.'
b. Il capo odia i broccoli.

The presence of the clitic object pronominals (l1 and li1) in the (a) sentences reveals
that the tail phrases, coindexed with these clitics, are not in their base positions,
Cf. Fukui & Speas 1986, Kroch, Heycock & Santorini 1988, Bonet 1988, Fernandez-Soriano
1989, Santorini 1989. We will return to this issue in Chs. 5 and 6. All preverbal subjects in Catalan
are interpreted as links, but that is not the case in English. Most are, but some are not, as in the
case of F The BOSS called ] (cf. the `ambiguity' of subjects with regard to their existential force
of lack thereof Horn 1989 suggests that the former are topics and the latter are not).
53
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since cooccurrence of clitic and argument is otherwise illicit. In this respect, Catalan
and Italian di er from English.
As a result of detaching both links and tails from the clause, the core clause is
left, at the surface, containing only the focus of the sentence. In other words, these
languages seem to re ect information packaging in a much more salient way than,
for example, English, involving not only prosody but the syntax in the process. The
informational representation of sentences proposed in the previous chapter re ects
closely these structural operations performed in Catalan and Italian, with respect
to both links and tails.
A di erent kind of empirical motivation comes from the fact that with the representation proposed above, one is able to re ect the relational nature of informational
properties without any need for stipulation. As pointed out in x 4.2.2, the focus is
not all there is within the scope of the focus operator +. This is indeed the case
in all-focus sentences, but as soon as there is a ground, one or more variables are
found with the focus within the clause, bound by either the link-operator or the
tail's -like operator. Let us illustrate this with the by now familiar instruction in
(87):


(87)

a. The boss hates broccoli.
b. L'amo l1'odia t1, el broquil1.
c. , 1, 1 = the boss " 2" +" 1 hates 2 ]] (
)
The presence of these variables within the scope of +, i.e. within the information of
the sentence, is not accidental. The clause portion in the instruction (87)c,
(88)

+"

x

x

x

1

hates

x

2

x

x

x

broccoli

]

re ects the fact that the information to be retrieved by the hearer is not just `hates'
in isolation but ` 1 hates 2', where the values of the variables are xed by the
operators that bind them. In other words, the information of the sentence is `hates'
but only when interpreted with respect to the ground `the boss is in some relation
with broccoli'.
This crucial relational nature of focus has been defended by many authors in
the literature and is the gist of Prince's (1981, 1986) account of focus, in which the
`new information' carried by the sentence is the fact that the focus instantiates the
x

x
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variable in the open-proposition (see x 3.1.4 above). The representation proposed
for tailful sentences adopts Prince's insight straightforwardly.
There is also an important conceptual motivation behind this representation. If
the view of information packaging argued for in this study is correct, the purpose
behind information-packaging instructions is to optimize the entry of information
in the hearer's knowledge-store. They single out what part of the sentence makes a
contribution to the hearer's knowledge-store and indicate where and how the hearer
should enter that contribution. Information therefore, is central to the packaging
instruction. As noted, all sentences must carry information since, otherwise, there
is, in principle, no informational reason for the utterance to exist.
Most semantic and syntactic analyses of focus (cf. Chs. 6 and 7) put forward
representations of focus-background structure where the focus is the element that
is, in some way or another (as a quantier-like element or a -abstracted term),
abstracted away from the sentence to a peripheral position. Such an approach does
not re ect the core status of focus as the informational motivation of the sentence.
The representation proposed here captures this conceptual point by taking the allfocus sentences as basic and have + take scope over the clause. The cases where
there is a ground are, in some sense, derived from this basic all-focus structure by
abstracting away the ground phrases, so that they can perform their task as dataentry instructions. In other words, a link and a tail exist only when they are needed
to make sure that information is entered appropriately.
Taking this stance, we automatically obtain an ecient handling of the all-focus
and the link-focus sentences, where most of the overt material is focal. In representations of focus that take the ground as basic and have the focus raise to a peripheral
position, the incorporation of all-focus and link-focus cases is problematic.54


4.3.2 Some Facts Captured
There are a number of additional facts discussed in the pragmatic literature that the
account as presented above did not incorporate directly but that are nevertheless
captured in an indirect way. One is the feeling of `aboutness' that has inspired the
See, for example, Rochemont's (1986) development of an LF rule of Focus Raising within
the Government & Binding Theory of syntax, where all-focus sentences are focus-raised in their
entirety leaving an empty clause behind (cf. Ch. 6).
54
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notion of topic. Contrary to the view of the topic-comment approach, aboutness
here is not a causal correlate of linkhood, but just a consequence of the fact that the
information carried by the sentence is entered under the address denoted by the link.
This is why speakers intuitively feel that, in some sense, the sentence is about the
link and not about the other entities involved in the sentence, whose addresses are
updated only via crossreferencing. Two other facts that are also incorporated into
our analysis are contrastiveness and felicity conditions in topicalization. Discussion
of these two issues, which was postponed above, is undertaken in this section.

Contrast
Contrast is a discourse notion which is found pervasively in the literature. Even
though it is considered a primitive in, for example, Kuno 1972 and Chafe 1976, it
has no place in our informational articulation. Contrast, however, is not a unied
phenomenon in that there exist two distinct types. These two types of contrast are
evident in examples (89) and (90):
(89)

Broccoli I like,
but pork rinds I hate.

(90)

She gave a shirt to Harry, not a tuxedo.

There is a feeling of contrast both between the link phrases in (89) and in the focus
of (90). Chafe seems to con ate the two in his `foci of contrast', but, as Szabolcsi
(1981:158) observes, these two types of contrast are di erent in nature. We may
label them link-contrast and focus-contrast.
Prince (1984:220), writing about felicity conditions for topicalization, argues that
link-contrast is not a primitive but a derived notion. In her account of topicalization
the topicalized phrase must represent an entity already evoked in the discourse, or
else an entity standing in a salient set relation to another evoked discourse entity.
The feeling of contrast that is obtained in most topicalizations is just an artifact of
the set understanding that licenses the construction. Prince's formulation is later
modied in Ward 1985 and Ward & Prince 1986, as will be seen in the next section,
but they all share the view that contrastiveness is derivable as a `side-e ect' of the
actual reason for topicalization.
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In fact, link-contrast is also a derived notion from the perspective of aboutness.
If a sentence is understood as being about a topic, then it may be understood that
it is not about another topic, given the right opposition exists between both topics.
In our system, link-contrast is derived in a similar way. If in (89), for instance, the
hearer is told that s/he has to go to the address `broccoli' and enter the information
of the sentence there, then it must mean that another (related) address like `pork
rinds' should not be `gone to', and that, therefore, the information must not be
entered under it. Link-contrast can be derived, then, the way it was derived in
previous acounts.
Ward 1985, in order to account for the contrastive or set feeling of foci (focuscontrast), proposes that foci must belong to a relevant scale. Ward argues that
the variable in the open-proposition must be on a scale and that the focus that
instantiates the variable represents a value on that scale. Ward's proposal is valid
for standard focus/open-proposition structures, but if one expands the notion of
focus to include the focus in cases of all-focus and link-focus sentences, his approach
loses some appeal, since it would be hard to nd a scale for, let us say, all-focus
sentences. In our theory, focus-contrast is also a derived notion. As Ward points
out, contrast occurs, for the most part, in the focus/open-proposition sentences,
i.e. our link-focus-tail and focus-tail structures. In these tailful structures the focus
operator + is interpreted not as retrieve-add but as retrieve-substitute, i.e.
retrieve the information of the sentence by substituting `focus' for the blank in the
relevant ground frame. The blank in the relevant ground frame may be a real blank,
as is in the examples discussed so far or the context in (91), where the utterer of
(91)b assumes his/her hearer has the entry ` broccoli( )' under the boss.
x

(91)

a. S1 So we gave him "=the boss] this huge bouquet of broccoli for
his birthday and it looked like he was very happy with it.
b. S2 I don't get it. The boss HATES broccoli.
But the blank need not be a real blank. It may be some preexistent element that the
hearer is instructed to substitute in an entry under a given address. For example,
in (90), a shirt is meant as a substitute for a tuxedo, i.e., the speaker assumes that
the hearer has the entry `gave a tuxedo to Harry( )' under the current address
and indicates with his/her informational encoding that `a tuxedo' must be removed
and substituted by `a shirt'. What is substituted here is not a real blank but the
x

89

entry segment `a tuxedo', so that after (90) is uttered the entry under the current
address is not `gave a tuxedo to harry( )' but `gave a shirt to Harry( )'. It is clear
that in this case there is an inherent contrast between the two arguments of the
focus operator `substitute x for y', one of which is the focus. In example (90), the
contrastive feeling is provided by the operation of substitution carried out from `a
tuxedo' to `a shirt'. The blank notation, then, is used as shorthand for any element
that gets substituted in the manner described, be it a real blank or a preexistent
elements that needs substitution.
x

x

Felicity in Topicalization
When the incompleteness of coverage in the focus-background articulation was discussed in x 3.1.4, it was mentioned that there was a sound proposal to cover the gap
in the work of Prince 1981, Ward 1985, and Ward & Prince 1986. Ward & Prince
1986, for instance, argue convincingly that the correct generalization capturing what
felicity conditions must be met for topicalization to be licit is as follows:
Discourse Condition on Preposing in Topicalization:
The entity represented by the preposed constituent must be related, via
a salient partially ordered set relation "poset], to one or more entities
already evoked in the discourse model. (1986:4)
This criterion seems to account for all the data at hand, but there is one objection
that may be raised: that this condition on preposing is a necessary condition but not
a sucient one. In other words, there may be NPs that encode entities that are related via a poset to another entity in the discourse model which nevertheless appear
in situ and not in a preposed slot. An example is (92), from Ward (1985:ex.109):
(92)

Colonel Bykov had delivered to Chambers in Washington six
Bokhara rugs which he directed Chambers to present as gifts from
him and the Soviet Government to the members of the ring who
had been most co-operative. One of these rugs Chambers delivered
to Harry Dexter White. Another he gave to
Here it is not only the preposed phrase one of these rugs which is in a poset relation
with an entity in the previous discourse (set-subset), but also Chambers (identity),
and Harry Dexter White (set-subset HDW is a member of the ring).
:::

90

There is one way, however, in which Prince and Ward's insight with respect to
preposing can be adapted into the approach presented here. Given the interpretation
of links as denoting an address in the knowledge-store and an instruction to go
to that address, Ward & Prince's Discourse Condition can be reinterpreted as a
constraint in the mutual accessibility of these addresses. In other words, hearers
cannot jump from one address to the other unless those two addresses are related via
a poset relation. The ban on the preposing of constituents that denote addresses that
fail to be in a poset relation with some already-evoked address is, then, a re ection
of the fact that the address the hearer is instructed to go to is not accessible from
the address s/he is at at the time of utterance. Only addresses that are in a poset
relation with the current address are accessible. This observation on the poset
relation condition on the mutual accessibility of addresses is, of course, made with
a speculative slant. It remains for a more general theory of cognition to determine
whether this observation is a valuable one or not.

4.3.3 Pronouns

It was mentioned in passing in x 4.2.2 above that the role of pronouns in our
information-packaging instructions needed further discussion. This section is devoted to this.
The informative part of the sentence|the scope of +|crucially includes the
variables bound by the link and the tail, if there is a ground at all. These bound
variables permit the interpretation of focus as a relational notion. The question
that may arise now is whether there may be free variables as well. The answer to
this question is yes: pronominal forms, for the most part, enter the informational
structure of the sentence as free variables under the scope of +.
The pronouns that participate in the packaging instruction as free variables
are the so-called `weak pronouns' (cf. Rigau 1986). In English, weak and strong
pronouns are not phonologically distinct, but in many languages, including some
Germanic and Romance varieties, there exist sets of both weak and strong pronouns. Weak pronouns are always unstressed|this applies to English as well|and
generally cliticize onto other sentence elements or may even be phonetically null.
Strong pronouns are always stressed and have fuller phonetical shape than their
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weak counterparts.
Let us compare a packaging instruction with free variables ((93)a) to a packaging
instruction with bound variables ((93)b):
a. + " 1 focus 2 ]
b. , 1, 1= , 2" + " 1focus 2]] ( )
In this abstract representation it may be observed that while the instruction with
the bound variables, (b), is a tripartite link-focus-tail sentence, the instruction with
the free variables, (a), is a simple all-focus sentence. This means that the (b)
sentence is interpreted as go-to plus retrieve-substitute while (a) is merely a
retrieve-add. The following are particular instantiations of the instructions in
(93):
(93)

x

x

(94)

x

x



x

x

x



a. The boss hates broccoli.
b. L'amo l1'odia t1, el broquil.

(95)

a. He hates it.
b. pro l'odia.
The information-packaging instruction encoded in (94) is `I am instructed to go to
the address \the boss" and then retrieve the information of the sentence by substituting hates for the blank in he broccoli under \the boss" ', but the information
packaging of (95) is just `I am instructed to retrieve the information of the sentence
by adding 1 hates 2 under the current address.' In other words, in (95) there
is no need for an address or for further specication on how to enter the sentence
under that address. The speaker assumes that the hearer is already at the correct
address and, further, that he does not possess any of the knowledge encoded in that
proposition. In contrast, in (94) the speaker assumes the hearer needs to be told
how the sentence contributes to her/his knowledge-store. To make this distinction
between (94) and (95) may seem, at rst blush, quite counterintuitive. After all, the
two sentences have a parallel syntactic structure and parallel prosodic contour. But
while this is true, it is also true that, somehow, there is a di erence in markedness
between (94) and (95): the former is clearly marked compared to its canonical The
boss likes broccoli, but the latter is obviously unmarked when compared to He
hates it, which is on the verge of ungrammaticality. This di erence in markedness
matches the intuition that while broccoli feels like a tail in (94), it does not feel like
x

x
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a tail in (95). In fact, a comparison of the Catalan sentences (the (b) sentences)
in (94) and (95) suggests that these two postfocal elements in English are informationally distinct. The object el broquil, equivalent to English postfocal broccoli is
encoded in the syntax typical of tails in that language (cf. x 4.3.1), but the object
clitic equivalent to English it is not.
One could actually view sentences like (95) as equivalent to sentence fragments
as the one discussed in x 4.2.2. That is, sentence (95) is informationally parallel
to an all-focus sentence and the presence of the pronouns is due to independent
syntactic motivations, namely, the -criterion and the idiosyncratic requirement in
some languages that all arguments of the verb be phonologically spelled out. In other
words, in languages where zero-anaphora is permitted the verb would be the only
overt element in the phrase, as is partially the case in Catalan, where the subject
is omitted. The prediction here is that sentence (95), repeated here in context in
(96)b, is informationally equivalent to sentence (97)b (=(53) in x 3.2.3)


(96)

a. How does the boss feel about broccoli?
b. He hates it. (cf. *hates)

(97)

a. What doesn't the boss like?
b. broccoli.

This equivalence, at least at the intuitive level, seems to be correct. In both (96) and
(97) the link is missing. As noted, this is because the information must be recorded
under the address the hearer is currently at. Links denote an address, but they also
instruct the hearer to go to that address. If the address relevant for information
entry is the current one, there cannot be a link in the sentence. Sentence (96)b,
however, is a tailless sentence as well. The hearer is instructed to add `he hates it'
under the address s/he is currently at. Contrary to the use of a tailful structure,
which is designed by the speaker to avoid redundant data entry in the hearer's
knowledge-store, the use of (96)b indicates that the speaker does not assume that
the hearer has any of the knowledge encoded in the proposition communicated, e.g.
the knowledge that `he is in some relation to it'. Therefore, the presence of the
pronoun in (96)b must be due to noninformational requirements. It is true that the
address denoted by it is already not only hearer-old but also active, which allows
the correct interpretation of the anaphoric form. But, as noted in the discussion of
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referential status, that process is independent of information packaging. In other
words, the variable in (96)b is free as far as the packaging instruction is concerned.
It remains for a theory of reference to say how the free variable is referentially
identied.
However, in natural language there are strong pronouns as well. In our representation, due to the formal characteristics of strong pronouns pointed out above, they
are treated like regular lexical material. Strong pronouns, within a given sentence,
may be part of the focus, or even make up the focus by themselves, as pointed out
in x 2.3.2 and further illustrated by the following example:
(98)

S1: Good morning. I am here to see Mrs. Bush again.
S2: Sure, Mr. Smith. Let's see One of her assistants will be with you
in a second.
S1: Could I see her today? I'm always talking to her assistants.
And they can be part of the ground as well, as illustrated by the link pronominal
phrase in (99):
:::

(99)

a. Him I don't want.
b. A ell1 pro no el1 vull.
In this example the hearer is instructed to go to the address denoted by him and
enter information there. Independently, him is marked for referential status as
being an already-activated address, thus allowing the hearer to know which address
it denotes. This identication, as noted, is the responsibility of reference resolution
and not of information packaging.
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Chapter 5
Syntactic Representation:
Catalan
The informational articulation proposed in x 3.2, like the ones that came before
it, is motivated by the need to account for variation found in the syntactic and
prosodic structure of otherwise truth-conditionally equivalent sentences. In building
the account of informatics presented in Chapter 4, several empirical observations
drawn from the representation of information packaging in Catalan and English
were taken into acount. In fact, as was mentioned in x 4.3.1, the conguration of
the proposed information-packaging instructions matches very closely the surface
syntactic conguration of Catalan sentential structure.
This chapter contains a thorough investigation of the syntactic representation
of information packaging in Catalan and a systematic comparison with English. In
x 5.1 the necessary background about the syntax of Catalan is introduced, especially concerning the specic syntactic operations and constructions relevant for the
representation of information packaging. The manner in which these constructions
encode di erent possible packaging structures is discussed in x 5.2, where a general
informational principle on surface syntactic conguration will be proposed. Finally,
in x 5.3, some comparisons with the facts of English are established. Some of the
conclusions drawn in this chapter will serve as input for the study of the syntaxinformatics interface presented in Chapter 6.
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5.1 Preliminaries
In order to describe the relevant syntactic facts of Catalan, the framework of Principles & Parameters Theory will be used. In particular, we will make explicit use
of its multistratal nature (especially in Chapter 6), the Move- mapping procedure
between strata, its phrase structure theory, and many terminological and notational
conventions made available by this framework.
Catalan is generally described as an SVO null-subject language. The sentences
in (100) illustrate these two characteristics (pro stands for the null subject).


(100)

a. Nosaltres quem el ganivet al calaix.
b. pro
quem el ganivet al calaix.
we/pro 1p.put the knife in.the drawer
`We put the knife in the drawer'
However, it has two main particularities. First, it has at least two surface positions
for the subject, preverbal and postverbal, and second, pronominalization of the
verbal complements is carried out by means of procliticization onto the verbal head,
yielding a partial order OV.55 Next, let us consider the syntax of verbal complements
and, then, turn to the syntax of subjects.

5.1.1 Verbal Complements
Catalan is a null-subject language, but all the complements of V must be overtly
expressed. When the complements are pronominal, they appear as clitics attached
to the verbal head. Sentence (101) is a canonical sentence, with a null subject. In
(102) el is the pronominal direct object and in (103) hi pronominalizes the locative
phrase. The (b) sentences show that the absence of the pronominal clitics renders
the sentences unacceptable (pro informally stands for the `missing' complement in
its canonical position):
(101)

Fiquem el ganivet al calaix.
1p.put the knife in.the drawer
`(We) put the knife in the drawer.'

In the case of -tns] verbal heads (innitives, gerunds, and imperatives), however, the pronouns
are enclitic and not proclitic, so the string order is still VO.
55
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(102)

a. El1 quem pro1 al calaix.
obj 1p.put
in.the drawer
`(We) put it in the drawer.'
b. *Fiquem pro al calaix.

(103)

a. Hi1 quem el ganivet pro1.
loc 1p.put the knife
`(We) put the knife there.'
b. *Fiquem el ganivet pro.

The pronominal clitics are taken to be generated in the preverbal position, following the standard approach in Strozer 1976, Rivas 1977, Borer 1983, Jaeggli 1982,
Zubizarreta 1982, or Su~ner 1988.56
In particular, the approach in Borer 1983 is taken, according to which clitics
do not occupy a syntactic position, but are axed to their verbal head in order to
express a number of agreement features (number, person, gender and case) when
the actual argument is not present. In fact, clitic doubling, i.e. the coocurrence of
a clitic and an argument (in A-position), is in general impossible:57
(104)

a. *El1 quem el ganivet1 al calaix.
b. *Hi1 quem el ganivet al calaix1.
c. *L1 'hi2 quem el ganivet1 al calaix2.
obj.loc 1p.put the knife in.the drawer
Clitics may pronominalize nonarguments as well. Clitic hi pronominalizes not only
subcategorized locative phrases, but also other locative adjuncts (105) and adjunct
and subcategorized PPs in general (106) (except for PPs headed by de `of', which
pronominalize into en):
(105)

Que ets de Margalef? No, pero hi tinc cosins.
Q 2s-be from M.
but loc 1s-have cousins
`Are you from Margalef? No, but I have cousins there.'

Kayne 1975, 1990, Quicoli 1976, and Emonds 1978 argue for or assume a movement analysis
of clitics. The clitic pronoun is in this view base-generated to the right af the verb and is moved
to a preverbal slot. This approach accounts for some facts that the standard approach leaves
unaccounted, but fails to capture others that follow unproblematically from the latter.
57There are two exceptions to this generalization: indirect objects and so-called strong pronouns.
The presence of the clitic is variable in the rst case and compulsory in the second case (*(el) vaig
veure a ell `I saw him') (cf. Rigau 1988). This issue will not be addressed here.
56
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(106)

Que viviu amb el Mec? No, nomes hi treballem.
Q 2p-live with the M.
only obl 1p-work
`Do you live with Mec? No, we only work with him.'

The absence of the clitic in this cases, however, as expected, does not cause ungrammaticality, although it alters the propositional content of the sentences. Catalan has
several other clitics that are used to pronominalize nonoblique determinerless arguments and de-headed PPs (clitic en), "+tns] sentential complements and predicate
nominals (clitic ho), and determiner-headed arguments (the l-clitics).
The order of the complements of the verb is xed, the direct object must precede
the indirect object or the locative phrase. Compare (107)a with (101) above, and
witness (107)b:
(107)

a. *Fiquem al calaix el ganivet.
b. Donem la clau al fuster.
1p.give the key to.the carpenter
`(We) give the key to the carpenter.'
*Donem al fuster la clau.
Analogously, complements must come before adjuncts, as (108) indicates:
(108)

(Ja no devem res,)
perque vam tornar les peles al banc
l'any passat.
because 1p-past-return the money to.the bank the.year last
`We don't owe anything anymore,
because we returned the money to the bank last year'
* , perque vam tornar l'any passat les peles al banc.
* , perque vam tornar les peles l'any passat al banc.
Below, in the discussion on detachment operations, it will become clear that these
facts are important in helping to determine the conguration of the structures under
examination.58
:::
:::

5.1.2 Subjects
As noted, pronominal subjects in Catalan may be either overt or null. Example
(100) above, repeated here as (109), illustrates this:
Heavy-NP shift is also an available syntactic operation in Catalan. Any `heavy' argument may
be shifted to a VP-nal position, thus yielding constituent sequences that do not t the pattern
just described.
58
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(109)

a. Nosaltres quem el ganivet al calaix.
b. pro
quem el ganivet al calaix.
we/pro 1p.put the knife in.the drawer
`We put the knife in the drawer.'
The phonetically null form is the unmarked one if we consider both frequency and
distribution (cf. Vallduv 1987). In fact, null anaphora in subject position is equivalent to the weak pronominal clitics that pronominalize complements of V. Overt
subject pronouns are the equivalent of the so-called strong pronouns for verbal
complements (cf. Rigau 1986, 1988). English, unfortunately, does not mark the distinction between weak and strong pronouns except by prosody, so an exact parallel
cannot be drawn. An approximate contrast in English is the comparison of a regular
subject pronoun, (110)a, with a `contrastive' subject pronoun, (111)a. The prosodic
di erence in English is matched by the overt/null di erence in Catalan (compare
the (b) sentences):59
(110)

a. And then he smiled.
b. I llavors pro va somriure.
and then
3s-past-smile

(111)

a. He smiled, but she was making faces.
b. Ell va somriure, pero ella feia
ganyes.
he 3s-past-smile but she 3s-impf-do grimaces
c. #pro va somriure pero pro feia ganyes.
It has traditionally been considered that the canonical position for subjects in
Catalan is preverbal. As mentioned above, however, there are at least two possible
surface positions for the subject, preverbal (112)a and postverbal (112)b:
(112)

a. Ahir el Pere va rentar la roba.
b. Ahir va rentar la roba el Pere.
yest. 3s-past-wash the clothes the P.
`Yesterday Pere washed the clothes.'
c. *Ahir va rentar el Pere la roba.
When the subject is postverbal, it is in a VP-nal position, as the example in (112)b
and its ungrammatical counterpart (112)c show.60
See x 4.3.3 above, where it was suggested that `contrastive' pronouns in sentence-initial position
are links, while regular ones are not.
60It is possible that subjects of inaccusative, psych, and maybe intransitive verbs occupy a
distinct slot to the right of the verb, structurally closer to it than subjects of regular transitive
59
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The issues around subjects will be further discussed in x 5.2, after some facts
about right- and left-detachment and intonation in Catalan are presented in the
next section.

5.1.3 Right- and Left-detachments
Complements of V can be detached from their A-position and placed in an adjoined
nonargument position (A0-position), either to the right or to the left of the core
clause. When such a detachment takes place, leaving the A-position of an argument
empty, a clitic pronominal, which is bound by the detached phrase, appears with V.
These detachment processes are mostly known as right- and left-dislocation, in the
general linguistic community, or as `emarginazione' in Italian linguistics (Antinucci
& Cinque 1977, Calabrese 1982, 1990).61 The sentences in (113) are left- and rightdetachments of the object, and those in (114) are left- and right-detachments of the
locative phrase (t stands for the D-structure thematic A-position of the detached
arguments):62
verbs. Their behavior in pronominalization is dierent, and the linear order facts also seem to
point in that direction (although, for independent reasons, it is hard to come up with evidence of
this sort):
(i) *Si vol ningu res, em truqueu.
Si vol
res ningu, em truqueu.
if 3s-want anyth. anyby. obj 2p-call
`If anybody wants anything, give me a call.'
(ii) *Si cal a ningu res, em truqueu.
Si cal
res a ningu, em truqueu.
if 3s-be.needed anyth. to anyby. obj 2p-call.
`If anybody needs anything, give me a call.'
The verb in (i), voler `want', a regular transitive, must have the subject after its complement, but
in (ii) the subject of caldre `be necessary' must sit between the verb and its complement.
61The reason for staying away from the term dislocation is the following. In American linguistics
there is a syntactic distinction between topicalization (gap-binding) and left-dislocation (pronounbinding). Catalan detachment is both (XP1 cl1 t1 ]) (or, assuming there is no gap in
A -position, is a left-dislocation). Catalan left-detachment, however, is informationally equivalent
to (most) English topicalizations. The uncompromising term `detachment' is already used by
Barnes 1985 for French. Left-detachment is also known as exbraciation in the English literature
and Ausklammerung in the German tradition.
62Catalan orthographic convention is used in the following discussion in that a comma is used
to separate right-detached phrases from the core clause, but nothing (generally) to indicate leftdetachment.
:::
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(113)

a. El ganivet1 el1 quem t1 al calaix.
the knife obj 1p.put in.the drawer
b. El1 quem t1 al calaix,
el ganivet1.
obj 1p.put in.the drawer the knife

(114)

a. Al calaix1 hi1 quem el ganivet t1.
in.the drawer loc 1p.put the knife
b. Hi1 quem el ganivet t1, al calaix1.
loc 1p.put the knife
in.the drawer

As with (102) and (103) above, these sentences are ungrammatical if the clitic
pronominal is missing:
(115)

a. *El ganivet1 quem t1 al calaix.
b. *Fiquem t1 al calaix, el ganivet1.
c. *Al calaix1 quem el ganivet t1.
d. *Fiquem el ganivet t1, al calaix1.
Notice that (115)d is starred but that (101) above, which has the exact same linear
order, is perfectly grammatical. How does one tell (115)d from (101), given that
they look, apparently, exactly alike? The answer to this question is prosody the
prosodic structure of these sentences is crucially di erent:
(116)

a. Fiquem el ganivet al calaix.
b. *Fiquem el ganivet t1, al calaix1.
c. *Hi quem el ganivet al calaix.
d. Hi quem el ganivet t1, al calaix1.
Comparing (a) and (b), one can observe that shifting the intonation peak to the left
results in ungrammaticality. Sentence (c) illustrates the ban on the cooccurrence
of clitic and argument, but as soon as the intonation peak is shifted to the left
(d), the sentence becomes grammatical again. The existence of left-detachment is
widely recognized and is a familiar construction often dealt with in the Romance
syntactic and functional literature (cf. Hirschbuhler 1975, Contreras 1976, Cinque
1977, Rivero 1980, Jaeggli 1982, Silva-Corvalan 1983, Campion 1984, Barnes 1985,
inter alia), but identication of right-detachment is less straightforward, due to the
fact that it sometimes has null string e ects. In some works, for instance, there is
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no mention of a distinction between right-detached subjects and regular postverbal
subjects.63
Fortunately, prosody is not the only structural property that distinguishes the
grammatical from the ungrammatical sentences in (116). First, and foremost, there
is the evidence provided by the presence of the clitics. As discussed, copresence
of a clitic and an argument in A-position is illicit, but as soon as the argument is
left-detached the clitic must appear. Compare (117)a and (117)b:
(117)

a. (*La1 ) vaig veure la baralla1.
obj 1s-past-see the ght
`I saw the ght.'
b. La baralla1 la1/(*) vaig veure t1.
`The ght I saw.'
Given the theory of clitics adopted here, this is not surprising, since the clitic is
sensitive to the presence of the empty category in argument position, whatever the
nature of this category. Now, compare (118)a and (118)b:
(118)

a. (*La1 ) vaig veure la baralla1.
`I saw the ght.'
b. La1 /(*) vaig veure t1, la baralla1.
`I saw the ght.'
If it is assumed that the NP la baralla `the ght' in (118)b is in a position equivalent
to the position of the left-detached la baralla in (117)b (albeit to the right of the
clause), the presence vs. absence of the clitic follows unproblematically: in (118)a
the presence of the clitic is illicit because it would cooccur with the argument in
argument position the presence of the clitic in (118)b is necessary because the
argument position it binds is empty.
Second there are some string order facts, which were noted in passing in (107)a
and (114)b, that are of relevance to show that right-detached phrases are really
right-detached. In (107) it was noted that the order of the verbal complements is
xed, the object coming before the indirect object or the locative phrase, but in
(113)b we also showed a right-detached object that followed a locative. Let us view
the paradigm in (119):
Romance right-detachment is discussed or touched upon in Antinucci & Cinque 1977, Cowper
1979, Lambrecht 1981, Calabrese 1982, 1990, Campion 1984, Ashby 1988, and Vallduv" 1988a (cf.
Rodman 1974 and Geluykens 1987 for English, and Packard & Shi 1986 for Chinese).
63
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(119)

a. Fiquem el ganivet al calaix.
b. *Fiquem al calaix el ganivet.
c. *El1 quem el ganivet1 al calaix.
d. El1/(*) quem t1 al calaix, el ganivet1.
Sentences (a) and (b) illustrate the xed order of the arguments and sentence (c)
illustrates the ban on clitic-argument cooccurrence. What (d) shows is that when el
ganivet `the knife' cooccurs with a clitic it must appear to the right of the locative.
This conrms that el ganivet is in an external position. Right-detached phrases
appear to the right of adjuncts as well:
(120)

a. (*La1 ) va trencar la vidriola1 l'any passat.
obj 3s-past-break the piggybank the.year past
`She broke her piggybank open last year.'
b. *Va trencar l'any passat la vidriola.
c. La1 /(*) va trencar t1 l'any passat, la vidriola1.

(121)

a. (*La1 ) va trencar la vidriola1 amb un martell.
obj 3s-past-break the piggybank with a hammer
`She broke her piggybank open with a hammer.'
b. *Va trencar amb un martell la vidriola.
c. La1 /(*) va trencar t1 amb un martell, la vidriola1.
Finally, there is further evidence from the placement of clause-peripheral particles like the vocative xec `man' and the tag-particle oi `right?'. This particles may
not occur between the verb and its arguments, as shown in (122)a-b, but they may
occur between a clause and a right-detached phrase, as in (122)c-d:
(122)

a. Fica (*xec) el ganivet (*xec) al calaix, xec!
`Put the knife in the drawer, man!'
b. Ficarem (*oi) el ganivet (*oi) al calaix, oi?
`We'll put the knife in the drawer, right?'
c. Fica'l1 t1 al calaix, xec, el ganivet1 (xec)!
d. El1 carem t1 al calaix, oi, el ganivet1 (oi)?
All this evidence together shows that right-detached phrases are found outside the
core clause. It will be assumed, therefore, that left-detachment and right-detachment
are the mirror image of each other, both being clause-external but di erent in their
directionality. Their clause-externalness will be represented through the structural
congurations in (123), where detached phrases are adjoined to the phrasal node at
S-structure:
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(123)

left-detachment:

right-detachment:

IP
/ \
XP
IP
/
\
/
\
- cl- t-

IP
/ \
IP
XP
/
\
/
\
- cl- t-

The adjunction-to-IP analysis of left- and right-detachment is in accordance with the
adjunction-to-IP analysis of topicalization found in Rochemont 1978, 1989, Baltin
1982, and Saito 1989.64
There is no structural restriction on the number of phrases that may be right- or
left-detached, and the linear order in which these phrases appear is free (contrasting
with the strict linear order of the phrases in situ). The following illustrate this point:
(124)

a. el ganivet1 al calaix2 l1'hi2 quem t1 t2.
b. al calaix2 el ganivet1 l1'hi2 quem t1 t2.
c.
el ganivet1 l1'hi2 quem t1 t2, al calaix2.
d.
al calaix2 l1'hi2 quem t1 t2, el ganivet1.
e.
l1'hi2 quem t1 t2, el ganivet1, al calaix2.
f.
l1'hi2 quem t1 t2, al calaix2, el ganivet1.
Sentences (a) and (b) are multiple left-detachments, (e) and (f) are multiple rightdetachments, and (c) and (d) are mixed examples. Catalan, then, in a sense allows
for exible word order, since the complements of the verb may appear in situ or in
left- or right-detachment slots. But, on the other hand, the order is not free in the
strict sense of the word, since strict xed linearity is required when the complements
of V are within the core clause.65

There are two other analyses of topicalization, both involving Spec, CP] in some way. I will
refer the reader to Rochemont 1989 for a comparison of the three approaches. His conclusion is
that the adjunction-to-IP analysis is empirically superior to the others. Rochemont also notes that
Romance clitic left-dislocation|our left-detachment|behaves exactly like English topicalization
in its syntactic eects (1989:154f.).
65Saito 1989 argues that the putative free word order (non-congurationality) of Japanese should
be viewed in the following way: there is one xed basic A-position for each argument and then
there is free multiple (left-)adjunction to IP. The situation in Catalan is somewhat similar to this
analysis of Japanese word-order `freeness'. Many details aside, the dierence between Catalan
and Japanese would be that Catalan has a set of telltale clitics to signal clause-externalness and
Japanese does not.
64
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5.1.4 Prosodic Structure
As noted, prosody in Catalan is correlated with syntactic structure in an important
way. In particular, prosody allows us to distinguish the grammatical (125)a from
the ungrammatical (125)b:
(125)

a. Hi1 quem el ganivet t1, al calaix1.
b. *Hi1 quem el ganivet al calaix1.
Prosody helps determine that the phrase al calaix in (a) is in a clause-external
right-adjoined slot, in contrast to the same phrase in argument position in (b). In
fact, given the correlation between prosody, the clitic facts, linear order, and the
presence of clause-peripheral particles, we are drawn to one conclusion: intonation
in Catalan has a xed invariable contour. From all the examples in the previous
section it must be concluded that intonational prominence in the Catalan sentence
falls on the clause-nal position. This accounts for the following pattern, which was
partially shown in (116):
(126)

a. Fiquem el ganivet al calaix.
b. *Fiquem el ganivet al calaix.
d. Hi1 quem el ganivet t1, al calaix1.
e. *fiquem el ganivet al calaix.
f. L1'hi2 fiquem t1 t2, el ganivet1, al calaix2.
g. L1'hi2 fiquem t1 t2, al calaix1, el ganivet2.
Shifting the intonation peak to the left is actually illegitimate, as illustrated by (b)
and (e). The cases in which it looks like the intonation peak is shifted to the left,
(d) and (f-g), are actually cases of right-dislocation.66
The Catalan sentence, then, has an intonation contour like the one in (127),
which we illustrate with our pet sentence Fiquem el ganivet al calaix. This is a
schematic representation of the fundamental frequency (F0) contour:
Examples (b) and (e) are actually not impossible, but they have an extreme metalinguistic
avor to them. Sentence (e) could be used as a correction of the pronunciation or another aspect
of the verb, or, as pointed out by L. Payrato, p.c., can be used in baby-talk, as in
(i) No toquis
aix#o.
no 2s-sbjv-touch this
`Don't touch this.'
instead of No ho1 TOQUIS t1, aixo1 . Horvath 1986 points out that the situation in Hungarian is
analogous.
66
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(127)

/--------------------------/
fiquem el ganivet al calaix

The right-detached phrase in a right-detachment construction, however, does not
fall under the pitch peak, since it is located in a clause external position. Rightdetached phrases follow the clause-nal peak under a at intonation contour. This
is represented in (128):
(128)

/---------------------/
___________
hi fiquem t el ganivet, al calaix

Intonation also signals that clitic-argument cooccurrence within the clause is ungrammatical:
(129)

/--------------------------/
*hi fiquem el ganivet al calaix

Prosodic prominence in Catalan unambiguously signals the end of the clause. Material may occur to the right of the intonational peak, but it is clear that it appears
in clause-external slots, right-adjoined to IP. The accuracy of this prosodic marking
is conrmed by the pattern of clitic cooccurrence, the linear order of phrases, and
the placement of clause-peripheral particles like xec `man' and oi `right?'.67
Given this, the structural position of certain adverbial adjuncts that do not have
matching clitic proforms can also be established. For example, the temporal adjunct
aquesta nit `tonight' is located in di erent positions in (130)a and (130)b, despite
the invariant string order:
(130)

a. Enllestire el treball aquesta nit.
1s-fut-nish the paper this night
`I'll nish up the paper tonight.'
b. Enllestire el treball, aquesta nit.
`I'll nish up the paper tonight.'

Prosodic prominence is known to perform several tasks and therefore there may be uses of
prominence unrelated to the above. The metalinguistic use of prominence cited above and the
intonational encoding of illocutionary meaning are good examples of this.
67
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In (a) the adverb is in situ, adjoined to VP, but in (b) the adverb has to be adjoined
to IP, since it follows the clause-nal intonation peak on treball. There are no linear
order facts here to show that this is indeed the case, but it would not be logical
to assume that intonation is xed in the case of arguments and adjuncts that have
a clitic proform but shiftable in the case of adjuncts that lack such a proform.
Furthermore, the reliability of intonation signalling is conrmed by the possible
placements of the clause-peripheral particles xec and oi:
(131)

a. Enllestire el treball (*xec) aquesta nit.
b. Enllestire el treball, xec, aquesta nit.
`I'll nish up the paper tonight, man.'
c. Enllestirem el treball (*oi) aquesta nit?
d. Enllestirem el treball, oi, aquesta nit?
`We'll nish up the paper tonight, right?'

5.1.5 Focus-preposing
In the previous sections the two following conclusions were reached: ) an empty
category in a VP-internal argument position must be licensed by the presence of a
coreferential clitic binding that position (with the exception of wh-movement traces),
and ) intonational prominence falls invariably on clause-nal position. In this section a construction that is an apparent counterexample to both claims is discussed:
focus-preposing. This construction is illustrated in (132):
a

b

a. "F Al calaix de dalt1 ], vaig car el ganivet t1.
in.the drawer of top 1s-past-put the knife
"F `In the top drawer ] I put the knife.'
b. El ganivet1, vaig car t1 al calaix de dalt.
`The knife I put in the top drawer.'
First, intonational prominence is not at the end of the clause, as one would expect
from the discussion in the previous chapter, but on the preposed phrase, with the
whole clause following with a at contour. Second, the argument position that corresponds to the preposed phrase is empty as expected, but, contrary to expectation,
there is no clitic attached to the verb binding that position.68 In fact, there may
(132)

This gap-binding conguration has led to the standard analysis of focus-preposing in Romance
as a wh-movement. The wh-movement analysis of focus-preposing is not adequate for Catalan, as
argued below.
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not be one, as (133) shows:
(133)

a. *"F Al calaix de dalt1], hi1 vaig car el ganivet t1.
b. *El ganivet1, el1 vaig car t1 al calaix de dalt.
Focus-preposing and left-detachment are similar constructions in that both seem to
involve movement to the left, but there are two distinctions between the two. One,
the focus-preposed phrase is intonationally prominent, while the left-detached phrase
is not. And two, the left-detached phrase binds a trace and and empty category
in the clause, while the focus-preposed phrase can only bind a gap. In (134) the
two are contrasted. The (a) sentence is a left-detachment and the (b) sentence
is a focus-preposing (cf. Vallduv 1988b for a comparison of focus-preposing and
left-detachment in Catalan and Spanish):
(134)

a. El ganivet1 el1 vaig car t1 al calaix de dalt.
b. El ganivet1 vaig car t1 al calaix de dalt.
Focus-preposing is also known as Yiddish-Movement or Y-movement (Hankamer
1971), Focus Topicalization (Gundel 1974), Focus-Movement (Prince 1981), or Rhematization (Hernanz & Brucart 1987). The name `focus-preposing' is taken from
Ward 1985, who provides a thorough analysis of the pragmatics of this construction. Catalan focus-preposing is analogous to English focus-preposing, although
without any restrictions on the type of argument that might undergo it.69 The discussion of the syntax of focus-preposing is postponed until the next section, where
we shall consider whether the generalizations formulated above must be changed in
view of the existence of focus-preposing, or whether another solution can be found.
Before, however, the informational value of all the aforementioned constructions,
right-detachment, left-detachment, and focus-preposing will be discussed in x 5.2.

Prince 1981, and others before her, argues for a further distinction between Focus-Movement
and Yiddish-Movement. The latter is restricted to some Yiddish-background varieties of English,
which use these constructions much more often than standard English. Catalan focus-preposing
covers both Focus-Movement and Yiddish-movement and its use is more like the use in the Yiddishbackground varieties of English than in the standard language.
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5.2 Information Packaging at the Surface

5.2.1 Prosody and Detachments

In this section the importance of left- and right-detachment for information packaging will be discussed. The informational articulation proposed in x 3.2.2 above is
as in (135):
S=ffocus, groundg
ground=flink, tailg
where the focus is the informative part and the ground is a vehicular frame that
instructs the hearer to enter that information appropriately into her/his knowledgestore (cf. Ch. 4). In the following sections the encoding of this articulation in the
surface syntax in Catalan will be discussed.
(135)

Left-detachment
Catalan left-detachment is, for all intents and purposes, equivalent to English topicalization or nonfocal preposing, as described in Chapter 3 (cf. Gundel 1974, Prince
1981, Ward 1985), i.e., it is a link-preposing construction. The following are examples of this construction70:
(136)

"written on an aerogram rst line on the extra space overleaf]
Amb-aquest-tros-de-paperet1 ja
no hi1 comptava t1.
with-this-little-piece-of-paper anymore no obl 1s-impf-count-on
`This-little piece-of-paper I wasn't counting on anymore.'
"P.C. 02-87]

(137)

dir,
Quant al Joan i la Isidora no t'ho se
as-for the J. and the I. no iobj.obj 1s-know to-say
doncs el Joan1 "F el1 veiem t1 ben poc ].
since the J.
obj 1p-see quite little
`As for Joan and Isidora I can't say, since Joan we see very little of.'
"J.P. 03-87]

70

Naturally occurring data are labeled by speaker's initials or written source and date.
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(138)

"after mentioning something nasty that the hearer had done to the
speaker a long time ago]
Aixo1 ho1 tinc clavat t1 al fons del cor.
this obj have pstppl-stick at.the depth of.the heart
Lit.: `This I have it stuck deep in my heart.'
`This I won't forget how it hurt.'
"C.G. 02-87]

According to the informational typology established in x 3.2.3 these examples are
link-focus constructions. This sentences re ect the information-packaging instructions in (139),
(139)

a. =(136) , 2, 2= this-piece-of-paper" +" 1 wasn't counting on 2 ]]
b. =(137) , 2, 2= Joan" +" 1 see very little of 2 ]]
c. =(138) , 2, 2= this" +" 1 has 2 stuck deep in heart ]]
The free variables represent the (free) weak pronominal forms, which are all null
subjects in the above examples. In the form of illustration, sentence (137) informationally means `I am instructed to go to the address \Joan" and retrieve the
information of the sentence by adding that 1 (whose identity is independently established) sees very little of him "= `Joan']'. The preposed phrases are links: they
have the `aboutness' feeling typical of linkful structures and satisfy the poset relation condition on preposed phrases of Ward & Prince 1986 (cf. x 4.3.2 above)
with the relations `is-identical-to (a contextually evoked entity)', `is-a-subset-of',
and `is-identical-to', respectively.
Notice how these left-detachments represent not only the linkhood of the preposed phrase, but also the fact that the nonpreposed part of the sentence left in the
lower IP is the focus, i.e., that the focus, along with the free and bound variables
in the clause is what constitutes the information carried by the sentence. The focus
is, as expected, marked by intonational prominence. In fact, given that intonational
prominence in Catalan is xed on clause-nal position, the preposing of the link,
as in (136)-(138), has a double e ect: it signals the linkhood of the link, and it
removes it from the clause-nal position, allowing the focus to nd itself under the
intonational peak.
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
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x

x

Right-detachment
It may be the case that a constituent that would normally sit at the end of the
clause and therefore receive intonational prominence must, in a particular speakerhearer interaction, be marked as nonfocal even when it is not a link. In other words,
what if a nonfocal nonlink element, i.e. a tail element, must be removed from the
intonationally-prominent slot? It cannot be left-detached, because that would make
it a link, but it cannot stay there either. This is when right-detachment comes into
the picture: it takes care of the marking of tails. The following are examples of
right-detachment:
(140) "ametllons: `green shelled almonds as they are on the tree before they
ripen' morphologically though, it is `almond+augmentative']
a. S1. Saps que son, ametllons?
`You know what `ametllons' are?'
b. S2. Ametlles grosses, suposo.
`Big almonds, I guess.'
c. S1. Bueno, son semblants, s. Pero aixs amb la closca i tot.
`Well, they're similar, yeah. But like with the shell and all.'
d. S2. Les ametlles tambe en1 tenen, de-closca1.
the almonds also obj 3p-have of-shell
`Almonds also have a shell.'
(CC/EV 11-86)
(141) "explaining why Gerard could not nd Joan's number in the phone book]
El Gerard es veu que no se'n1 recordava t1, del-cognom-del-J.1.
the G. 3s-seem that no re .obj 3s-impf-remember of J.'s surname
`It seems Gerard didn't remember Joan's last name.'
"M.R.B. 06-90]
(142) Vet aqu la veu de l'autoritat, aixo cal, aixo no cal: aquesta es la realitat.
`Here's the voice of authority, this is necessary, that isn't:
this is reality.'
Ah, carall, que pro1 n2'es, de-dura2, de-vegades3, la-realitat1.
Lit.: `It is so, tough, sometimes, reality.'
`Oh, shit, reality is tough sometimes.'
(Pau Faner, La primera oracio, AVUI 1-25-87)
Examples (140)d and (141) are link-focus-tail structures, and (142) is an example
of focus-tail structure.
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As discussed in Chs. 3 and 4, the presence of the tail alters the brand of the +
`retrieve-information' operator, turning it from a plain `add' into a `substitute-for'
(cf. x 4.2.2). This notational operation represents the fact that the tail indicates
that, under a given address, the information carried by the sentence must not be
merely added, but construed with the material denoted by the tail. Let us illustrate
this with (140)d. The instruction it represents is (143)
(143)

, 1, 1= almonds,
x

x

2"

x

+"

1

x

also have

2

x

]] (a shell)

This may be read as `I am instructed to go to the address \almonds", and then
retrieve the information of the sentence by substituting also have for the blank in
`almonds shells', which is already under \almonds" '. In other words, the speaker
assumes the hearer knows that a relation holds between almonds and shells so s/he
treats ` 1 also have 2' as the information conveyed by this sentence at the time
of utterance. In addition, s/he also species how this sentence contributes to the
hearer's knowledge-store by directing the hearer to the adress `almonds' to add the
information there.
The right-dislocation in (140)d indicates that de closca `a shell' is a tail. It
removes that phrase from the `scope' of the intonational peak without converting it
into a link. If the intonation contour in Catalan were malleable, prominence could
be shifted to the left and the same e ect would be achieved. This is, in fact, what
English does: what Catalan right-detaches, English demotes intonationally. This
has been pointed out in several occasions, as with the example in (144), where (a)
and (b) are informationally accurate translations of each other:
x

x

(144)

a. L'amo l1'odia, el broquil1.
b. The boss hates broccoli.
Before closing this section on right-detachment, it must be mentioned that there
are other informational analysis of right-detachment in Romance and in natural
language in general. These analyses are of two kinds: those that suggest that rightdetachments are an `afterthought'|an analysis that reduces the phenomenon to a
language-production error of sorts|and those that take the right-detached phrase
to be a topic, be it a topic-topic or a Givon-topic. As pointed out in Vallduv 1988a,
these analyses have several conceptual problems and are empirically inadequate to
handle the phenomenon in Catalan.
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5.2.2 Subjects Revisited
It was noted in x 3.1.2 that subjects in SVO languages, as a default, are interpreted

as links (cf. van Oosten 1986, Horn 1989:Ch. 7). Catalan preverbal subjects do not
seem to constitute an exception to this generalization, as the discussion in previous
chapters indicates. They show the same aboutness feeling, the same existential
force, and seem to obey Ward & Prince's poset relation condition on preposing as
well. What about postverbal subjects? By denition, they cannot be links, since
links are thought to be universally sentence-initial. This means they have to be tails
or (part of) the focus.

Right-detached Subjects
If the postverbal position of subjects in Catalan is VP-nal, they will automatically be under the scope of intonational prominence, since intonation is xed (and
therefore interpreted as focal). Subjects, however, can undergo right-detachment as
well, as seen already in (142). Example (145) shows the three positions of a subject:
preverbal (a), VP-nal (b), and right-detached (c).
(145)

a. La Coia "F parara la taula ].
the C.
3s-fut-set the table
`Coia will set the table.'
b. "F Parara la taula la coia ].
c. "F Parara la taula ], la Coia.
Notice that (c) has the intonation contour typical of right-detached phrases: the
xed clause-nal prominence precedes the clause-external right-detachment. However, in contrast to the verbal complements discussed in previous sections, rightdetached subjects do not need to bind a clitic in the clause. This fact, not surprising given that Catalan is a null subject language, makes (b) and (c) in (145) look
structurally alike except, of course, for the intonation contour. Recall that in the
case of right-detached objects (b) and (c) would have been further distinguished by
the mandatory presence of a coreferential clitic in (c) and its mandatory absence in
(b).
Furthermore, even though the clitic facts cannot be used to determine the location of subjects, the evidence provided by the prosodic pattern is, as expected,
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backed by the evidence provided by the placement of the clause-peripheral particles
xec `man' and oi `right?':
(146)

a. "F Parara la taula (*xec) la coia ], xec.
b. "F Parara la taula ], xec, la Coia.
`Coia'll set the table, man.'
c. Parara la taula (*oi) la coia, oi?
d. Parara la taula, oi, la Coia?
`Coia'll set the table, right?'
The evidence provided by prosody is rm and the subject la Coia in (145)c and
(146)b-d can be assumed to be in a clause-external right-adjoined-to-IP position.
Right-detached subjects, like any right-detached phrase, are interpreted as tails.

VP-nal Subjects
Postverbal clause-internal subjects, then, fall under the intonation peak and must
therefore be part of the focus. This is the case in (145)b above and in the cases seen
in previous chapters, like the following:
(147)

"F Ha trucat l'amo ].
3s-perf-call the.boss
"F `The boss has called ].'
Sentence (147) is an all-focus structure representing the instruction +" the boss
called ], and its meaning is as in `I'm instructed to retrieve the information of the
sentence by adding that the boss called into my knowledge-store under a temporary situation address'. Notice that in English these sentences show intonational
prominence on the subject. This signals their status as all-focus sentences. The
equivalence between VS order in Romance and the all-focus (news-sentence, thetic
judgment, etc.) intonation pattern in English has long been noticed (cf. Bolinger
1954, Hatcher 1956, Contreras 1976, Lambrecht 1987, 1988, etc.)
A subject, then, like any other sentence constituent, may be part of the focus
(VP-nal) or part of the ground if part of the ground, it may be a tail (clauseexternal right-detached), or a link (preverbal). Examples (148) to (150) illustrate
the three positions/informational-roles of subjects:
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(148)

Focal:
Tot esta ben posat
perque "F ha parat la taula la coia ]. Aquesta es la rao.
`Everything is in its right place
because Coia's set the table. That's the reason.'

(149)

Tail:
S1: El meu xiquet no m'ajuda mai, amb les feines de casa.
S2: Ah, no? Doncs a casa "F sempre para la taula ], la Coia.
`S1: My son never helps me with the housework.
S2: He doesn't? At home she always sets the table, Coia.'

(150)

Link:
Vosaltres fregueu el plats, que la Coia "F ja ha parat la taula ].
`You guys do the dishes. Coia already set the table.'

Preverbal Subjects
What is the structural position of preverbal subjects? Traditionally it has been
considered that subjects are located in the "Spec, IP] slot, which was an underived
position. This view, however, is undergoing thorough revision in current research.
Many authors suggest that the surface position of preverbal subjects in English
and Romance, for instance, is a derived position (cf. Zagona 1982, Kitagawa 1986,
Kuroda 1986, Fukui 1986, Fukui & Speas 1986, Koopman & Sportiche 1988, Bonet
1989, Pollock 1989). Others, like Contreras 1986, Kroch, Santorini & Heycock
1988, Rigau 1988, Fernandez-Soriano 1989 and Santorini 1989, even suggest that
the surface position of the subject is a left-adjoined position.
The situation so far is as follows: ) we have two apparent positions for subjects
within the core clause, but only one for other arguments ) complements of the
verb that are informational links occur in a left-adjoined-to-IP position and )
sentence-initial preverbal subjects are interpreted as links. If Catalan preverbal
subjects were not located in "Spec, IP] but in a left-adjoined position, like some of
the research mentioned above suggests, we would obtain an explanation for facts a)
to c). Subjects would have only one possible position within the core clause|VPnal|just like the other arguments, and subjects, like any other argument, when
interpreted as links, would move to a sentence-initial adjoined-to-IP slot.
a

b

c
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The left-adjuntion-to-IP hypothesis for subjects is a desirable one in that it takes
care of some irregularities in the syntactic distributional facts and homogenizes the
informational representation of links. Left-adjunction is already necessary for the
preposed link complements of the verb, so there is no need to make any addition to
our phrase structure. In addition, it is obvious that subjects may be left-adjoined as
well: sentence (151) contains an embedded subject adjoined to a matrix IP sentence
(152)b is a double left-detachment, with an object occurring between the subject
and the clause and sentence (153)a shows the clause-peripheral particle xec between
the subject and the clause, just as it occurs between preposed links and the clause
in (153)b:
(151)

El Pep1 no crec que t1 vulgui
peix.
the P. no 1s-think that 3s-sbjv-want sh
`Pep I don't think will want sh.'
(152) a. De peix2 el Pep no en2 voldra t2.
of sh the P. no obj 3s-fut-want
`Fish Pep won't want any.'
b. El Pep1 de peix2 t1 no en2 voldra t2.
(153) a. El Pep1, xec, t1 no en2 voldra t2, de peix2.
b. De peix2, xec, t1 no en2 voldra t2, el Pep1.
Of course, this evidence does not show that all preverbal subjects occur in a leftadjoined slot. It only shows that they may appear on a left-adjoined slot. There are
some additional facts that suggest that subjects may always appear in a left-adjoined
position. We turn to these facts in the next section, where the exact adjunction
location of detached phrases is discussed. Nevertheless, taking the facts reviewed so
far into consideration, it will be assumed henceforth that the base position of the
subject is the VP-nal one.

5.2.3 The Adjunction Site for Left-detachment
It was noted above that left-detached phrases must be in a clause-external position
and, following Baltin 1972, Rochemont 1989, and others, it was assumed that they
were adjoined to IP. This section provides further evidence that this is indeed the
correct analysis and then focuses on the repercussion of the analysis for the structural
position of preverbal subjects.
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It is well known that links in some Romance languages, including Catalan, appear
to the left of wh-phrases (cf. Rivero 1980, Plann 1982). This is illustrated in (154):
(154)

a. Al Roc1 que2 li1 donaras t2 t1 pro?
to.the R. what iobj 2s-fut-give
`To Roc what are you going to give?'
b. El ganivet1 on2 el1 quem t1 t2 pro?
the knife where obj 1p-put
`The knife where do we put?'

c. El Roc1 qui2 el1 va veure t1 t2?
the R. who obj 3s-past-see
`Roc who saw (him)?'
At rst blush, this suggests that the left-detached phrase does not adjoin to IP but to
CP, i.e. to the left of the "Spec, CP] position where wh-phrases apparently land. But
this option is soon discouraged by the relative order of links and complementizers:
links are located to the right of the complementizer, as shown in (155) and (156):
(155)

a. Diu que el ganivet1 on2 el1 caras t1 t2 pro.
2s-say that the knife where obj 2s-fut-put
Lit.: `He's asking that the knife where you'll put.'
`He's asking where you'll put the knife.'
b. *Diu el ganivet1 que on2 el1 caras t1 t2 pro.

(156)

a. Pregunten que la feina1 qui2 la1 fara t1 t2.
3p-ask that the work who obj 3s-fut-do
Lit.: `They're asking that the work who will do?'
`They're asking who will do the work.'
b. *Pregunten la feina1 que qui2 la1 fara t1 t2.

This indicates that wh-words are not actually in "Spec, CP], to the left of the
complementizer, but in some lower position within the clause.71 Left-detached links,
therefore, are found lower than CP but higher than IP, i.e. adjoined to IP.
Furthermore, it is also well known that preverbal subjects must appear to the
See Plann 1982 for an alternative analysis where certain matrix verbs select for a double CP
structure with a slot for the link between the two complementizer projections. This proposal seems
to enrich phrase structure excessively.
71
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left of the wh-phrase and to the right of the complementizer as well.72 This is shown
in (157) and (158), and (159):
(157)

a. El Lluc1 on2 va car el ganivet t2 t1?
the L. where 3s-past-put the knife
`Where did Lluc put the knife?'
b. *On2 el Lluc1 va car el ganivet t2 t1?

(158)

a. El Lluc1 qui2 va veure t2 t1?
the L. who 3s-pst-see
`Who did Lluc see?'
b. *Qui2 el Lluc1 va veure t2 t1?

(159)

a. Pregunten que el Lluc1 qui2 va veure t2 t1.
3p-ask that the L. who 3s-pst-see
Lit.: `They're asking that Lluc who saw.'
`They're asking who Lluc saw.'
b. *Prequnten el Lluc1 que qui2 va veure t2 t1.

This distribution has led several researchers (e.g. Campos 1986, Eguzkitza 1986)
to propose that (some) wh-movement in Romance, especically Spanish, does not
involve "Spec, CP] in any way. Instead, they suggest, following Horvath's (1986)
proposal for Hungarian, that there exists a special structural slot adjoined to V0 or
I0, which serves as a landing site for wh-movement. There is a problem, however,
with Campos' and Eguzkitza's analysis: the fact that they have to posit an ad hoc
slot for the wh-word to land. The adjunction-to-I0 analysis is problematic because,
following Chomsky 1986 and Fukui 1986, adjunction is only possible to maximal
projections. The adjunction to V0 analysis has the same problem but, in addition,
it also turns wh-movement into a downgrading movement.
Now, if one assumes that all preverbal subjects appear in a left-detached slot,
a non-ad-hoc structural position, "Spec, IP], becomes automatically available for
wh-words to land. If this position is always empty, it may be used as a landing
site for wh-movement. In other words, Campos' and Eguzkitza's proposal may be
implemented and still avoid the problem of creating a new structural position for
72In Catalan, as noted, subjects may also be VP-nal or right-detached. In Spanish there seems
to exist a process of subject-verb inversion that places the subject between the verb and the direct
object (cf. Torrego 1984). This operation is not available in Catalan (cf. Picallo 1984 for dissent
this might be due to dialectal dierence).
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the purpose of accommodating the wh-phrase. Although this last point must be
taken in a speculative note, it seems to provide further support for the idea that
subjects are always left-detached if preverbal.
To summarize, getting rid of a base preverbal position for subjects eliminates
the need to accept two base positions for subjects, levelling subjects with the other
arguments of the verb in that all would be able to surface in one single postverbal
base position, a right-detached slot, and a left-detached slot. It also correlates with
the fact that preverbal subjects are always interpreted as links. Finally, given the
Campos-Eguzkitza proposal for wh-movement in Romance, it provides a landing
site for the wh-element, thus freeing that analysis of its main problem.
It seems, then, that after all these considerations, there is a very straightforward
representation of information packaging in Catalan surface syntax. All links are
left-detached, all tails are right-detached, and whatever is left in the core clause
(under the lowest IP) must be interpreted as focal (with the exception of clitics).
Focus-preposing, as introduced above in x 5.1.5, is the only apparent counterexample
to this generalization. The next section looks at focus preposing and shows that,
despite its apparent conguration, it may be incorporated into the general pattern
of information-packaging representation in Catalan.73

5.2.4 Focus-preposing Revisited
All the cases of left- and right-detachment seen above have one characteristic in
common. They detach any argument or complement of the verb to the left or to the
right to mark it as a link or as a tail, respectively. As a consequence, the nonclitic
nondetached material that appears within the core IP must be all focal. Unavoidably, the focal material will be either V or a projection of V, i.e. Vn. It appears,
then, that left- and right-detachments are used only when the focal constituent is
Vn.
How does Catalan express cases in which the focal material excludes the verbal
head, i.e. cases in which V is part of the ground? The answer to this question is focuspreposing. Focus-preposing is an anomalous construction in that it violates two of
the generalizations established on the basis of the other congurations: intonational
73

An earlier version of the discussion in x 5.2.4 is the subject of Vallduv" 1989.
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prominence is not clause-nal but clause-initial, and the preposed phrase does not
bind a clitic in the clause but only a gap. The following examples illustrate the
construction:
(160)

"S1 is addressing S3. S2 is present]
S1: Hostia! S'hem acabat la botella, eh! Que som... que som...
S2: Les dues botelles ja!
S1: DUES-BOTELLES1 , s'hem polit t1.
`S1: My god! We nished the bottle! We are... we are...
S2: The two bottles already!
S1: TWO-BOTTLES1 , we polished o t1.'
"QM 10-85]

(161)

S1. Xec, avui vaig perdut.
S2. Com sempre...
S3. CERDO1, ha anat t1 tots aquests dies! CERDO1, va t1!
`S1. Boy, I'm really drunk today.
S2. As usual...
S3. WASTED1, he's been t1 lately! WASTED1, he is t1!'
"PC 10-85]

In (160) the focus is the direct object and in (161) the focus is the predicate nominal.
In both cases, the verb is excluded from the scope of the focus operator and is,
therefore, part of the ground.
Once the particular task of focus-preposing and detachment qua informationpackaging constructions is clear, it becomes obvious that they stand in complementary distribution: while, as noted, detachment is used in cases where the focus is
Vn, focus preposing is used to signal the focus in cases where the focus is not Vn.74
This complementarity is most clearly seen from the focus-tail examples in (162) to
(165), although the same pattern would be obtained with linkful structures. Examples (162)-(163) are right-detachments that, by right-detaching the tail, signal that
the Vn material in the clause is focal. Examples (164)-(165) are focus-preposings
that isolate the non-Vn focus of the sentence by preposing it to the left. The tail
material is left in the clause:
One must exclude, of course, cases of all-focus sentences where the focus is the entire IP.
Notice, however, that in these cases we need neither detachment nor focus-preposing.
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(162) Right-detachment: Focus-tail. Focus is V.
Els1 te t1 t2, molts amics1, la Nuria2.
obj 3s-have many friends the N.
`Nuria has many friends.'
(163) Right-detachment: Focus-tail. Focus is VP.
"F Te
molts amics t1, la Nuria1.
3s-have many friends the N.
`Nuria has many friends.'
(164) Focus-preposing: Focus-tail. Focus is object NP.
molts-amics1, la Nuria te t1.
many friends the N. 3s-have
`Many friends, Nuria has.'
(165) Focus-preposing: Focus-tail. Focus is subject NP.
La nuria1, t1 te
molts amics.
the N.
3s-have many friends
`nuria, has many friends.'
Apparently, then, the full range of focal choices within a given packaging instruction,
here a focus-tail structure, is represented at surface structure by the constructions
here discussed.75
The situation so far is the following: a) two syntactic constructions encode the
same information-packaging instruction and stand in complementary distribution
with respect to the particular constituent they mark as focus b) both constructions
are prosodically homophonous, with a pitch maximum on the focus, as expected, and
an ensuing atter contour over the nonfocal material and c) yet these constructions
are thought of as radically di erent in strict syntactic terms, due to the pivotal
nature attributed to the "+TNS] verb cluster.
In principle, there is nothing wrong with this situation: linguists interested in
describing the mapping between surface structure and informatics could take note
Notice that in the case of focused subjects, the last example above, one cannot determine
from string order whether they are in situ or in an A -position. They will be assumed to be focuspreposed, following the overt structure of parallel object focus-preposings. Notice, also, that when
the focused constituent is a +TNS] verbal element the actual focus could be the lexical category
V0 , the functional category TNS], or even the a$rmation/negation scale yes/no].
75
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of the mismatch and incorporate it into their theory. But, of course, there is a
very attractive alternative: exploring the possibility that focus-preposing and rightdetachment are identical in strict syntactic terms as well. If there is evidence for
it, this move is highly desirable, not only because of the spirit of the structuralist
method, but also because it provides us with a much more elegant account of the
syntax of information packaging. If they can be reduced to one and the same
construction we may be able to maintain the generalization o the representation
of information packaging in Catalan surface syntax introduced above. Let us look
closely at the syntactic facts around focus-preposing and right-detachment

Syntactic Structure
Traditionally, focus-preposing has been viewed as a wh-movement operation, totally
parallel to wh-question formation. This is the approach followed by Bonet & Sola
(1986:138f.) for Catalan, and Hernanz & Brucart (1987:96 .) for Spanish, among
others. The structure of a sentence like (166), would be, then, identical to the
structure of a wh-question (167), with the focus-preposed phrase in "Spec,CP]:76
(166) Focus-preposing:
"CP Molts-amics1 " te t1 pro ]].
`Many friends, (she) has.'
(167) Wh- question:
"CP Que1 " te t1 pro ]] ?
what 3s-have
`What does (she) have?'
This analysis certainly captures the generalization that both focus-preposed XPs
and wh-phrases bind an empty category in the clause to their right, contrary to link
left-detachment, which must bind a pronominal clitic, and which was assumed to
have the structure in (168), involving an adjunction to IP and not involving CP in
any way.
Bonet & Sol#a's (1986) account, following Chomsky 1976, actually base-generates the XP in a
xed topic position and posits a null-operator movement into Spec,CP] (i.e.  XP1  O1 ...t1...]]]).
Both approaches, though, crucially involve a wh-movement into CP. Also, for the sake of argument,
the discussion here on the position of wh-words in Catalan in the previous section will be ignored
and it will be assumed that they move into Spec, CP].
76
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(168) Link-marking left-detachment:
"CP "IP Molts amics1 "IP els1 te t1 pro ]]].
`Many friends (she) has.'
In order to capture this generalization in this fashion, it has to be assumed that
the wh-phrase in a wh-question is interpreted as the focus of the sentence in which it
occurs. If wh-phrases are focused constituents, it makes perfect sense that both are
structurally the same. That wh-phrases are the focus of the sentence in which they
occur is a widespread belief within the syntactic literature on focus, as illustrated, for
instance, by Rochemont 1986:19, Horvath 1986:118, Hernanz & Brucart 1987:97 .,
Campos 1986, Eguzkitza 1986, etc. From the informational point of view, however,
there is no reason to believe that wh-phrases are focused constituents. In fact, this
is a problematic assumption: in a paper on the informational role of gap-containing
constructions in English, Prince 1986:215 suggests that wh-questions have a `special
story', and that they are very di erent from information-packaging constructions.
Kuno 1980, 1982 has argued that, in Japanese, the focus of a question must contain
the wh-phrase, but not that the focus of a question is only the wh-phrase. ErteschikShir 1986 o ers a number of arguments against considering that wh-phrases in whquestions are interpreted as informational foci. Moreover, Wunderlich 1981 describes
wh-questions where the wh-phrase is the focus, but also wh-questions where it is
not. Finally, if the prosodic characteristics of questions are taken into account, it
will be noticed that intonational prominence does not fall on the wh-word, even
though focus is always marked by prominence in any other situation.77
Actually, Catalan presents dierent intonation contours for dierent types of wh-questions,
along the lines of the division made by Wunderlich 1981. Unmarked wh-questions have clause-nal
intonational prominence, like the wh-question seen above or (i) here. Marked wh-questions are
also allowed, as in (ii), with intonational prominence on the wh-phrase (and they are not echo
questions):
77

(i) Qui1 vindra t1 ?
who 3s-fut-come
`Who1 t1 will come?'
(ii) qui1 vindr#a t1 ?
`who1 t1 will come?'
The focus in (ii) is the wh-phrase, but not necessarily so in (i). The phrases to the right of the
wh-phrase in sentences like (ii) do behave as if they had been right-detached.
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Perhaps the fact that both wh-questions and focus-preposing involve the binding of a gap can be captured somehow else. In fact, the main piece of evidence
in support of the wh-like behavior of the focused XP in focus-preposing is that
both focus-preposing and wh-questions, at least in Spanish, trigger subject-verb
inversion (cf. Torrego 1984 for Spanish and Picallo 1984 for wh-questions in Catalan). Hernanz & Brucart (1987:96f.) present an analysis of Spanish focus-preposing
(their rematizacion) along these lines. Unfortunately, in Catalan, while it is true
that the uninverted order is impossible in wh-questions, focus-preposing does not
require subject-verb inversion. In other words, Catalan (169) and Spanish (170),
wh-questions without inversion, are both ungrammatical, but when it comes to
focus-preposing without inversion, Catalan (171) is perfect, whereas Spanish (172)
is out:78
(169) Catalan Wh-movement:
*"CP Que1 "IP la Nuria te t1 ]]?
what the N. 3s-have
`What does Nuria have?'
(170) Spanish Wh-movement:
*"CP Que1 "IP Mara tiene t1 ]]?
what
3s-have
`What does Mara have?'
(171) Catalan focus-preposing:
"CP Molts-amics1 "IP la Nuria te t1 ]].
`Many friends, Nuria has.'
(172) Spanish focus-preposing:
*"CP Muchos-amigos1 "IP Mara tiene t1 ]].
`Many friends, Mara has.'
Above it was stated that Catalan presented no subject-verb inversion (cf. Picallo 1984 for
dissent). If this position is correct, then the evidence in these examples must be interpreted
dierently: whatever factor it is that does not allow the subject to go between wh-words and the
verb in Catalan (in our terms it is just a matter of string order, since subjects are clause-external
and the wh-word is clause-internal) does not aect subjects in the case of `focus-preposing'. This
shows that the two constructions are dierent.
78
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The facts around subject-verb inversion, then, cannot be used to structurally equate
wh-questions and focus-preposing in Catalan, in the way they seem to support this
equation in Spanish. This suggests that perhaps there exists an important di erence
between the otherwise parallel constructions in Catalan and Spanish.
That `focus-preposing' is not a wh-movement operation in Catalan seems to be
further conrmed by the fact that it does not obey the island constraints. Compare
the grammatical Catalan sentence in (173) to the ungrammatical Spanish sentence
in (174) (from Hernanz & Brucart (1987:97 ex. 72)), where extraction from within
an island apparently results in ungrammaticality:
(173)

Els cales, la Nuria no sap
qui te.
the money the N. not 3s-know who 3s-have
`The money, Nuria doesn't know who has.'

(174)

*El dinero, ignora
Mara quien tiene.
the money 3s-not.know M. who 3s-have
`The money, Mara doesn't know who has.'

Sentences like (173), however, pose a problem also for the analysis that will be presented below. Once this analysis is laid out, this problematic example will discussed
in more detail.
As noted above, the distribution of these constructions, regarding the di erent
parts of the sentence they respectively signal as focus, seems natural if we assume
that we have a xed undetachable "+TNS] verbal core. However, another possible
approach becomes obvious if we assume that the "+TNS] element in the clause is
indeed detachable.
A rst hypothesis from this point of view would suggest that apparent rightdetachment of the arguments of V0 could actually be the focus-preposing of V0
itself (assuming clitics attach to V0). So, in a sentence like (175)b ((175)a is the
corresponding canonical), one could argue that the focused V0 has been preposed
to "Spec, CP] from its clausal slot between the subject and the object (S=subject,
V=verb, 0=direct object, I=indirect object):
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(175)

a. La NuriaS donaraV les clausO al fusterI.
the N. 3s-fut-give the keys to.the carpenter
`Nuria will give the keys to the carpenter.'

b. LesO hiI donara, la NuriaS, les clausO, al fusterI.
obj iobj 3s-fut-give the N. the keys to.the carpenter
`She will give the keys to the carpenter, Nuria.'
c. LesO hiI donara, fS,O,IS,I,OO,I,SO,S,II,S,OI,O,Sg.
Unfortunately, the fact that the elements to the right of the focus can be freely
ordered, as represented by (175)c, does not support this approach. One could,
if anything, postulate free scrambling of constituents, without any informational
relevance, in the clause following the focused V0. However, there is no independent
motivation to support this move, since canonical (i.e. non-focus-preposing) sentences
in Catalan do not accept free scrambling at all. Moreover, if (175)c is in fact a rightdetachment construction, the linear order variation that its postfocal constituents
present is not a problem: one of the characteristics of right-detachment is that,
when multiple detachment occurs, the detached phrases end up in any possible
linear order. The range of linear order possibilities in (175)c is just what one should
expect.
Taking these facts into account, and still assuming that the "+TNS] element
in the clause is detachable, there is yet a second possibility. If from the canonical
sentence in (175)a one derives a sentence where the only focal material is the indirect
object PP, one obtains (176):
(176)

Al fuster,
la Nuria donara les claus.
to.the carpenter the N. 3s-fut-give the keys
`To the carpenter, Nuria will give the keys.'
Example (176), according to the traditional analysis, is a focus-preposing. But,
observing the behavior of the phrases to the right of the focus with respect to linear
order, it is clear that they behave exactly like the right-detached phrases in (175)b-c:
here, again, any order among the phrases to the right of focus is grammatical,
(177)

a. Al fuster, la NuriaS, donaraV , les clausO.
`To the carpenter, Nuria will give the keys.'
b. Al fuster, fS,V,OS,O,VV,S,OV,O,SO,S,VO,V,Sg.
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If (177)b is viewed as a focus-preposing, the free linear order among the phrases
to the right of the focus remains unexplained, unless one is willing to postulate free
scrambling, which is not a desirable approach, as noted above. If, on the other hand,
it is viewed as a right-detachment, where the V0 has been detached to the right along
with the subject and object NPs, parallel to (175)b-c, the problem automatically
disappears, given that right-detached phrases can appear in any linear order. The
structure of our `focus-preposing-turned-right-detachment' should be, then, as in
(178), allowing free linear order among the detached phrases:I
(178)

a. "IP=F v1 molts amics t2 ], te1, la-Nuria2.
b. "IP=F v1 molts amics t2 ], la-Nuria2, te1.
`"F Many friends ], Nuria has.'
It was already mentioned that by considering focus-preposing to be an actual
right-detachment, the otherwise problematic free linear order among the postfocal
phrases can be accounted for. It is also clear that there is no reason now for `focuspreposing' to trigger subject-verb inversion, since it is does not involve a fronting, let
alone a movement into "Spec,CP], unlike wh-question formation. The linear order of
the subject and the verb in (178), for instance, is free, because they are individually
detached phrases.
Furthermore, consider an example like (179)a, for which (179)b is the corresponding canonical:
(179)

a. "F tenir-ne2 molts ], vol
d'amics2 la Nuria.
to-have.obj many 3s-want of-friends the N.
Approx.: `Friends, it is "F having many ] that Nuria wants.'
b. " La Nuria vol " (PRO) tenir molts amics ]].
`Nuria wants to have many friends.'
If the structure in (180), i.e. the traditional focus-preposing analysis where the
focused embedded innitival clause has been moved to "Spec,CP], is assumed for
(179),
(180)

"CP (PRO) "F tenir-ne2 molts ] "IP vol d'amics2 la Nuria ]].

we run into trouble when trying to account for the position of d'amics `of-friends', a
complement of the embedded verb tenir `to have'. One would have to say, then, that
part of this embedded clause, namely the N0 in the object QP, has been lowered back
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inside IP leaving a clitic copy behind, ne. This derivation, involving a downgrading
movement, has no parallel in the language, and is extremely hard to justify. In
contrast, accepting (181),
(181)

"IP=F v1 " (PRO) tenir-ne2 molts ] t3 ], vol1, d'amics2, la Nuria3.

the structure presupposed by this proposal, where the embedded clause remains in
situ, and where the matrix V0, the matrix subject, and the object of the embedded
clause are right-detached, this sentence is just one more unproblematic example of
right-detachment. It is interesting to note here that, once more, the linear order
among the postfocal phrases in (179)a (=(181)) is free.
Notice, furthermore, that, from this standpoint, we can also account for the fact
that, while link-preposing left detachment and right-detachment require a pronominal clitic in the clause coreferential with the XP, `focus-preposed' XPs must bind
a gap in the same situation. Right- and left-detachment bind a clitic in IP because
they are detached away from their head, V0, and V0 requires the presence of the
clitics when its arguments are not present in the clause. But XPs in the alleged
`focus-preposing' construction are not detached XPs anymore. They remain in situ,
and it is the V0 head now which is detached, subject to right-detachment, leaving its
original slot in the clause empty. Therefore, no clitic, coreferential with the focus,
appears with V0, since the focus remains in its canonical argument position in the
clause, and, therefore, does not license the presence of a clitic. Both our proposal
and the traditional approach, then, account for the clitic-versus-gap distribution.79
The apparent `focus-preposing' of Catalan is not a `preposing' at all but a rightdetachment, and what has been traditionally considered a detached XP is actually
an XP in situ. It is perhaps surprising that such a di erence should underlie the
apparently similar `focus-preposing' congurations of Catalan and Spanish. The
facts, though, seem clear: in Catalan the order of the postfocal phrases, the verb
Positing the detachment of the +TNS] verbal element to a clause-peripheral right-dislocation
position might strike one as an unusual proposal. However, if V0 adjoins to IP, the detached
+TNS]-carrying verb can properly govern the trace in I0 position, a necessary condition to license
verbal empty categories, according to Koopman (1984:170.). Also, this proposal runs counter to
the Head Movement Constraint as posited by Travis (1984:131): `An X0 may only move into the
Y0 which properly governs it'. The detachment slots we are considering in this paper are not Y0
positions, but see Torrego 1984, Kayne 1989, Schlonsky 1990 for analyses where X0 is adjoined to
XP. If the movement into the adjoined-to-XP position is terminal, as in our case, the problems
with barrierhood that the HMC was designed to prevent do not even arise.
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and the subject, in the apparent `focus-preposing' of an object is free (cf. (178))
(as it should if they were right-detached) in Spanish, in contrast, it is not, given
that sentences like (170) are out, since the verb and the subject must be inverted.
In Catalan, `extraction' of a `focus-preposed' phrase from within islands is possible
(given that there is actually no extraction, since the focused phrase remains in
situ) in Spanish it is not. It follows, then, that Spanish should not allow the free
arrangement in the linear order of the postfocal phrases that Catalan presents in
sentences like (177)b. And, in fact, it does not, as shown by (183), from Contreras
(1976:106 ex. 10.12) ((182) is the canonical):
(182)

Don Fermn saco sus espuelas de la sala.
`Don Fermn took his spurs out of the room.'

(183)

a. De-la-SALA, saco don Fermn sus espuelas.
b. De-la-SALA, saco sus espuelas don Fermn.
c. *De-la-SALA, sus espuelas don Fermn saco.
d. *De-la-SALA, don Fermn sus espuelas saco.
e. *De-la-SALA, don Fermn saco sus espuelas.
f. *De-la-SALA, sus espuelas saco don Fermn.

In Catalan, as pointed out above, all the linear orders to the right of the focus are
grammatically generated:
(184)

a. Del calaix, la NuriaS va treureV
els esperonsO .
of.the drawer the N. 3s-past-take-out the spurs
`The drawer, Nuria took the spurs out of.'
b. Del calaix, fS,V,OS,O,VV,S,OV,O,SO,S,VO,V,Sg.
A consequence of this proposal is, then, that the representation of focus at surface structure is crucially di erent in Catalan and Spanish, despite the apparent
similarity between `focus-preposing' congurations in both languages.80
Italian seems to pattern like Catalan in this respect: both (i) and (ii) are grammatical strings
((i) is from Antinucci & Cinque (1977:123 ex. 17)):
(i) un'automobile, Giorgio,
ha comprato.
(ii) un'automobile, ha comprato, Giorgio.
a car
3s-pst-buy G.
`A car, Giorgio bought.'
But in wh-questions only one order is possible:
(iii) Che cosa ha comprato Giorgio?
80
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Before closing this section, let us return to the problematic example (173), repeated here as (185):
(185) Els cales, la Nuria no sap
qui te.
the money the N. not 3s-know who 3s-have
`The money, Nuria doesn't know who has.'
This example was brought up as a problem for the position that focus-preposing is
a wh-movement because it involves a clear violation of the wh-island constraints.
It was also noted, though, that it presented a problem for the `focus-preposing as
right-detachment' analysis as well.
The `focus-preposing as right-detachment' analysis states that the focal phrase
els cales stays in situ and that the postfocal phrases are detached according to
constituency. Assuming that wh-movement and V-to-I movement take place before right-detachment in the derivation from D-structure to S-structure, the predetachment equivalent of (185), No sap qui te els cales la Nuria, has the structure
in (186):
(186)
IP
/

\
I'

/
I
no sap-1

\
V'
/ \
V' la Nuria
/ \
IP
V
t-1
/ \
qui-2
I'
/ \
I
V'
te-3 / \
V'
t-2
/ \
V
els CALES
t-3

(iv) *Che cosa Giorgio
ha comprato?
what
G.
3s-past-buy
`What did Giorgio buy?'
If Italian `focus-preposing' were really a focus-preposing, i.e. with movement into Spec,CP] of the
focused phrase, (ii) should be ruled out by the same reasons for which (iv) is ruled out.
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With this structure, there are four constituent units that are available for detachment: la Nuria, no sap, qui, and te. The following grammatical strings, some of
them underivable in the traditional analysis, are correctly predicted,
(187)

Els cales, la Nuria, no sap, qui te.
Els cales, la Nuria, qui te, no sap.
Els cales, no sap, la Nuria, qui te.
Els cales, no sap, qui te, la Nuria.
Els cales, qui te, no sap, la Nuria.
Els cales, qui te, la Nuria, no sap.
but, unfortunately, strings where the phrases qui and te do not appear together, like
in (188), are also predicted to be licit, even though they are utterly ungrammatical:
(188)

*Els cales, no sap, te, la Nuria, qui.
*Els cales, qui, no sap, te, la Nuria.
Similarly, the same pattern is found in examples with a "-wh] complementizer,
as in (190) (sentence (189) is the pre-detachment equivalent):
(189)

Vaig dir que no vindria
la Neus.
1s-past-say that no 3s-cond-come the N.
`(I) said that Neus wouldn't come.'

(190)

La neus, vaig dir, que no vindria.
La neus, que no vindria, vaig dir.
*La neus, no vindria, que, vaig dir.
*La neus, que, vaig dir, no vindria.

It seems that there is a constraint on the detachment of complementizers and whelements in isolation. They apparently have to be right-detached in one `group'
with the verbal head of the clause they belong to. Searching for a solution to this
problem would lead us astray from the main point of this chapter. It should be
noted, though, that, even though our approach manages to predict correctly the
existence of some of the sentences at issue, there is a small residue that cannot be
accounted for. In any event, more cases are covered here than in the traditional
approach.81
A possible explanation for the undetachability in isolation of complementizers could be related
to their status as phonological clitics, since they need a stress-bearing host to lean on. Wh-elements,
however, bear their own stress.
81
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5.2.5 The Informational Representation Condition
The exact syntactic conguration of the putative `focus-preposing' construction has
been discussed at length because the results obtained are important for the global
characterization of the syntactic representation of information packaging in Catalan.
By reducing `focus-preposing' to just another case of right-detachment, the generalizations about Catalan surface structure stated above in x 5.2 can be maintained: )
intonational prominence is invariably clause-nal (even for `focus-preposing'), and
) any right- or left-detachment extracting a complement of the verb from IP must
leave a clitic copy behind (since `focus-preposing' is not a preposing anymore and,
possibly, wh-movement is to a clause internal position).
The conspiracy carried out by these right- and left-detachments invariably leaves
the focus of the sentence in clause-nal position, where it bears the pitch maximum
that is normally associated with that position. In fact, the focus of the sentence is
associated with the entire core IP-slot. No part of the ground may remain within the
core IP at the surface. All the overt material within the core IP at surface structure
(with the exception of clitics) is interpreted as the focus of the sentence, and all the
nonfocal constituents are removed and detached from the core IP. If the analysis in
the previous sections is correct, Catalan surface structure, without exception, shows
the following mapping to the informational articulation of the sentence:
a

b

(191)

"IP link "IP "IP focus ] tail ]]

In (191), the ground material lies on both sides of the focus, while the latter is
invariably associated with the lowest IP as just described. Given the mapping in
(191), the rule for focus representation in Catalan could be stated along the lines of
(31):
(192)

Informational Representation in Catalan:
In a given sentence S, S=f focus, groundg, all and only the
overt nonclitic material in the core IP-slot is focus.
In Catalan, therefore, the material within IP at the surface constitutes the information of the sentence, i.e. it is the part of the sentence that contributes to the
hearer's knowledge-store. The basic conguration, then, seems to correspond to
the cases where the entire sentence is informative (all-focus sentences). The ground
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is added as needed, both in the way of links|left-detachments|and tails|rightdetachments|to insure that the information in the core IP is entered appropriately
into the hearer's knowledge-store.
Notice that, if focus-preposing and right-detachment had been kept as separate
constructions in strict syntactic terms, the surface representation of information
packaging for Catalan could not be described as in (191) and (192), since there
would have been two positions relevant to focus interpretation: "Spec,CP], on the
one hand, and the IP-slot in the other. A potential rule of informational representation at the surface in this situation should include specic information about
the fact that the focus of a given sentence would be represented by the material in
"Spec,CP] if focus6=Vn, and by the material in the core IP-slot if focus=Vn. Our
proposal provides a much simpler and less arbitrary condition on the representation
of information packaging at the surface.

5.3 More on Catalan and English
This section considers some further di erence between Catalan and English with
respect to their encoding of information packaging. In x 5.3.1, the fact that Catalan
may not encode information packaging exclusively by means of prosody, as English
does, and its relevance for the structural encoding of English and Catalan tails is
compared. Finally, x 5.3.2 o ers a brief discussion of it-clefts, a construction that
has not been mentioned so far in this study.

5.3.1 Tails in Catalan and English
Example (193) illustrates the contrast between an English link-focus-tail structure
and a Catalan link-focus-tail structure:
a. The boss hates broccoli.
b. L'amo l'odia, el broquil.
c. , 1, 1 = the boss " 2" +" 1 hates 2 ]] (
)
Both (a) and (b) represent the packaging instruction in (c), i.e. they are informationally equivalent, yet they are encoded in di erent surface syntactic structures.
The English sentence, except for the intonation, is a canonical structure, while the
(193)

x

x

x

x
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x

broccoli

Catalan one has a right-detached constituent. It was suggested above that this contrast was due to the fact that prosodic prominence in Catalan seems to be xed on
clause-nal position, while in English it may be shifted to clause-internal positions.
The sentences in (193) show a contrast in the way tails are encoded in the surface
syntax. While tails in Catalan are always right-detached, in English they are not. In
cases like (193), where the tail is the default clause-nal element, the fact that the
tail is right-detached in one language but not in the other does not a ect the linear
order of the sentence in any important way. In both languages the link precedes the
focus and the focus precedes the tail. In contrast, other tail assignments will cause
greater discrepancies between the Catalan and the English linear order. This is the
case in an example like (194), where only the clause-nal locative is interpreted as
focus:
(194) a. The boy kissed everybody "F at the party ].
If the focus is restricted to the clause-nal locative, and the subject the boy is taken
to be the link, the V0 constituent kissed everybody must constitute the tail. A natural
rendering of (194) into Catalan is (195):
(195) El xiquet1 ""IP t2 t1 a la festa ] "V va petonejar tothom ]2 ].
`The boy kissed everybody "F at the party ]'.
Catalan surface structure, as expected, signals the tail status of the V0 constituent
unambiguously, by right-detaching it. This alternative is not available in English,
as (196) indicates:
(196) a. *The boy at the party kissed everybody.
This example illustrates the point made above that tails do not have a universal structural correlate. In English, for instance, they may either precede or follow
the focus, while in Catalan they must follow it. Language-particular syntactic and
prosodic constraints presumably determine how the tail is encoded in each language.
The availability of the right-detachment rule in Catalan and the possibility of applying it to verbal projections allows the operation in (195). English, in this case,
must determine that the V0 constituent kiss everybody is nonfocal by independent
means.
Other examples are more problematic. What is the English equivalent of an
example like (197), where the tail is just the direct object?
0
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(197)

L'Iu "F el1 va car t1 al calaix ], el ganivet1.
the I. obj 3s-past-put in.the drawer the knife
Approx.: `Iu put it in the drawer, the knife.'

Is it, following the translation provided for the Catalan sentence, a right-detachment
construction in English as well? If not, what is it? The standard rules for focus
encoding by means of prosody in English do not allow the sequence put in the drawer,
with the exclusion of the direct object to be marked as focus, and there do not seem
to be any syntactic means to represent it structurally either, other than the awkward
It is putting it in the drawer that Iu did with the knife. The right-detachment in
(197) is certainly an available option in English, but it is also clear that in other
cases exclusive use of prosody, as in (198)a, is preferred over right-detachment:
(198)

a. The boss hates broccoli.
b. The boss hates it1, broccoli1.
Another case that seems to be hard to translate to English is the case of subject
tails. What does the informational equivalent of (199) in English look like?
De pa1 "F no en1 menja t1 t2 ], mon germa2.
of bread no obj 3s-eat
my brother
Approx.: `Bread he doesn't eat, my brother.'
Again, the example has been translated by means of an English right-detachment.
Despite the rarity of right-detachment, this sentence seems to be the best approximate to the informational understanding of the sentence as encoded in the Catalan
equivalent. Encoding the tail subject as a preverbal subject is not appropriate, since
preverbal subjects in English are interpreted either as links, as in The boss called,
or as being (part of) the focus when they receive intonational prominence, as in
F The boss called ] or F The boss ] called.
These examples raise interesting questions about the role of right-detachment in
English. Is English right-detachment an information-packaging construction as well?
If so, is it used only in cases like the ones discussed in this section, where no other
structural means are available? It is true that, while right-detachment in Catalan
is an option which is frequent and available in all registers, right-detachment in
English is a more elusive construction (cf. Vallduv 1988a). English seems to share
with Catalan the right-detachment encoding of tails, but restricted to nonverbal
(199)
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projections, and, furthermore, used mostly in cases where the exclusively prosodic
alternative is not available. Addressing the above questions would require a comprehensive study of right-dislocation in English. The point of this section, however,
was to show that tails in English may be either preverbal or postverbal, and that,
on some occasions, it seems one has to resort to English right-detachment to nd
informational equivalents of some Catalan constructions.

5.3.2 It-clefts
It-clefts constitute a core case of focus-ground marking constructions (cf. Akmajian
1979(1970), Prince 1978, 1986). It may then seem surprising that they have not been
addressed in this study. This section brie y discusses the reason for this omission.
It-clefts in English represent a way to mark (narrow) foci by stripping them
away from the ground. It is generally assumed that the two sentences in (200) are
informationally equivalent:
(200)

a. The boss hates "F broccoli ].
b. It is broccoli that the boss hates.
In principle, this seems correct: the same focus-ground understanding is obtained
from (a) and from (b). But, if some additional data is considered, it becomes
clear that it-clefts perform some additional encoding task that is absent from its
`equivalent' (a) sentence. Compare the following sentences:
(201)

a. She saw nobody at the party.
b. *It's nobody that she saw at the party.
If (201)a and (201)b are equivalent, what is responsible for the ungrammaticality of
(b)? There is clearly some additional `meaning' in (b), absent in (a), which is responsible for the di erence is acceptability between the two sentences (cf. Rochemont
1976, where this contrast was already noticed).
As discussed in x 3.1.4, it is not the case that in a focus-ground sentence the
ground is entailed or semantically presupposed. The ground is just assumed by the
speaker to be believed by the hearer. This is why sentence (201)a is good: the
ground `She saw at the party' is (assumed to be) believed by the hearer, but the
sentence cannot entail or semantically presuppose `She saw at the party', since the
proposition it encodes would be inconsistent with its entailment or presupposition.
x

x
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The cleft in (201)b, however, does entail or presuppose the proposition `She saw at
the party', and therefore the sentence is semantically unacceptable. The same must
be the case, then, with the examples in (200), even though no e ects are observable
at the surface with respect to contradictory entailments or presuppositions. The
conclusion arrived at is that it-clefts do not only perform a focus/ground-marking
task, but also that they have a true semantic role as well.82
Catalan has it-clefts as well, but they do not occur as often as they occur in
English. Many times, an English it-cleft may be translated into a Catalan `focuspreposing', as in (202)b, even though it-clefts are also available, as in (202)c:
x

(202)

a. It's broccoli that I bought.
b. broquil, vaig comprar.
c. Es broquil que vaig comprar.
As noted above, Catalan `focus-preposing' has more in common with Yiddish Movement than with Standard English Focus Movement. It is known that in Yiddishbackground varieties of English Yiddish Movement does the work of Standard English it-clefts (cf. Prince 1981a). That could account for the more restricted use of
it-clefts in Catalan. One could even speculate that perhaps Catalan it-clefts only
have a role as markers of certain entailments or `real' presuppositions, but not as
focus-ground structures. There is some recent work that might shed some light on
these issues. First, Ball (to appear) is a thorough study of the history of it-clefts in
English. This work may allow us to determine what factors intervened in the rise
and expansion of it-clefts in English. Second, Delin 1990 is an analysis of it-clefts
which takes into account their dual status as both an informationally and a semantically relevant construction. Once more is known about its dual status, it will be
possible to understand what additions it brings into our depiction of information
packaging.

It is not the case that the ungrammaticality of *It's nobody that she saw at the party is the
result of a potential incompatibility of quantiers and the clefted position in it-clefts. Sentences
like It's every chapter that you have to read or It's only some people that hate their kids are
grammatical.
82
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Chapter 6
The Syntax-Informatics Interface
Chapter 4 described how sentences are articulated into packaging instructions and
how these instructions may be represented. The di erent possible informational
articulations of the sentence were captured in four distinct information-packaging
instructions. These instructions mark the information carried by the sentence and
direct the hearer as to how this information must be entered into her/his knowledgestore.
Accepting the position that informatics and logical-semantics are two distinct
autonomous components of our linguistic apparatus, one may then wonder how the
interpretive component where instructions are generated and interpreted is connected to the structural components through which they are expressed. It has been
pointed out that in Catalan surface syntactic structure allows for a very straightforward mapping to information packaging. The informational scope of the + operator
corresponds in the syntax to the material dominated by the lowest IP, and ground
elements which are found outside the scope of + in the informational representation
are detached to a clause-external position in the syntax.
It was also noted, however, that in English this is not quite the same. While
a subset of the ground, the link, is indeed detached from the core clause, other
ground elements remain in situ dominated by the lowest IP. In English, it is not
the position of a (nonlink) constituent in the surface syntactic conguration which
tells us whether that constituent is focal or not, but rather its position with respect
to prosodic prominence. This contrast is evident in the informationally-equivalent
Catalan and English examples (203)a-b:
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(203)

a. The boss hates broccoli.
b. L'amo l1' odia t1, el broquil1.
the.boss obj-cl 3s-hate
the broccoli
Nevertheless, these two distinct syntactic congurations re ect the same informationpackaging instruction.
This chapter focuses on the nature of the mapping between surface syntactic
conguration and informatics. It indicates how Catalan surface structure may be
translated into abstract information-packaging instructions and then it extends this
procedure to English. This mapping operation is represented using the Principles
& Parameters theory of syntax.83

6.1 Information Packaging in the Grammar

6.1.1 The Structure of Grammar I

It is obvious that all sentences that can be generated by a given grammar must be
fully interpretable and that the surface structure of a sentence must provide sucient
information to guarantee its interpretation. It is also known that `interpretation'
is not a monolithic process since it encompasses the interpretation of relations of
di erent types, all encoded in parallel in the syntax. For instance, the lexical item
everybody, in a given structure, must be interpreted both as a quantier over a
proposition and as an argument of a predicate.
In the Principles & Parameters theory of syntax, a multistratal theory, each
stratum represents purely and structurally one of these relations: D-structure is a
pure representation of argument or -structure and LF is, ideally, a pure representation of logico-semantic relations. Thus, we posit D-structures where surface distant
arguments are locally governed by their -assigning predicate, and we posit LF
repesentations where quantiers c-command their scope. But, in order to guarantee
interpretability, these structural relations must be also recoverable at S-structure,
which is the only point of contact between these abstract pure representations on
the one hand, and PF and the audible surface form of sentences on the other. Sstructure, then, must encode in some way or another all this information in Chom



An earlier version of this material was presented at the 16th GLOW Colloquium, Cambridge/London, April 6-9, 1990.
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sky's words, it is `something like the solution to a certain set of equations' (1988:3).
This view of grammar can be represented as in (204) (Chomsky 1981:17):
(204)

D-structure
|
S-structure
/
\
PF
LF

A given sentence is, therefore, a bundle of derivationally related levels of representation. D-structure, S-structure and LF are related transformationally through the
rule Move- and appropriate indexing. The nature of these representations and
mappings is severely constrained by a number of subsystems and principles, like
government theory, binding theory, and bounding theory. Of utmost importance is
the Projection Principle put forth in Chomsky (1981):


Representations at each syntactic level (i.e. LF, D- and S-structure) are
projected from the lexicon, in that they observe the `lexical' properties
of lexical items.
The Projection Principle forces thematic structure and other lexical requirements
to be retrievable at every stage of syntactic derivation, thus restricting the number
of possible derivations at S-structure and LF.
The level of LF, as stated, is a pure representation of logico-semantic meaning
and is the level that serves as an interface between syntax and logical-semantics.
For instance, the sentences in (205),
(205)

a. Mary saw everybody.
b. Mary saw John.
have identical surface syntactic congurations but their logico-semantic structures
are crucially distinct. The syntactic objects of see in (205)a and (205)b are semantically very di erent items: while John is an individual appearing as the argument
of see0, everybody is an operator acting as a function that takes see0(mary,x) as its
argument:
(206)

a. see0 (john, mary)
b. 8 "see0( mary)]
x

x
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These distinctions relevant for logico-semantic interpretation are structurally represented at LF. Even though (205)a and (205)b have identical representations at
D-structure (the thematic structure of (205)a and (205)b is the same) and at Sstructure, their LF structures are distinct:
(207)

a. LF: Everybody Mary saw t .
b. LF: Mary saw John.
The S-structure in (205)a above maps onto the LF structure in (207)a through the
rule Move- . This instance of Move- is called Quantier Raising (QR). Coindexing of the moved element and its trace guarantees the satisfaction of the Projection
Principle. (207)a, then, structurally represents all the information needed by the
semantic translation algorithms. LF may be viewed, then, as an intermediate stage
in the mapping between surface syntax and abstract logico-semantic representation that facilitates the translation procedure between structure and logico-semantic
meaning. Crucially, a single S-structure can be derivationally related to more than
one LF representation, as in the case of sentences with more than one quantier.84
The relations re ected in the levels of D-structure, S-structure, and LF, namely
logico-semantic relations, -structure and Case requirements, however, do not exhaust the list of relations that must hold among sentence elements to guarantee the
full interpretation of sentences. At least two other types of relations have important
structural e ects at S-structure and seem to be integral part of global sentence interpretation. One is the subject-predicate structure of the sentence, which takes one of
the arguments of the verb and turns it into a `special' element, a subject of a predication. The subject-predicate articulation is the main motivation behind Chomsky's
Extended Projection Principle, which stipulates that sentences must have subjects.
Rothstein 1985 and Heycock 1989 study the structural e ects of this relation. The
second type of relation is the subject-matter of this study: information packaging.
i
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Some syntactic theories oer models without multiplicity of levels of representation (e.g. GPSG
and derivations, Williams' LF-less P&P). Whether the phenomena described here using a multistratal notation (as indeed other analogous phenomena) are better described within a multistratal
or a monostratal approach is left open as an empirical question.
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6.1.2 Proposal
Adopting the view that S-structure is a sort of contact level between levels of pure
representation (Chomsky 1988), it must be assumed that information packaging
is represented at one such level of pure representation. Information packaging is
represented as S-structure as well, in the same way quanticational elements and
-relations are, to permit the interface with PF and the audible surface form of
sentences.
Given the assumption that information packaging is independent of logico-semantic meaning, it must be concluded that the model of grammar sketched above is not
sucient to incorporate all the complexity of sentence interpretation. In what follows it is argued that informational relations are purely represented at the abstract
level of information structure (henceforth IS), distinct from LF, which interfaces the informatics. In other words, IS serves the mediating role between surface
conguration and informatics that LF serves between surface syntactic conguration and logical-semantics. The information-packaging instructions generated in the
informatics are mapped onto the syntax at IS, which in turn maps onto S-structure
along with all the other abstract levels of representation. And, vice versa, in the interpretation of information-packaging instructions, S-structure encoding is mapped
onto a pure IS representation and this representation is, in turn, translated into an
abstract entity in the informatics.
IS is directly derived from S-structure, parallel to LF and D-structure, by means
of well-known mechanisms of grammar, and satises the Projection Principle and
the other principles of UG. This proposal constitutes an important modication of
the T-model of grammar and its derivatives (Chomsky & Lasnik 1977, Chomsky
1981, 1986). In the T-model, one single level of representation, LF, is available as
an interface with the complex conceptual systems it presumably feeds. If `interpretation' is not a monolithic process, the syntactic representation that serves as
input to this interpretation cannot be monolithic either. It is our intent to show
that a single level of LF is not sucient to perform this interfacing task, and that
the pure structural representation of propositional content and the pure structural
representation of information must be carried out at di erent levels of abstraction.
If this can be done successfully, there will be additional support for the autonomy
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of logico-semantic meaning and information.

6.1.3 Focus in LF
There have been several proposals in the syntactic literature to determine what the
exact locus of informational representation is, especially for the notion of focus.
These proposals assume that informational notions are structurally represented either at LF or at a level of representation derived from LF, called LF0. Among the
former there are Chomsky 1976, 1981, Huang 1982, Horvath 1986, and Rochemont
1986, and among the latter there are Brody 1981 and Huang 1984. There is a third
group of works (cf. Koopman & Sportiche 1982, and Culicover & Rochemont 1983)
that leave the question open.
Perhaps the most well-known proposal is the rule of Focus Interpretation or
Focus Raising due to Chomsky 1976 and pursued in Brody 1981, Chomsky 1981,
Huang 1982, Culicover & Rochemont 1983, and Rochemont 1986, inter alia. Under
this view, a focus constituent is treated as quanticational and is raised at LF
or LF0 to an A0-position adjoined to the root IP node, just like quantiers do by
means of Quantier Raising.85 The output of such a movement is what Culicover &
Rochemont (1983) call F-structure (equivalent to either LF or LF0, as noted), where
focus-presupposition relations are structurally laid out as in (208):
(208)

" focus1 ]"IP

:::

t1

:::

]

The motivation for this rule is twofold: it is modeled after the overt rule of Focus
Movement, shown in (209),
(209)

fido1 they named it t1.

and it accounts for the weak crossover e ects (cf. Chomsky 1976, 1981) that focus
seems to create, parallel with quantiers and wh-words. Weak crossover is observable
in the following paradigm:
May 1985:114 suggests that focus constituents adjoin to CP and not to IP, to account for some
cases where focused elements are claimed to have scope over the wh-word (cf. Ch. 7).
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(210)

a. " His mother saw John yesterday ]
b. * " Who " did his mother see t yesterday ]]
c. * " His mother saw everyone yesterday ]
" Everyone " his mother saw t yesterday ]]
d. * " His mother saw john yesterday ]
" john " his mother saw t yesterday ]]
In sentence (210)a coreference, indicated by the indices, seems possible however, in
(210)b it is impossible, and in (210)c it is again impossible. If one assumes a whlike movement of the quantier in (210)c at an abstract level, as represented in the
example, one can account for its ungrammaticality by means of the same principles
invoked to explain (210)b, since they are structurally identical (cf. May 1985 for
two main accounts). Consider now sentence (210)d. This sentence, in contrast with
the grammatical (210)a, is apparently unacceptable. This pattern can again be
explained if one assumes that the focused NP John in (210)d has undergone some
wh-like raising operation at an abstract level of representation: the same principles
that rule out (210)b and (210)c would rule out (210)d.86 This evidence seems, at
rst blush, very strong. Unfortunately, there are three main problems for an analysis
along these lines. First, the imsiness of the data second, the analysis of focus as
quanticational and third, the problematic nature of Focus Raising as a rule of
grammar. Let us discuss them in this order.
Judgments on the grammaticality of weak crossover with focus are not very
strong. In particular, it is not that clear that the di erence in grammaticality
between (210)a and (210)d, repeated here under (211), is clear cut:
(211) a. " His mother saw John yesterday ]
b. * " His mother saw john yesterday ]
Rochemont 1978 and Solan 1984 provide examples in which sentences of type (b)
appear to be grammatical. The following example is from Rochemont 1978 (in
Rooth 1985:71):
(212) a. A: Sally and the woman John loves are leaving the country today.
b. B: I thought that the woman he loves had betrayed Sally.
c. A: No|the woman he loves betrayed john. Sally and she are
the best of friends.
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Huang 1982 oers some evidence for a Focus-Raising operation in Chinese as well. He argues certain irregularities can be captured if it is assumed that Focus-Raising applies at LF. His
arguments will not be discussed here.
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Rochemont's conclusion is that there are no crossover e ects on the case of focus. And Solan suggests, given this and other data, that the rule of Focus Raising
should be removed from sentential grammar, leaving the interpretation of focus to
`discourse'.
However, Rooth 1985 and Horvath 1986 argue that the evidence provided by
Rochemont does not a ect the existence of the crossover e ect with focus. The
reading that Rochemont's example has is the so-called `free variable' reading, i.e.
both variables refer to the same entity not because they are both bound by the same
operator, but because one of them is free in reference and ends up referring to the
same individual. In (212), at the time (c) is uttered, propositions of the form `the
woman he (John) loves betrayed ' are under discussion. The fact that he refers to
`John' is established independently by means of discourse anaphora, i.e., coreference
between he and (the variable left by the focus-raised) John is just accidental but
licit nevertheless.
One can construct, however, examples in which no such free variable reading
seems to be available but are nevertheless grammatical. See (213), where the putatively illegal reading is not only possible but almost unavoidable:
(213)
"A teenage couple is found snorting coke. Her parents catch them
redhanded. After yelling at the girl, her father says to the boy:]
F: And what am I supposed to do with you? Take you to the police?
"To which the girl replies:]
a. G: Leave him alone. You deal with me
b. G: and his parents will deal with him.
In this context no proposition of the form `his (boyfriend's) parents will deal with
' is under discussion, but rather a proposition like ` 's parents deal with ', which
is a bound reading. In other words, if him in (213)b is focus-raised at LF (or LF0),
the conguration obtained will be a typical weak crossover conguration but the
sentence is still grammatical. In (213)b the focus is a pronoun and not a full NP.
This should not a ect the argument, as Rooth points out. But compare (213)b with
(214)b, which does indeed seem to be out due to the weak crossover e ects:
(214) a. You deal with me
b. *and his parents will deal with john.
The contrast between these two sentences is due to the pronoun vs. full NP distinction. An explanation of these facts will not be attempted here, but it seems clear
y
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that, given the contrast at hand, the ungrammaticality of (214) cannot be due to
the focal nature of the NP, but to some other reason probably related to the binding
of nouns.87
Taking focus to be quanticational in nature is also problematic. Focus does
not seem to have any quanticational force, at least in the way traditional quantiers and wh-words do. Consider example (215), which has two interpretations (cf.
Hirschbuhler 1985(1979)): which is the exam that all students passed vs. for each
student, which exam (possibly di erent) did s/he pass. If focus were quanticational, given a pair of sentences like (216)a-b,
(215)

Which exam did every student pass last year?

(216)

a. Every student passed the prelims last year.
b. Every student passed the prelims last year.

one would be lead to expect a duplicity of readings in (b) but a unique reading
in (a). In other words, if focus were a quantier of sorts there should be a scopal
ambiguity in (216)b, parallel to the one found in (215). However, no such ambiguity
seems to exist.88
It is true that there have been attempts to reduce focus to a quantier of sorts,
especially an exhaustiveness quantier (cf. Szabolcsi 1981, 1983 and Svoboda &
Materna 1987). So while (216)a would merely mean that all the students passed the
prelims last year, (216)b would mean that all the students passed the prelims and
no other exam. In Chapter 7, however, it will be shown that analyses of this sort
are problematic. The exhaustiveness feeling one gets with foci is an artifact of their
informational task. Jackendo 1972 provides focus with a quanticational force of
a di erent nature. For Jackendo , the meaning of (216)b would be something like
`The prelims are an such that every student passed ' in the wide-scope reading
for focus and `For every student the prelims are an such that s/he passed ' in its
narrow-scope reading. The only possible truth-conditional di erence between these
x
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x

x

The unstressed full NP in cases like His lover BETRAYED John behaves like pronouns
(stressed or unstressed) and not like stressed full NPs with respect to these binding considerations, thus allowing a licit reading. The reason behind this behavior will not be pursued here.
88Horvath 1986:144 claims that a sentence like Every man likes a BLONDE exhibits a scopeambiguity that she attributes to focus. The ambiguity between the specic and nonspecic readings
of indenite NPs, however, is an independent well-known fact unrelated to focus in any obvious
way. The ambiguity in Horvath's sentence seems to be the result of this distinction.
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two readings is whether all students passed the same prelims or whether each student
passed possibly di erent prelims. While these two readings are indeed present in
(216)b, they are also present in (216)a. Therefore, focus cannot be blamed for this
`ambiguity' (actually, this is just a case of vagueness).
Finally, with regard to the problematic nature of Focus Raising as a rule of
grammar, di erent observations made by several authors must be taken into consideration. Koopman & Sportiche point out that Focus Raising is quite an `exceptional'
rule in that it does not obey the ECP and the Binding Theory. If Focus Raising is
adopted, sentences like (217) (Koopman & Sportiche 1982 ex. 39),
(217)

Mary claims that sarah should stay.

violate the ECP, since Sarah should raise and adjoin to the matrix IP. A way out
of this problem is to force focus to adjoin to the lower clause, but this requires the
existence of an additional principle banning the long movement. Another solution
is to assume that focus representation is carried out at LF0 and that at LF0, unlike
LF, the ECP does not apply (Brody 1981).
Solan 1984, following Chomsky 1981, points out that the putative rule of Focus
Raising must yield its output at a level where the binding theory does not apply
either, given examples like the following (Solan 1984:ex. 12),
(218)

a. John thought that Paul Drake was investigating him.
b. for = him, John thought that Paul Drake was investigating .
since the variable in the lower clause should be free, incorrectly ruling out John
as an A-binder. Of course, if Focus Raising is an LF0 operation and the Binding
Theory does not apply at LF0, the problem disappears again. One may wonder,
however, what kinds of well-formedness conditions would apply at LF0, given that
the two core modules that apply at LF|the ECP and the Binding Theory|are not
available at that level.89
Also, a di erent kind of problem with the Focus Raising approach is more of
a conceptual nature. Focus Raising seems to be elegant and economical in cases
of `narrow' focus, i.e. when most of the sentence is part of the ground. However,
in cases of link-focus or all-focus structures, where most of the sentence is focal,
x
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Kratzer 1990 discusses some apparent subjacency violations of some Focus Raising outputs. If
her point is correct, subjacency should be added to the list of modules that do not apply at LF .
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the entire predicate or the entire sentence must be raised to the clause peripheral
position, so that focus can take `scope' (cf. Culicover & Rochemont 1983, Rochemont
1986, for details). In other words, in cases where the entire clause is focal one ends
up with an LF representation where the original IP-slot is empty and the entire
clause is adjoined to IP (from Rochemont 1986:34):
(219)

S
/
S-i
+focus]

\
S-i
|
e

Even though such an operation is allowed by the grammar, it strikes us as very
counterintuitive, especially when taking into account that link-focus sentences where
the entire VP is focal and all-focus sentences are the unmarked case (cf. Lambrecht
1987).
The other motivation for Focus Raising is the existence of overt Focus Movement in English. Not much will be said concerning the validity of adopting this
construction as the generalized abstract representation of focus. However, it must
be pointed out that Focus Movement is actually not the unmarked way to represent
focus in English. The unmarked and most common way to do so is to signal focus
prosodically while leaving it in situ. Furthermore, Focus Movement is restricted to
certain types of arguments and also to certain restricted `scalar' contexts (cf. Ward
1985:137 .). It is odd to take such a construction as basic and assume that it is
generalized at an abstract level. Besides, as noted above, focus-preposing is absent
from languages like Catalan.90
To conclude our review of Focus Raising, it must be pointed out that, while the
abstract representation it yields re ects the focus-ground division appropriately, it
does not contain a global representation of informational meaning with inclusion
of the distinction between links and tails. The proposal in this chapter does not
encompass a rule of focus-raising, despite the weak crossover data and the existence
of focus preposing in English. We tried to show that the evidence used to marshall
It does not seem possible nor desirable to reduce English focus-preposing to a right dislocation
of sorts, as was done in the case of Catalan. In fact, English Focus Movement is peculiar in that it
seems to perform two informational tasks. This will be addressed below before closing this chapter.
As for Spanish, it seems to be like English in this respect.
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such a rule is inconclusive or unclear, and that Focus Raising itself is a problematic
rule of grammar in several ways.

6.2 Information Structure (IS)
It will be proposed here that information packaging is purely represented at IS,
which serves as an interface between S-structure and informatics. In this section
the details of this proposal are discussed. The conguration of IS, the derivation
procedure from S-structure, and its non-identity with the level of LF are described.
The conguration of IS, just like the conguration of LF, is meant to be universal
in coverage, although it is open to parameterization. In trying to determine the
makeup of this abstract level, we will rely heavily on the overt syntactic structure of
Catalan. The motivation for this is legitimate: if Catalan faithfully represents information packaging at the surface by syntactic means, it seems logical to assume that
the conguration of IS|which is precisely the level of pure syntactic representation
of information packaging|resembles very closely the surface syntactic conguration of Catalan. In fact, this is what has been done with respect to the abstract
representation of wh-raising in languages without overt wh-movement.

6.2.1 Surface Representation in Catalan
The syntax of information packaging in Catalan was discussed in chapter 5. In this
section some of the main aspects of that discussion will be recalled, so as to provide
the immediate basis for our discussion of IS. In Catalan, all nonfocal elements in the
sentence, i.e. the ground, are subject to right- and left-detachment to A0-position.
Like topicalization in English, these syntactic operations are not triggered by the
need to satisfy the -criterion, agreement requirements, the Case lter or any logicosemantic relations. The detached A0-phrases are moved from their D-structure Apositions, by means of the operation move- . They also bind a pronominal clitic
that attaches to V and is coindexed with the corresponding empty position. This
conguration is represented in (220) (=(123) above):
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(220)

left-detachment:

right-detachment:

IP
/ \
XP
IP
/
\
/
\
- cl- t-

IP
/ \
IP
XP
/
\
/
\
- cl- t-

The directionality of the detachment depends on whether the nonfocal phrase is a
link or not: phrases that are detached to the left are links and phrases that are
detached to the right are tails. Therefore, these A0-movements in Catalan yield the
surface conguration in (221) for information packaging in this language (=(191)
above):
(221)

"IP link "IP "IP focus ] tail ]]

In other words, the focus of the sentence is all and only the overt nonclitic material
in the core IP-slot

6.2.2 Derivation and Con guration
Let us now turn to the characterization of Information Structure (IS). As already
mentioned, S-structure may be viewed as a contact level from which all the structural
relations purely represented at the abstract levels must be retrievable somehow. How
exactly these distinct abstract structures are conveyed by S-structure is a languageparticular matter with wide crosslinguistic variation, which can be expressed in the
form of a multivalued parameter. In Catalan it is the informational articulation
of the sentence which is overwhelmingly re ected in the S-structure position of the
major constituents, while -structure is represented at the surface by a combination
of fully indexed clitics and null categories. Notice, for example, how in (222) the
-positions governed by the -assigning predicate are empty positions, and how
the arguments that bind these empty positions are located in adjoined positions
according to their informational role:
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(222)

"IP El petit1 "IP "IP "IP=F (ja) l1'hi2 ha portat t1 t2 t3 ] ma mare3 ]
the small-one
obj.obl 3s-past-take
my mother
al metge2. ]]
to.the doctor
Approx.: `The youngest she (already) took to the doctor, my mother.'
This situation is analogous to the case of wh-quantication in English-type languages
in the following sense. In a sentence like (223),
(223)

Who1 did you see t1?

the S-structure position of the wh-element re ects logico-semantic considerations
and not thematic considerations. The -relations in (223) are recoverable thanks to
the presence of the trace bound by the overt direct object wh-phrase. In fact, the
LF representation of sentences like (223) is taken to be identical to their S-structure
representation, since wh-quantication is appropriately represented already at Sstructure. Therefore, the mapping function between (223) and its LF representation
is taken to apply vacuously.
Exactly like in this case, and given that Catalan S-structure closely re ects
informational structure, it will be assumed here that the mapping function between
S-structure and IS in Catalan applies vacuously as well. Given a Catalan S-structure
like (222), all that has to be done to obtain a `pure' representation of information
packaging is delete the pronominal clitics, which perform no informational task. So
from (222), the IS representation in (224) is derived:


(224)

"IP el petit1 "IP "IP "IP=F ha portat t1 t3 t2 ] ma mare2 ] al metge3 ]

The IS representation of this sentence matches exactly the abstract Catalan surfacestructure conguration expressed in (221) above. Given this, the abstract conguration in (221) can be now viewed as an IS conguration as well:
(225)

IS Conguration:
"IP link "IP "IP focus ] tail ]]
This IS conguration is then translated into the corresponding procedural instruction in the informational component and interpreted.
Now, let us describe in detail how the informational primitives described above
are re ected in the IS representation proposed in this chapter. The three following
features of this conguration are important (cf. x 4.3.1 above):
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 First, the link(s) is sentence initial. This is correlated with its informational
role as an address pointer. It c-commands the clause containing the oncoming
information that hearers are instructed to retrieve and enter under the address
denoted by such a link.

 Second, the focus is in the core IP slot this re ects the conceptual argument

that what is informative, the focus, is in some sense the actual informational
reason for the clause to exist. The core IP slot is identied with the scope of
the + operator. All nonfocal elements must move away from the scope of + to
perform their anchoring task, and everything within the scope of + is taken
as informative. Ground elements, i.e. detachments, only occur when a ground
is necessary.

 Third, strictly speaking, the information of the sentence is not just the overt

focus material in the core IP, but the overt material embedded in its sentential
environment, i.e. everything under the scope of +. For instance, the focus in
(224) is not just the verb ha portat `took', but the entire frame x took y to z,
where the value of the variables is determined by the ground (unless they are
free). In other words took is not the informative part of the sentence by itself.
It is only informative if interpreted in relation to the ground that accompanies
it, my mother the youngest to the doctor. Our conguration represents this
relational nature of focus with no further stipulation.

Summarizing, the structural conguration at IS represents the informational
relations of the sentence in a pure and disambiguated fashion. The focus is in
the core IP, which represents the scope of +, and the ground anchoring material,
including the sentence initial link, raises to both perform its anchoring task and
bind the variables in the core IP.

6.2.3 IS = LF
6

Having seen how IS may be derived from S-structure in Catalan and what kinds of
relationships are purely represented at that level so that the input into the informational component is done appropriately, we shall now address what the relationship
of IS is with the other levels of representation in the grammar, especially LF.
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Non-identity
If the characterization proposed for IS is correct, it automatically follows that IS
must be distinct from LF. To see this let us consider a simple example like (226):
(226)

"IP A la festa1 "IP=F hi1 vaig enviar tothom t1 ]].
to the party loc 1s-past-send everybody
`The party "F (I) sent everybody to ].'
This example is a standard link-focus sentence. The focus is the V0 constituent in
the lowest IP slot, and the link has been left-detached to an A0-position. The IS
representation for (226) is (227), which is later translated into the informational
instruction (228) in the informational component:
(227)

IS: "IP A la festa1 "IP=F vaig enviar tothom t1 ]].

(228)

, 1, 1= party, "+ "
x

x

2

x

sent everybody to 1 ]]
x

At IS the universal quantier tothom must be within the core IP so that it is correctly
interpreted as part of the focus of the sentence. Tothom is not ground material but
part of the information of the sentence, i.e. a contribution to the hearer's knowledgestore. At LF, however, the quantier must be in an A0-position binding a variable
in A-position so that the relevant logico-semantic quantication is appropriately
represented (as in (229)) and translated into the logico-semantic formula (230)
(229)

LF: "IP tothom2 "IP a la festa1 "IP hi1 vaig enviar t2 t1 ]]]

(230)

8 1 " sent( 1, party, I) ]
x

x

The two representations, LF and IS must be obviously distinct. Notice that if
(229) were taken to be both the IS and the LF for (226), i.e. if we were to accept that
informational notions are interpreted at LF, it would be erroneously concluded that
tothom `everybody' is a link in this case, since it is detached to the left. If tothom
were a link, however, it would be marked as such in the Catalan S-structure91:
Some sentences with quantier links are less natural than others, causing raised eyebrows
among some Catalan speakers. Sentences like A tots els estudiants1 els1 donen un carnet t1 `To
all students they give an ID' or A tothom1 no el1 tracten t1 igual `Everybody they don't treat
the same' are extremely natural, some other sentences sound odder. Most sentences, however,
are felicitous once the right context is construed, although in some cases it may require some
sophistication.
91
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(231)

(A) Tothom1 el1 vaig enviar t1 a la festa.

Therefore, the level at which quantiers raise and attach to IP, i.e. LF, must be
distinct from the level at which links raise and attach to IP, i.e. IS.

IS directly derived from S-structure
Another alternative that has been considered in the literature is to have information
packaging be represented at a level of LF0 derived from LF. If this is shown to be
the case, our description of the mapping from Catalan S-structure to IS will have
to be reformulated. It is very hard to gather empirical evidence to argue that one
hypothesis in (232) is more correct than the other.
(232)

a.

SS
|
LF
|
IS

b.

SS
\

/
LF

IS

However, there are conceptual arguments that suggest that a direct derivation of IS
from S-structure is to be preferred over a derivation from LF. These arguments are
based on the economy-of-derivation condition of Chomsky 1988.
The spirit of Chomsky's condition is to minimize derivation mappings. By a
`least e ort' principle, if a given result can be achieved by a simple derivation and a
complex one, only the former should be legitimate. For instance, a given movement
conguration should not be posited if it has to be undone in the next derivation.
Chomsky's example is the lowering of in ection to V at S-structure. This operation
is `costly', since at LF it has to be undone when V+in ection is raised to the original
position of the in ection. He states that `"t]he result is essentially the same as would
have been achieved with the shorter derivation that involves only raising in the
overt syntax. Therefore, by a \least e ort" condition, only the latter is permissible'
(1988:9).92
Let us take, for example, sentence (226) above, repeated here as (233) for convenience:
There are other cost-based reasons that might render an operation like inection-lowering
less costly than an apparently more `eortless' alternative, as is the case in the English rule of
a$x-hopping. None of them, however, are relevant in the issue under discussion.
92
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(233)

"IP A la festa1 "IP=F hi1 vaig enviar tothom t1 ]].
to the party loc 1s-past-send everybody
`The party "F (I) sent everybody to ].'
The LF and IS representations for this sentence were shown in (229) and (227)
above, respectively, and are shown again in (234). At LF the quantier must ccommand the clause at IS it must not. If it is assumed that IS is derived from LF,
mediating the mapping from S-structure to IS, one obtains the 2-step derivation in
(234):
(234)

1#
2#

SS:

"IP a la festa1 "IP=F hi1 vaig enviar tothom t1 ]]

LF: "IP tothom2 "IP a la festa1 "IP hi1 vaig enviar t2 t1 ]]

IS:
"IP a la festa1 "IP=F vaig enviar tothom t1 ]]
Notice that under step 2 the conguration obtained with step 1 is undone. This is
precisely the type of derivation that Chomsky 1988 describes as `not permissible',
all things being equal. The derivation that yields IS directly from S-structure, in
contrast, is straightforward and maximally economical, as in (235):
(235)

SS: "IP a la festa1 "IP=F hi1 vaig enviar tothom t1 ]]
IS: "IP a la festa1 "IP=F vaig enviar tothom t1 ]]
Notice that, in this fashion, the use of a downgrading movement where the antecedent does not c-command its trace is also avoided. The derivation of LF from
S-structure proceeds as above in the standard way, and it is done in parallel with
the derivation of IS.

6.2.4 Extending IS to English
The question arises next whether the IS conguration in (225) is applicable to other
languages. In principle, such an extension should be not only desirable but necessary.
IS, as a level of pure representation of information packaging should be languageinvariant, since presumably the interpretive informational component it feeds is
constant across languages. Owing to this, it is argued that the structure in (225)
is indeed applicable to other languages. This is illustrated with English. Of course,
the possibility that this IS representation is subject to parametrization must be
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entertained, much in the same way that the directionality of logical scope assignment
might be subject to crosslinguistic variation.
It may be said that Catalan is to English with respect to IS nonfocal movement
as English is to Chinese with respect to LF wh-movement. Since Huang 1982, it
has been assumed that Chinese has at LF the wh-movement that English has at
S-structure. The English vacuous derivation in (236) is paralleled in Chinese by the
nonvacuous (237):
(236)

SS: Who do you like? ! LF: Who do you like?

(237)

SS: ni xihuan shei? ! LF: shei1 " ni xihuan t1]
you like who
`Who do you like?'

In analogy to the Chinese-English example, it is proposed here that the nonfocal
detachments that Catalan has at S-structure, English has at the level of IS. In
fact, English does have an overt subset of the IS movements Catalan has, namely
topicalization. At IS, therefore, one would have to perform only the operations that
are nonovert. Of course, the mapping between S-structure and IS in English is not
as direct as in Catalan, but in some cases it is fairly straightforward, providing
further support for our hypothesis.
The mapping between the two levels of representation is carried out by means of
standard move- operations, in particular, as in the case of Catalan overt syntax,
left- and right-adjunction to IP. Let us consider a sentence like (238), where the link
subject NP and the locative PP are nonfocal:


(238)

The boy "F kissed everybody ] at the party.

If the subject is to be interpreted as a link, it must left-adjoin to IP at IS, just like
overt topicalization. Such a proposal is unproblematic, and, in fact, there is some
evidence to suggest that most subjects in English are already in a left-adjoined
position at S-structure (cf. Kroch, Heycock & Santorini 1988). If this were correct,
link subjects would not have to raise and adjoin at IS. The nonfocal PP is a tail, left
in a destressed position in a sentence-nal slot. As any tail material, the PP must be
right-detached at IS. Such an operation is also unproblematic. It is proposed, then,
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that (238) has the IS representation in (240), derived by the operations diagrammed
in (239):
(239)
/
the boy-1

IP
\

IP
/
\
IP
at-the-party-2
______________|______________
|
|
- t-1 kissed everybody t-2 -

(240)

IS: "IP the boy1 "IP "IP=F t1 kissed everybody t2 ] at the party2 ]

Let us consider an example with a less straightforward derivation. Example (241)
is the IS representation of a sentence where the focus is restricted to the sentencenal locative. In such an example, the V0 constituent may be interpreted as the
tail:
(241)

a. SS: The boy kissed everybody "F at the party ].
b. IS: "IP the boy1 "IP "IP t1 t2 at the party ] "V kissed everybody ]2 ]]
Such a derivation may seem surprising, since it is involves the movement of a V0
element, which also includes the V head. However, such operations involving the
detachment of Vn are necessary to account for Catalan S-structures where the verbal
head is right-detached.93 In fact, a natural translation of (241)a into Catalan is the
sentence in (242), where Catalan S-structure, as expected, matches one-to-one the
IS representation posited for its English equivalent:94
0

(242)

El xiquet1 ""IP t2 t1 a la festa ] "V va petonejar tothom ]2 ].
`The boy kissed everybody "F at the party ]'.
0

See x 5.2.4 for a mention of other analysis where movement of Vn to an adjoined clauseperipheral position is posited.
94This example is crucially dierent from (i), where both the subject el xiquet and the PP a la
festa are links and therefore are left-detached. Notice that here the PP binds a clitic within the
core IP:
(i). El xiquet1 a la festa2 IP=F hi2 va petonejar tothom t1 t2 ]
`At the party the boy kissed everybody.'
93
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But beyond establishing a crosslinguistic generalization, is there any specic
structural e ect in English that would support the existence of IS-operations for
this language, parallel to the ones Catalan has at S-structure? The answer seems
to be yes, and the evidence comes from the data in (243) and (244):
(243)

a. "IP El Pau1 "IP "IP=F no l2'ha mort t2 t1 ] el jutge2]].
b. "IP Paul didn't kill the judge ].

(244)

a. "IP El Pau1 "IP=F no ha mort el jutge t1 ]].
b. "IP Paul "F didn't kill the judge ] ].

This sentences illustrate a phenomenon a ecting the scope of negation known as `association with focus' (cf. Jackendo 1972, Horn 1989).95 In (243), for both Catalan
and English, the direct object phrase the judge escapes negation somehow: the scope
of negation does not seem to extend beyond the verb kill. In (244), in contrast, the
entire VP sequence is negated. In other words, from (243) we understand that, even
though Paul did not kill the judge, some other relation holds between them, but no
such understanding arises from (244).
Notice, too, that the Catalan sentences|the (a) sentences|are not structurally
alike. In (243)a, the phrase that escapes negation, el jutge `the judge', is rightdetached, as the presence of the clitic and the prosody show. But in (244)a el jutge
remains in situ. Therefore, the di erence in the scope of negation between (243)a
and (244)a has a clear structural correlate. It appears that when a phrase is removed
from the core IP by means of detachment it escapes the scope of negation as well.
The English equivalents of these sentences, (243)b and (244)b, however, while
showing the same contrast with respect to the scope of negation, do not o er any
overt structural contrast of the Catalan type. Therefore, there is no structural
correlate to re ect the distinction between (243)b and (244)b with respect to scope
of negation. Now, if English has an abstract right-detachment movement at IS
like the one Catalan has at S-structure, yielding an IS representation like (245) for
sentence (243)b,
(245)

IS: "IP Paul1 "IP=F t1 didn't kill t2 ] the judge2 ]

Negation is actually only one of the logico-semantic operators reputedly aected by `association
with focus'. Scalar particles like only and even undergo association with focus as well (cf. x 7.2).
95
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the scope-of-negation facts can be captured much in the same way they are captured in Catalan. Examples (243)b and (244)b, while identical at S-structure, are
crucially di erent at IS, and the di erence in interpretation is captured at that
level. This constitutes important language-internal evidence for positing a rule of
IS nonfocal detachment. The di erent congurations at the separate levels of representation for the English sentences (243)b and (244)b are displayed in (246) and
(247), respectively:
(246)

a. SS: "IP Paul didn't kill the judge ].
b. LF: : " Paul killed the judge ]
c. IS: "IP Paul1 "IP t1 didn't kill t2 ] the judge2 ]

(247)

a. SS: "IP Paul "F didn't kill the judge ] ].
b. LF: : " Paul killed the judge ]
c. IS: "IP Paul1 "IP t1 didn't kill the judge ]

For the sake of exposition, the facts relevant to this argument have been simplied . In fact, what is going on in these examples of `association with focus' has
to do with negation only indirectly. From the previous discussion it may seem that
it has been assumed that negation denes its logico-semantic scope at IS. This is
obviously undesirable, if IS is to be a pure representation of information packaging.
It is not the case, however, that negation denes its scope at IS. Actually, the different readings for negation are due to the interaction of a constant logico-semantic
LF representation for both (243) and (244) (in (246)b and (247)b) and a variable
informational IS structure, di erent for (243) and (244) (as in (246)c and (247)c,
respectively). As di erent focus-ground structures interact indirectly with the same
logico-semantic structures, di erent readings are derived (cf. x 7.3).
Alternatively, it could be claimed that the `scope' of negation is directly represented at LF, i.e., that sentences (243) and (244) are truly di erent in their truthconditions, and therefore, their LF representations must be di erent as well. This
position, though, has been argued to be quite problematic by Gazdar 1979 and Horn
1989, among others. Furthermore, if negation were truly associated with the focal
verb in (243), that is, if the direct object lay outside the LF scope of negation, the
following sentence should be ungrammatical, but it is not:
(248)

Paul didn't kill anybody, he just threatened some of us.
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At LF the polarity item anybody must be included under the logical scope of negation, even though negation is still `associated' with the verb. At IS, however, anybody
must be outside IP (the scope of +), since it is part of the ground `Paul is in some
relation to someone'. The conclusion that (243) and (244) have an identical LF
representation but distinct IS representations is conrmed by this fact.

6.3 Overt Focus Movement
Once the existence of an IS rule of Focus Raising is rejected and the universal
conguration for IS proposed in this chapter accepted, the existence of overt Focus
Movement in English and Spanish is left unexplained. What is the IS representation
of sentence (249) (=(209))?
(249)

"XP fido1 "IP they named it t1. ]]

Focus Movement preposes the focus of the sentence to a left-adjoined position and
is used as empirical `stimulus' for the abstract rule of Focus Raising. If this overt
construction re ects a focus-ground relationship, it is indeed natural to assume
that the corresponding IS structure is identical to the S-structure conguration.
In our characterization of IS, however, the focus remains in situ dominated by the
lowest phrasal node, which represents the scope of +. The focus in (249), Fido,
is clearly outside the lowest IP node. This leads us to an apparent contradiction.
Furthermore, the arguments in Ch. 5 against the existence of focus-preposing in
Catalan were indirect arguments for the existence of such a rule in Spanish. This
section will try to reconcile the existence of overt Focus Movement in English and
Spanish with the universal IS conguration proposed in this chapter.
As noted above, there is more than one way to represent at the surface the
focus-ground relationship encoded in (249) sentence (250) is another way to do so:
(250)

They named it "F fido. ]

The conguration in (250) is actually the unmarked way to represent such an informational split between Fido and They named it x, while (249) has a more marked
`feeling'. Is there a di erence between (249) and (250), and if so, what is it? It could
be stated that (249) is nothing but a disambiguated variant of (250). In (250), in
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principle, both Fido and named it Fido could be the focus (although the `narrow'
focus reading is clearly favored), while in (249) the focus is unambiguously Fido.
This, however, is not a very desirable approach in that ambiguity is an everyday fact
of language that does not present any problem for communication. It seems unwarranted to argue that the reason behind Focus Movement is simply a disambiguating
process.
Could it be then that there is a real informational di erence between these
sentences? Following the work of Ward 1985 on the pragmatics of preposing, it
is argued that the answer to this question is yes. Ward suggests that in English
the functions of preposing are two: ) marking the referent or denotation of the
preposed constituent as the BLC (=backward looking center) of an utterance, and )
encoding the focus/open-proposition (i.e. focus-ground) structure plus signaling its
salient status in the current discourse. Even though the details cannot be discussed
here, the BLC is dened as that element which `links up' the current sentence S1
with the preceding discourse up to S1.96
A link-focus sentence like (251) (Ward 1985:ex. 162),
a

b

(251)

Badminton1 I played in high school t1.

marks the focus-ground structure of the sentence (the information being here that
1 played 2 in high school, where 1=I and 2=badminton) but also marks `badminton' as a BLC `linking up' (251) to the previous discourse (in the terms of this
study, badminton is a link that denotes an address in the hearer's knowledge-store
to which the hearer is instructed to go). Both (251) and (249) involve a preposing
and in Ward's analysis both have the same informational function of marking the
preposed element as a BLC. The di erence is that in (251) the BLC is part of the
open-proposition or ground and in (249) the BLC is the focus of the sentence.
In other words, in Ward's approach, the same sentence element can be a focus
and a BLC simultaneously, and such is the situation in the case of the overt Focus
Movement in (249) or in Ward's example (252) (1985:ex. 207):
x

x

(252)

x

x

I think she was Japanese. No|korean she was.

Ward's BLC is inspired in the early Centering notion of the same name, but diers somewhat
from the meaning of BLC in current Centering work.
96
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In our terms, this would mean that a given element may be both a focus and a
link, but given the interpretation of these primitives provided in this study it seems
impossible to have one element be both a link and the focus. It certainly cannot be
the case that `Korean' in (252) is both the address in the hearer's knowledge-store
s/he is instructed to go to and the information to be entered there. In other words,
the instruction encoded in (252) cannot be `I am instructed to go to the address
\Korean" and retrieve the information of the sentence by substituting Korean for
the blank in She was under the address \Korean" ' because the blank is already
identied by means of the binding link. The sentence would be informationally
useless.
Ward points out that the focal phrase in sentences with Focus Movement serves
as a `specication' of a scalar value in the scale evoked also by the focus. What the
BLC Korean does in (252), in Ward's terms, is `call up' a scale into the salient discourse and specify a value in that scale: it `calls up' the scale `(Asian) nationalities'
and species a value in that scale, namely, `Korean'. This scale is marked as the
BLC, and the specication as focus. This is clearly a dual task for the same constituent. Let us now try to translate Ward's analysis into an information-packaging
instruction, taking into account this dual status of the preposed phrases in Focus
Movement environments: `I am instructed to go to the address \(Asian) nationalities" and retrieve the information of the sentence by substituting Korean for the
blank in She is (of) nationality under \(Asian) nationalities" '. In other words,
given an address for Asian nationalities in the hearer's knowledge-store where relevant knowledge about those nationalities (e.g. its members, etc.) is listed, the hearer
is instructed to substitute Korean for the blank with respect to the nationality of
`she' under that address. The scale is a link, and the specication is a focus. The
address for `Asian nationalities' in the hearer's knowledge-store could be partially
represented, before and after the utterance of (252), as in (253):
(253) Before (252):
After (252):
addr.: Asian nationalities( )
addr.: Asian nationalities( )
x

Li is (Chinese )
Naoki is (Japanese
`She' is (
)
x

x

Li is (Chinese )
Naoki is (Japanese )
`She' is (Korean )
x

)

x

x

x

x
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The point of interest in this section, however, is the representation of sentences
like (252) at IS and how this representation might be reconciled with the IS conguration proposed in this chapter. The discussion so far has served to establish
that a focus-preposed constituent has a dual status in that part of it `calls up' a
scale or set and part of it species a value on that scale, i.e., part of it acts as a
link and part of it acts as focus. Therefore, at IS a constituent like Korean in (252)
must be both in a left-adjoined A0-position to allow part of it to be interpreted as
a link and in a position within the lowest IP to allow the other part of it to be
interpreted as focus. The S-structure position of Korean is probably a re ection of
its information-packaging force as a link. If the IS conguration of (252) is identical
to its S-structure, as the traditional analysis in terms of Focus Raising assumes,
the link `side' of Korean is captured straightforwardly, but its role as focus is left
unrepresented.
The Principles & Parameters framework has a device that will allow us to have
Korean be both a link and a focus at IS: Reconstruction. Chomsky 1977 and van
Riemsdijk & Williams 1986 discuss a rule of Reconstruction which is available to
capture the interpretation of sentences like (254):
(254)

" Whose mother ]1 did you see t1?

The question interpretation that must be obtained from (254) is `for which did
you see 's mother?', but the fronted constituent in the actual overt sentence is not
just (whose) but x's mother, which in an LF representation would yield the wrong
interpretation. In order to address this mismatch, and encouraged by some strong
crossover e ects, an application of the rule of Reconstruction is posited yielding the
LF representation in (255),
x

x

x

(255)

Whose1 did you see t1 mother?

where part of the wh-phrase stays in "Spec, CP] and part of it is demoted to the
clause internal position.
Analogously, the following IS representation for sentence (252) is proposed:
(256)

" t"+scale]1 ""

x

2 v 3korean1

] was3. ]]

Notice that the informational `meaning' of Korean is divided into two subelements:
the scalar or set inference and the value-specication task. At IS the focus value of
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the focus-preposed phrase is reconstructed and is placed back in the lowest IP. The
trace in the left-adjoined A0-position, however, keeps the set understanding (represented by the "+scale] feature) and is interpreted as a link. In this way, the dual
force of focus-preposed phrases is captured straightforwardly. As Ward 1985 indicates, only the set or scale evoked by the phrase is understood as being a BLC, i.e. a
link, while its actual lexical content is understood as an informative specication of
a value in that scale, i.e. a focus. This is exactly what the reconstructed representation in (256) achieves by splitting the focus-preposed phrase into two informationally
distinct elements.
This use of Reconstruction not only allows us to capture Ward's insights with
respect to focal preposing, but also provides a way to reconcile the existence of Focus
Movement with the conguration of IS proposed above. Furthermore, it also re ects
the fact that the `apparent' focus-preposing of Catalan discussed above in x 5.2.4 is
more common and less marked than English and Spanish Focus Movement. While
the Catalan case is a plain focus-tail construction, the English and Spanish cases
contain a complex informational understanding.97

6.4 The Structure of Grammar II
Let us conclude this chapter with some remarks on the structure of grammar. If a
separate level of IS, derived directly from S-structure is, as argued, necessary in a
complete model of grammar, the standard view of what grammar must consist of is
severely a ected. The standard model of grammar is the one in (257), the T-model
(Chomsky & Lasnik 1977, Chomsky 1981, 1986), with D-structure associated with
the lexicon, PF as an interface with phonetic articulation and perception, and LF
as an interface with the interpretive component of language.
Catalan should also have a means to represent the complex informational understanding conveyed in English by means of Focus Movement. Probably, a subset of the Catalan `apparent'
focus-preposings do indeed have this dual link-focus force, especially the ones involving scalar and
value-specication understandings. This, however, does not mean they have to be overt Focus
Movements, since the overt syntax of Catalan, unlike the overt syntax of English, may reect
the force of the focal part of these dual phrases, leaving the link part to IS by means of an IS
left-adjunction to IP of the scalar or set subelement. Making a strong claim with regard to this
issue would require many additional considerations and will not be discussed any further.
97
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(257) The T-model:
DS
|
SS
/
\
PF
LF

Chomsky 1988 views S-structure as a `contact' level between fundamental levels of representation: `From this standpoint S-structure is a derived concept. For
a specic language , its properties are determined by those of the fundamental
levels, and the condition that it be related to them by the appropriate principles'
(1988:3). Each of the `fundamental levels' is the structural interface with an autonomous linguistic component, and each sentence is a bundle of `fundamental'
abstract representations that must all be re ected somehow at S-structure to allow
for the interface with the physical reality of an utterance.
A model of grammar that incorporates this view can be drawn as in (258).
L

(258)

DS
|
PF -- SS -- IS
. \
.
LF

The dotted line signals that further strata are probably needed to represent other
notions, like, following Heycock 1990, subject-predicate structure. Each level of
pure representation is related to S-structure by a di erent spoke, and S-structure is
literally the hub, from where or to where all the information is passed. At S-structure
all information must be recoverable, to be passed on to PF and the physical reality
of the utterance, or vice versa.98 Notice that under this model the role of contact
level between levels of pure representation that Chomsky 1988 assigns to S-structure
becomes even more plausible and better dened.
Sentence interpretation is a considerably complex process. The goal of this study
is to argue that logico-semantic interpretation and informational interpretation must
be distinguished and that the interpretation of both is crucial for global language
understanding. This chapter, in particular, was intended to show that these distinct
98

The wheel imagery was pointed out to me by B. Santorini, p.c.
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interpretive modules must be matched one-to-one by di erent levels of representation
in the syntax. Each of these levels contains a pure representation of the `meaning'
relations relevant to the component it interfaces.

166

Chapter 7
Logical Semantics and
Informatics
In Chapter 6 it was argued that the level of informational representation, IS, could
not be the same level at which logico-semantic meaning, LF, is represented. This
nding was taken to be consistent with the position that informatics and logical
semantics are two separate linguistic components, and that IS and LF serve as
separate interfaces with each one of them. In this chapter, further support will
be provided for the discreteness of informatics and logical-semantics. It will be
argued that any attempts to reduce information packaging to logical semantics are
incorrect in some way or another, and that any interactions that exist between
truth-conditional operators and informational operators can be accounted for as
indirect interactions between autonomous components. This chapter will address the
semantic analyses of `association with focus' (Jackendo 1972, Rooth 1985) (in x 7.2
and x 7.3), the claim that focus is not an informational notion but a truth-conditional
exhaustiveness operator (Szabolcsi 1981, 1983, Svoboda & Materna 1987) (in x 7.1),
the claim that focus a ects quantier interaction (e.g. Jones 1988) (in x 7.4), and
the `ability' of the ground, especially links, to escape the scope of prepositional
operators like negation (Payne 1985, Horn 1989) (in x 7.3).99
Some of the material in x 7.1 and x 7.2 was presented at the 1989 Linguistic Society of America
Meeting in Washington, D.C., December 27-30. The discussion in x 7.3 was the subject of a paper
presented at the 16th Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society, February 17-19, 1990.
99
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7.1 Focus and Exhaustiveness
It is not uncommon to nd treatments that assume that focus has an implicit exhaustiveness property, even in the absence of overt exhaustiveness operators like
only. This position has been taken to an extreme in the work of Szabolcsi 1981,
1983 and Svoboda & Materna 1987. It is argued by these authors that focus has
nothing to do with the informational articulation of the sentence. Instead, they
claim that focus is precisely an exhaustiveness operator. Svoboda & Materna, for
example, equate (259)a (their ex. 17) to (259)b, and Szabolcsi (1981) would provide
the translation in (259)c (which has been extrapolated from a parallel example):
(259)

a. charlie visited Prague.
b. The only that visited Prague is Charlie.
c. For all , visited Prague i =Charlie.
While it is true that a set-membership feeling for Charlie in (259) exists, it is not
too intuitively appealing to suggest that this sentence truth-conditionally means
that Only Charlie visited Prague. That would mean that in the latter sentence the
presence of only would be totally redundant. This position, however, is hard to
maintain. These facts will be discussed in a moment, but before some related work
done on the relationship between exhaustiveness and it-clefts must be considered.
The issue of whether it-clefts entail, conventionally implicate, or conversationally
implicate exhaustiveness has received some attention. Halvorsen 1978 claims that itclefts conventionally implicate exhaustiveness. However both Horn 1981 and Atlas
& Levinson 1981 attack that position. Conventional implicatures survive negation
and yes-no questioning, but the putative exhaustiveness conventional implicature
associated with it-clefts does not survive under such conditions. While it can be
plausibly argued that (260)a conventionally implicates (261), it seems clear that
(260)b and (260)c do not (they are, respectively, Horn's (1981) 4a, 4d, 5a, and 5b):
x

x

x

x

(260)

a. It was a pizza that Mary ate.
b. It wasn't a pizza that Mary ate.
c. Was it a pizza that Mary ate?

(261)

Mary ate nothing (within some contextually dened set) other than
a pizza.
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Given these and other considerations, Atlas & Levinson argue that it-clefts truthconditionally entail exhaustiveness (basically, they posit a null only operator). Horn
shows that the exhaustiveness `feeling' cannot be truth-conditional either. If it-clefts
entailed exhaustiveness, (262)b should be as felicitous as (262)a is (Horn's 110 and
11c, respectively):
(262)

a. I know Mary ate a pizza, but I've just discovered that it was only a
pizza that she ate.
b. # I know Mary ate a pizza, but I've just discovered that it was a
pizza that she ate.
Horn concludes that the exhaustiveness `feeling' that it-clefts emanate is instead a
generalized conversational implicature not at all conned to it-clefts.
How is this nding relevant for our purposes here? As stated in x 5.3 above,
it has been convincingly argued (e.g. Akmajian 1979(1970), Chomsky 1971, Prince
1978, 1986) that it-clefts are special focus-ground marking constructions in that the
clefted element is always the focus of the sentence. Horn's arguments against truthconditional exhaustiveness in clefts are, in fact, arguments against truth-conditional
exhaustiveness of focus in general. As already pointed out by Horn, sentence (263),
where pizza is the focus, also seems to convey an exhaustiveness `suggestion'.
(263)

Mary ate a pizza.

This `suggestion', parallel to the exhaustiveness feeling obtained from CHARLIE
visited Prague, must be ascribed to pragmatics as a generalized conversational implicature as well. Following Horn's lead, further arguments will be provided for the
position that focus is not an only-type operator. If environments can be found where
focus and only contrast, we will have further evidence for their non-identity.
First some evidence will be presented that focus is not equivalent to an exhaustiveness operator. It is clear that only and focus are not always interchangeable.
One example is the contrast in (264):
(264)

a. I met nobody at the party.
b. *I met only NOBODY at the party.
Of course, (264)b is semantically anomalous because only and the phrase associated
with it, nobody, are incompatible. And that is precisely the point: focus and nobody
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are not incompatible. Therefore, focus and only must be nonidentical. While nobody
may be the associated with the focus of the sentence, it may not be associated with
only.
The contrast between focus and only need not yield ungrammaticality, as in
(264), but may be a matter of infelicity in a given context. With respect to (265), it
may be claimed, at rst blush, that it is necessary that the speaker has never been
to the Brazilian jungle for the sentence to be true,
(265)

I've been to the cities in Brazil.

but that this is not the case is evident from contextualizations like (266). Notice
that (266)b, with an overt only, is indeed infelicitous:
(266)

a. I knew the Amazon quite well and I've also been to the cities in
Brazil.
b. # I knew the Amazon quite well and I've also only been to the
CITIES in Brazil.
The exhaustiveness feeling obtained from the focus phrase cities in (265) must be
then considered a conversational implicature. The evidence provided by (266) parallels the evidence provided by Horn 1981 with respect to it-clefts.
The claim that focused constituents truth-conditionally entail exhaustiveness
leads to extreme positions. For instance, one is forced to claim that sentence (267)a,
from Sgall, Haji!cova & Panevova 1986:ex.18, entails that English is spoken nowhere
other than the Shetlands.
(267)

a. English is spoken in the shetlands.
b. Is English spoken on the Faroer Islands or in the Shetlands?
This entailment is, of course, false. In fact, Sgall, Haji!cova & Panevova claim that
sentence (267)a is false unless used as a reply to a question like (267)b.100 However,
maintaining that (267)a is false runs counter to most denitions of truth.

7.2 Scalar Particles and Focus
A certain class of words, including items like only, even, and also, has been claimed
to have an intimate tie with the focus of the sentence. These items, known as scalar
100

This, of course, cannot be done in a two-valued logic.
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particles, are sometimes also called `focus adverbs' or `focus inducers' (Karttunen
& Peters 1979, Jacobs 1984, 1986) or `focus-sensitive particles' (Kratzer 1989), and
their intimate tie with focus has been named `association with focus' (Jackendo
1972, Rooth 1985). This section concentrates on the interaction of focus and only.
While it is undeniable that a certain interaction exists between only and focus, we
show that `association with focus' is not an inherent logico-semantic property of this
scalar particle. First, it will be shown that only need not be associated with focus in
all of its occurrences, even though it tends to do so very often. And second, it will
be suggested why it is that focus and only seem to go together most of the time.

7.2.1 Only and Association with Focus
Only is always semantically associated with some other constituent in the sentence.
This semantic association, however, does not have to be necessarily re ected in the
overt syntax in a continuous constituent. Thus, while only+XP forms a syntactic
constituent in (268), it does not do so in (269) (the element semantically associated
with only is italicized):

(268)

a. I only sprinkled salt in the stew.
b. I only sprinkled salt in the stew.
c. I sprinkled only salt in the stew.
d. I sprinkled salt only in the stew.

(269)

a. I only sprinkled salt in the stew.
b. I only sprinkled salt in the stew.

The association of only with di erent parts of the sentence yields di erent truthconditional interpretations.
The constituent only is associated with has been called the `scope' of only (Anderson 1972, Hoeksema 1989), and the `focus' of only (Karttunen & Peters 1979, Jacobs
1982, 1984). Rooth 1985 suggests rejecting the term `scope', since it is used di erently elsewhere, and the term `focus' will be avoided for obvious reasons. Therefore,
the element semantically associated with only will be called only's partner.
Jackendo 1972 notices that only's partner is generally intonationally prominent,
i.e. it seems to be the focus of the sentence. He proposes a rule of `association with
focus', by means of which preverbal only is linked to the focus of the sentence to form
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an intimate semantic tie between the two. Rooth 1985 takes up on this proposal and
develops it further. For him, the truth-conditional interpretation of only requires
its association with focus. The focus element provides a p-set, a set of relevant
alternates within a given discourse, which represent the quanticational domain
for only. Rooth's analysis will be discussed in detail in x 7.2.2. It is clear from
this approach that only's partner must be the focus of the sentence. This view is
found in Hoeksema 1989 as well, who arms that the `scope' of `focus adverbs'|his
terms|is `determined by intonational means, being restricted to a focus constituent'
(1989:106)
Similarly, Jacobs 1984, 1986 argues that, if a scalar particle occurs in a sentence,
the focus of that sentence must be the partner of the scalar particle. Remember that,
as mentioned above, Jacobs refers to scalar particles as `focus inducers'. He calls
the focus in sentences with scalar particles `bound focus' and the focus in sentences
without scalar particles `free focus'. Even though Jacobs is careful to point out that
bound focus belongs to the domain of truth-conditional meaning and free focus to
the domain of pragmatics (1986:fn.7), he also states `that scalar particles are focus
inducers in all of their occurrences' (1986:107). In other words, the focus of the
sentence must be only's partner if only is present.101
It is possible to show that only can occur without any association with focus,
in other words, that only's partner need not be the focus of the sentence. Take,
for instance, example (270)a. At rst blush, it may seem that the only way to
utter this sentence is with prosodic prominence on John, contrary to what the small
caps in the example indicates. Rooth (1985:128), for instance, claims that in Only
John loves Mary, John is obligatorily focused. But (270)a is perfectly felicitous in
a context like (270)b:
(270)

a. Only John's been to the cities in Brazil.
b. John and Mary know the Amazon quite well but only John's been
to the cities in Brazil.
In (270)b only's partner is nonfocal. The focus, cities, is totally independent of only
and its partner.102
Jacobs' (1984, 1986) approach was briey discussed in x 2.4.3 with respect to his denition of
information packaging as illocutionary meaning.
102Sentence (b) above could be understood as a double-focus reading, where both John and cities
are foci. This reading is still problematic for Rooth 1985, since association with both foci is
101
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Also, it is well known that only may appear in the nonclefted part of it-clefts.
Example (271)a is from Horn (1969:ex. 20a), and the sentence is equally acceptable
with only the second only ((271)b or (271)c):
(271)

a. It's only JOHN who eats only rice.
b. It's john who eats only rice.
c. It's john who only eats rice
Since, as mentioned above, the nonclefted part of it-clefts is part of the ground,
in (271)b/(271)c only and its partner are nonfocal. Only's partner is also clearly
nonfocal in the response to the question in (272):
(272)

a. What food would you only eat if you had to?
b. liver, I would only eat if I had to.
The answer in (272) is an instance of focus-preposing or Focus Movement, a construction discussed above in Ch. 6 (cf. also Prince 1981, 1986, and Ward 1985). In
focus-preposing, as the very name indicates, the focus of the sentence is dislocated to
a sentence initial position. Only in (272)b is not associated with liver. The meaning
of (272)b is that the speaker would not eat liver unless s/he had to. If only were
associated with focus, its meaning would be di erent: if s/he had to, the speaker
would eat exclusively liver and no other food.
Gapping is a construction that has also been argued to mark focus-ground relationships (see Kuno 1983, Prince 1986). It is traditionally recognized that the only
nonelidable part of the sentence is the focus, since it represents the only addition of
information in the current discourse. If there exist gapping constructions where only
and its partner constitute the gapped material, there exists another environment in
which only occurs in non-association with focus. Example (273)a is a typical example where only's partner is the focus of the sentence. The second conjunct in (273)b
is an acceptable continuation of (273)a. In (273)b, only scratching is part of the
ground, and therefore it is gapped. Again, we witness an example where focus is
not associated with only in any way.
required. The meaning of (b) with a double-focus reading, according to Rooth is `If a proposition
of the form \x has been to y in Brazil" is true, then it is the proposition \John has been to the
cities in Brazil"'. In our context this is clearly not the case, since Mary has been to the jungle in
Brazil (cf. Section 7.2.2 below for greater detail on this). However, in case this example is unclear,
the examples that follow in the text are all cases in which only's partner is indubitably nonfocal,
since it is clearly found in the ground segment of focus-ground marking constructions.
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(273)

a. Mary only SCRATCHED the Mercedes.
b. Mary only SCRATCHED the Mercedes, and John the bentley.
Finally, evidence can also be found in other languages. In Catalan, rightdetachment removes nonfocal material, the tail in particular, from the clause by
means of detaching it to the right, while the focus is left in clause-nal position
(cf. Ch. 5). Only|or, in this case, its Catalan equivalent nomes|and its partner,
however, can appear in the right-detachment slot, clearly unrelated to the focus of
the sentence, as in (274)a. The sentence in (274)b is the corresponding canonical.
(274)

a. Ens en1 nodrim, nomes-d'arros1.
1p-re obj 1p-feed only of rice
Approx.: `(We) LIVE only on rice.'
b. Nomes ens nodrim d'arros.
The focus in (274)a is on the verb, not on the right-dislocated direct object. Again,
there is an only that occurs with no association with focus. In fact, a similar sentence
can be constructed in English, as shown by (275)b, in a context like (275)a. The
relevant construction in (275)b (underlined) is a `topicalization', which preposes
nonfocal link material:
(275)

a. When we were in China, we only lived on rice.
b. Boy, I'm glad I wasn't there. I'm not nicky,
but only on rice "F I couldn't live ].
It must be concluded, then, that only's partner need not be the focus of the
sentence, i.e. that association with focus is not a necessary condition for the interpretation of only.

7.2.2 Consequences for Rooth's Semantics of Only
Background
The fact that only is not necessarily associated with focus has obvious consequences
for Rooth's (1985) analysis of the semantics of only. Rooth sets out to account
for the truth-conditional di erence between (276)a and (276)b (Rooth's 5a and 5b,
Ch. 2). If John introduced Jim and Bill to Sue, (276)a is false, but (276)b might
still be true.
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(276)

a. John only introduced BILL to Sue.
b. John only introduced Bill to SUE.
He notices that only's partner is the focus of the sentence, i.e. that only must
apparently be associated with the focus constituent, and argues that focus furnishes
the selection of the domain of quantication to the semantics of only. Expanding
on the older proposal in Jackendo 1972, he proposes that focused constituents are
assigned an extra denotation that generates a set of alternatives for this focus. This
set of alternatives, the p-set, is obtained by substituting the focus for a variable
in the predicate structure. Thus, sentence (277)a generates, along with a normal
denotation, the set of propositions in (277)b, where is the variable substituted for
the focus constituent and E stands for some contextually relevant set of individuals:
y

(277)

a. John introduced bill to Sue.
b. f^ introduce0 ( s)(j) j 2 Eg
The p-set represented by (277)b is taken as the domain of quantication needed
by the meaning of only only marks only one of the alternatives as being the case.
Sentence (278)a is, then, paraphrased as in (278)b (Rooth's 47, Ch. 2):
y

y

(278)

a. John only introduced BILL to Sue.
b. If a proposition of the form `John introduced to Sue' is true,
then it is the proposition `John introduced Bill to Sue'.
In other words, the p-set (alternative propositions) is made available on independent
grounds by focus, and only merely uses that p-set as a domain of exhaustiveness
quantication.
x

Problems
Given the data presented in the previous section, Rooth's position regarding the
involvement of focus in determining the p-set becomes less plausible. Consider
sentence (271)c, repeated here as (279)a. Only requires a p-set of the relevant sort
to determine its domain of quantication. For (279)a, it is (279)b, where E is, say,
the set of starchy foods fbread, rice, noodlesg:
(279)

a. It's john who only eats rice.
b. f^ eat0 ( )(j) j 2 Eg
c. f^ eat0 ((only)-r)( ) j 2 Eg
y

y

x

x
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The problem here is that the p-set cannot be independently provided by focus,
since only's partner is not the focus in (279)a. The focus structure of (279)a would
provide the p-set in (279)c, where E is the set of, say, housemates fRita, John,
Margog, for which only has no relevance in this sentence. This is tantamount to
saying that only's partner must necessarily be assigned a second denotation that
generates the p-set independent of whether it is focus or ground. In other words,
only does not require association with focus to have access to the relevant p-set,
since any constituent that ends up being only's partner can generate such a p-set.
In fact, this is not surprising at all. It is well known that almost any term
in a sentence can be understood as pertaining to (at least) one set of some kind.
This property is by no means restricted to focus. This gives rise to the pervasive
conversational and scalar implicatures that accompany almost every utterance (cf.
Hirschberg 1985). Given a prosodically neutral sentence like (280)a, a number of
di erent sets can be evoked:
(280)

a. The middle-income woman bought the average-sized pick-up.
b. The middle-income woman bought the average-sized pick-up
Signicantly, the same is true if focus is narrowed down to a single constituent. If,
for instance, woman is focused in (280)b, the p-sets for the other constituents do not
disappear, provided that the context is such that the alternates are of some interest.
See Rubino 1987 for some examples of scalar implicatures triggered by nonfocal
constituents.
Assuming that Rooth's semantics for only are essentially right in arguing that a
second denotation for only's partner is needed, it must be concluded from the above
that the availability of such second intensional translation is not due to the presence
of a focus feature at the level of logico-semantic representation. It is, rather, a more
general characteristic of any linguistic phrase uttered in the appropriate context.
All, or most, constituents in a sentence may generate a p-set that only may use to
determine its domain. In turn, this conrms that focus is not needed in accounting
for the semantics of only. Finally, all of these suggest that, if the domain selection
theory for only is to be maintained (as opposed to the `scope' theory rejected by
Rooth), a new way to establish the association between ad-VP only and its partner
must be found.
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7.2.3 But There's a Large Overlap
While it is clear, then, that the relationship of focus and only is not a necessary
one, it is also obvious that there is a large number of cases|a vast majority one
should say|in which only's partner is the intonationally prominent element and
indeed seems to be the focus of the sentence. In what follows, an account of such
overlap will be sketched. It will be argued that the fact that only's partner is usually
the focus of the sentence in which it occurs (although, as noted, not necessarily so)
follows from independent informational considerations.
As noted in Chs. 3 and 4, the only informational force of the ground is that of
anchoring the informative part of the utterance, i.e. the focus, so that the hearer may
retrieve the information of the sentence and enter it into her/his knowledge-store.
As a pre-condition of the task it performs, the ground must be hearer-old: it must
represent knowledge the speaker assumes hearers already have in their knowledgestore. But, at the same time, it must also be relevant to perform the task. If
the speaker assumes the hearer can retrieve the information provided by the focus
without the help of a ground, there is no ground present.
Let us see what the information packaging of sentence (276)a/(278)a, repeated
here as (281), is:
(281)

John only introduced BILL to Sue.

This sentence encodes the following packaging instruction: `I am instructed to go
to address \John" and retrieve the information of the sentence by substituting only
Bill for the blank in he introduced to Sue, which is already under \John" '. In
other words, the speaker assumes that at the time of utterance the hearer knows
about John's introducing, with Sue being the goal of such introducing, and that this
introducing is being attended to somehow.
Now, consider the apparently semantically anomalous sentence in (282).
(282)

*John only introduced Bill to sue.

This sentence is claimed to be unacceptable in the intended reading because only
is not associated with focus. In other words, if the focus is on Sue, Sue must be
interpreted as only's partner. For the sake of the argument, however, we could ask
ourselves what the information packaging of (282) would be. It would be along the
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lines of `I'm instructed to go to address \John" and retrieve the information of the
sentence by substituting Sue for the blank in he introduced only Bill to , which is
already under \John" '.
In other words, John's introducing only Bill|not just John's introducing Bill|
must be known by the hearer (so the speaker assumes). But if only and its partner
are not the informative part of the utterance and are, therefore, part of the ground,
their informational force must consist of providing appropriate instructions for the
entry of the information it provides. All of the ground must be necessary for this
task, including the exhaustiveness operator. Exhaustiveness must be important for
the ground's informational task. If, in contrast, the speaker assumes the information
of the sentence will be entered appropriately without the help of the exhaustiveness
modier, it will not be included in the ground.
In principle, the state of a airs that the informational structure of (282) requires
is not an impossible one. In fact, all the examples of non-association with focus
introduced above represent such a state of a airs. The inclusion of exhaustiveness
in the ground may indeed make a di erence. However, contextual situations in
which exhaustiveness is still relevant for anchoring the informative part while not
being part of it are rare, and, therefore, so are utterances that re ect such a state
of a airs. One such context, for instance, is the one in (283):
(283)

a. I know that
1. John introduced Bill and Barb to Ralph
2. John introduced Bill (but not Barb) to
b. I don't know that
3. =Sue
c. So I ask Mary
Who did John only introduce BILL to?
A perfectly acceptable answer to (283)c in such a context|ratied by several native
speakers of English|is precisely the putatively unacceptable string in (282) above,
which is repeated here for convenience as (284). Notice that SUE here cannot be
only's partner, since John introduced Bill to Ralph too.
x

x

(284)

John only introduced Bill to sue.

The contextual sophistication required for the felicity of this utterance, however,
is considerably larger than the sophistication required for utterances like (281). So
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much so, it may be suggested, that when we are presented with such a string we cling
to the reading where the focus is only's partner unless strong contextual pressure
forces on us a reading where only's partner is nonfocal. In particular, the prediction
here is that sentence (284) would only be uttered in a situation in which the address
for `John' in the hearer's knowledge-store looked like (285),
addr: John( )
x

(285)

introduce Barb to Ralph( )
introduce Bill to Ralph( )
introduce (only) Bill to ( )
x

x

x

where exhaustiveness on `Bill' is crucial for getting the informative focus to the right
spot under the address `John'.
This type of account, then, claims that there is no linguistic oddness whatsoever, of a logico-semantic or an informational sort, in sentences like (284). Their
oddity is exclusively due to the fact that in the actual world one would seldom utter
them, given that they require sophisticated contextual pre-conditions. This type of
pragmatic oddity is what was called `actual-world felicity' in x 2.4.1, and has been
invoked by several authors in recent research (Kroch 1989, Searle 1989). It must be
concluded from this that the di erent truth-conditions observed in these sentences
are, in principle, completely independent of the location of focus in the sentence.

7.2.4 Only's Partner in the Discourse History

If we look back into the discourse history previous to every utterance where only
is in non-association with focus|let us call it Ut, it will be noticed that, in the
majority of cases, only's partner was the focus in some previous utterance Ut;n.
See, as examples, (272), (273), (275), and (284). This fact is, of course, irrelevant
for a static propositional semantics of the sort Rooth uses: that only's nonfocal
partner at Ut was a focus at Ut;n cannot be taken into account in the semantic
representation of Ut. At Ut only's partner is nonfocal and still provides a second
intensional translation. Discourse history is of no use.
However, a dynamic approach to truth-value computation, a la Kamp (1981) for
instance, which makes use of chunks of discourse larger than the proposition, might
be able to utilize the fact that only's nonfocal partner at Ut was a focus at Ut;n.
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It could be argued, for instance, that in the question-answer pair in (283)-(284),
repeated here as (286),
(286)

a. Who did John only introduce BILL to?
b. John only introduced Bill to sue.
the p-set generated by the focus and used by only as a domain of exhaustive quantication in (286)a is `frozen' and passed down somehow to (286)b, where it is still
available as a domain of quantication for only by virtue of its partner having been
a focus in the relevant discourse history.
Even if such an approach could be worked out, and leaving aside the problem of
disallowing only to quantify over the p-set provided by the real focus in Ut, there
are examples where there is no explicit mention of only's nonfocal partner in the
discourse history:
(287)

"A last-minute guest arrives at host's house. The host has known
the guest's family for years]
A: I'm glad you could come for dinner. Had I known before,
I wouldn't have made pig's feet.
B: I love pig's feet. It's my sister who only eats prime cuts.
Obviously, such example is felicitous only in a context where the host knows that
one of the guest's family members eats only prime cuts (although there is a mix-up
with respect to exactly which person). Furthermore, exhaustiveness is indeed crucial
in anchoring the focus in (287)B appropriately, since, presumably, the guest herself
eats prime cuts too, i.e. my sister would not make any contribution to the hearer's
knowledge-store|would not be informative|if construed with respect to just eats
prime cuts instead of eats only prime cuts, since eating only prime cuts is the crucial
issue here. Sentence (287)B is nevertheless a awless example.
Why, then, do only's nonfocal partners tend to be found in a Ut which follows
a Ut;n in which they were focal? The answer is quite straightforward: most nonfocal elements found in a Ut were focal in a Ut;n, and that includes only and its
partner. The ground must be hearer-old, but most hearer-old material has been,
in the discourse history, discourse-new at one time. There are two ways in which
a discourse element may enter the discourse: ) it may do it as part of the focus
(if the element is hearer-new) this is the most common case, and this is why most
partners of only, like any ground material, have been part of the focus at one point
a
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or another in the discourse history or ) it may do it as part of a sentence's ground
(if the element is discourse-new but hearer-old, i.e. knowledge the speaker had before
the discourse interaction is started). Given this, the prediction is that only phrases
will be acceptable as part of a non-previously-mentioned ground when they represent discourse-new but hearer-old material and when exhaustiveness is important
to anchor the focus appropriately. Example (287) satises both these requirements.
b

7.2.5 Conclusion

The approach sketched out in x 7.2.3 suggests that the tendency|not requirement|
to associate only with focus is due to factors which are clearly nonlinguistic. Situations in which only and its partner are nonfocal require a large degree of contextual
sophistication. Situations in which exhaustiveness is part of the focus require little
contextual sophistication. As a consequence, due to the pragmatic unlikelihood of
nonfocal exhaustiveness, we only accept only's partner as nonfocal in presence of
compelling contextual pressure.
Given that, in the appropriate context, cases of non-association with focus are
perfectly acceptable, `association with focus' should not be built into the semantics
of only. The notion of p-set proposed by Rooth 1985, or a similar mechanism
(cf. Kratzer 1989), and the domain selection theory for only seem to be helpful
tools in accounting for only quantication. What has been shown here is that
association with focus is not the right way to provide only with the correct domain
of quantication, since only's partner need not be the focus: the p-set generated
by only's partner second denotation, and therefore the second denotation itself,
must be provided by only's nonfocal partners as well. This conclusion supports the
position that focus is a real information-packaging primitive that has no place in
truth-conditional logico-semantic interpretation.

7.3 The Scope of Sentential Negation
Another case of `association with focus' occurs with propositional operators like
negation and the interrogative yes/no-operator. Jackendo 1972 focuses on the
role of focus in the alteration of the scope of negation. This fact had already
been noticed by Frege and other philosophers, who had pointed out that ground
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elements may escape the scope of negation. If these claims are correct, our position
that informatics and semantics are distinct autonomous components will be proven
wrong. If, however, the phenomenon can be derived from a indirect interaction
between two types of `meaning', logico-semantic and informational, the position
held in this study will still be tenable.

7.3.1 The Facts
Apparent irregularities in the semantic scope of sentential negation have been noticed by many linguists and philosophers. A well-known problem is the existential
force of most sentential subjects in negative statements. Many authors conclude
from the presence of this existential force that the subject lies outside the scope
of negation (e.g. Frege 1892, Strawson 1950, Kamp 1981). Another irregularity,
noticed by Kraak 1966, Jackendo 1972, Gabbay & Moravcsik 1978, Kuno 1980,
Payne 1985, McGloin 1987, and Horn 1989, among others, is that, in certain contexts, some parts of the predicate do not seem to be a ected by sentential negation either. It has been suggested that the scope of negation must exclude these
`nonnegated' constituents as well. A di erent approach to the rst problem (e.g.
Kempson 1975, Gazdar 1979, and Horn 1986), or to both (Horn 1989), however,
maintains that sentential negation is indeed external and has scope over the entire
subject-predicate structure, and that the existential force of subjects and the feeling
that only part of the predicate is negated in certain sentences are better handled by
a non-truth-conditional account. Similar observations are applicable to the yes/no
question operator or Q-operator, as discussed in Kuno 1980, 1982.103
In this section, a unied account of these two phenomena is provided. Following
Horn's externalist point of view, and using evidence from Catalan and English, it
is argued that the readings where part of the sentence is felt as `nonnegated' are
the outcome of the interaction of logical-semantics and informatics, i.e. between
the interpretation of propositional content and the interpretation of informationpackaging instructions. In particular, it is proposed that information packaging
and semantic meaning interact by means of partial cancellation, yielding the understandings where some part of the clause is felt to escape the scope of negation or
103

But see Horn (1989:472-73) for arguments that the Q-operator and negation are not analogous.
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the Q-operator, without the need to resort to any additional constraints.
In what follows, the readings where part of the proposition is felt to lie outside
the scope of negation or the Q-operator will be referred to as infrapropositional
readings, and the elements that lie outside the scope of negation or the Q-operator
as outsider terms. As noted, outsider terms may be either subjects or complements of V.

Subjects
The scopal relation between subject denite descriptions and sentential negation
has been a matter of controversy for many years. A sentence like (288), in one of
its `readings',
(288)

Gomez Addams didn't sell his South American holdings.

seems to convey the understanding that Gomez Addams exists in other words,
that there is a Gomez Addams about whom a negative predicate is communicated.
Some semantic theories incorporate this understanding in their formal semantic
representation of negation by either arguing or assuming that negation is internal
and does not have scope over the subject (Frege 1892, Strawson 1950, Kamp 1981,
inter alia) or by arguing that the subject in (288) must be analyzed as an existential
quantier which gives rise to logical scope interactions with the negation operator
(Russell 1905) (cf. Lukasiewicz 1922 for a di erent ambiguist approach), yielding
the wide-scope reading of negation, where there is no existential claim for Gomez,
and the infrapropositional reading, where there is.
In contrast, one may address the issue in a totally di erent fashion: let negation
have scope over the entire predication, including the subject, at all times, and attribute the existential force of the subject NP in (288) to some non-truth-conditional
property of this NP (cf. Kempson 1975, Gazdar 1979, Horn 1989, among others).104
Horn (1989:x7.3.4), for example, argues that subjects tend to be felt as lying outside the scope of negation because they tend to be topics. Topics, being what the
There are two analyses of this wide-scope negation operator: an Aristotelian two-place subjectpredicate operator, or a Fregean one-place propositional operator. This controversy, though important, will be overlooked in this paper. For our purposes here, a Fregean propositional operator
will be adopted (but cf. Horn 1989 for compelling arguments for the Aristotelian two-place term
operator, which he heralds as superior to its alternatives).
104
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sentence is about (cf. Strawson 1964, Reinhart 1981) are not within the scope of
`assertion' and, therefore, are pragmatically understood as being outside the scope
of negation as well. As noted in previous sections, existential force is one of the
characteristics of links.

Complements of V
It is not subjects alone which appear to give rise to infrapropositional readings.
Jackendo 1972 notices that sometimes negation seems to apply to only part of the
predicate (cf. also Gabbay & Moravcsik 1978). One such example is, for instance,
the sentence in (289) (in Jackendo 1972:255),
(289)

Max didn't kill the judge with a hammer.

where negation is felt to a ect only the direct object and not the entire VP or
sentence, i.e., not only the subject Max but also the PP with a hammer behave like
outsider terms. Jackendo argues that this is an example of his rule of `association
with focus', a rule that somehow connects logical operators with the focus element
in the sentence to establish an intimate tie between the two.105
Kuno 1980, 1982 notes similar restrictions for negation or the Q-operator in
Japanese: their scope generally only extends to the focal verbal constituent that
immediately precedes them. In fact, English, while distinct from Japanese in word
order and directionality of scope, also shows parallel e ects for both operators.
Compare (289) with (290). Notice that in (290) only judge is understood as the
`aim' of the yes/no question.
(290)

Did Max kill the judge with a hammer?

In most of the literature, it is clearly concluded or tacitly assumed that the semantics
of sentences like (289) and (290) cannot include a sentential negation operator with
scope over the entire proposition. When trying to dene the logico-semantic scope
of negation in these sentences, however, one encounters references to non-logicosemantic, informational notions like focus and theme. A clear example is Payne 1985,
who does not seem to clearly endorse an exclusively logico-semantic approach to the
These data were discussed above in Ch. 6 with respect to their relevance for syntactic
representation.
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diversity of readings, and arms, using Praguean terminology, that `the contextually
bound elements are removed from the scope of negation, and what is actually negated
is the contextually free portion of the sentence' (1985:199). And it is again Horn
(1989:515) who proposes that there should be no need to resort to multiple logicosemantic ambiguity to account for the VP infrapropositional readings: `the negative
element takes semantic scope over the entire predication, but "...] will be understood
as associated with that rhematic constituent which receives the intonation peak'.
It is precisely this position, expressed by Payne and Horn with respect to VP outsider terms, that is developed in this paper in terms of the interaction of semantics
and informatics, while applying it to all outsider terms: subjects and complements
of V. The position is taken that sentential negation and the Q-operator have always
semantic scope over the entire predication, with no exceptions, and the infrapropositional readings are derived from the di erent informational structures of the sentence
and their di erent overlapping patterns with the invariable semantic structure. If it
is possible to come up with an explanation for this scope-of-negation e ects without
resorting to including informational notions in the logico-semantic representation,
our position will be strengthened. As a side benet, the disadvantages and shortcomings of the internalist and ambiguist approaches discussed in detail in Horn 1989
to this infrapropositional readings will be avoided.

7.3.2 Deriving the Infrapropositional Readings
The argument will be based on examples from Catalan. In Catalan, as discussed in
Ch. 5, the informational articulation of the sentence is structurally expressed in the
syntax by means of right- or left-detachment of nonfocal constituents, yielding the
conguration in (291):
(291)

"IP non-focus (link) "IP "IP focus ] non-focus (tail) ]]

This abstract conguration is instantiated in sentences like the ones in (292). The
example in (292)a is a right-detachment and (292)b is a left-detachment. The sentences in (293) illustrate further combinations with an overt link subject:106
Notice that in these examples the null subject pronominal pro is placed in a preverbal position.
It was argued above in Ch. 5 that the clause-internal position of subjects must be postverbal, but
since nothing hinges on that fact in the following discussion, they have been placed in preverbal
position for the sake of clarity.
106
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(292)

a. "XP "IP=F hi van obrir botiga, ] a Londres . ]
loc 3p-past-open store
in London
`"F (They) opened a store ] in London.'
i

i

b. "XP A Londres "IP=F hi van obrir botiga. ]]
in London
loc 3p-past-open store
`In London "F (they) opened a store ].'
i

(293)

i

a. "XP Els Lladro "IP=F pro van obrir botiga a londres. ]]
3p-past-open store in London
`The Lladro Brothers "F opened a store in london ].'
i

i

b. "XP Els Lladro "XP "IP=F pro hi van obrir botiga ] a Londres . ]]
loc 3p-past-open store
in London
`The Lladro Brothers "F opened a store ] in London.'
i

i

j

j

c. "XP A Londres "XP "IP=F pro hi van obrir botiga ] els Lladro . ]]
`In London the Lladro Brothers "F opened a store ].'
j

i

j

i

The informational interpretation of, say, sentence (293)b is the following: `I am
instructed to go to the address \the Lladro Brothers" and retrieve the information
of the sentence by substituting opened a store for the blank the Lladro Brothers
London, which is already under \the Lladro Brothers" '. This was represented
with the informational instruction in (294):107
(294)

,

1

1

np  np

= L. Bros.,

2

pp

" + " yes(

np

1

opened a store

pp

2)

]] (in-L.)

Notice that this instruction includes a representation of the armation operator
(yes), which is in complementary distribution with the interrogative Q- and the
negation operators.
Representations for other informational readings|the list is not exhaustive|of
the same logico-semantic proposition are displayed in (295). Sentence (295)a is an
example of all-focus structure, (295)b an example of link-focus structure, and (295)c
an example of link-focus-tail structure:108
In this section, the variables bound by the ground are typed for the sake of clarity.
Sentence (a) is presented as an embedded sentence to improve its felicity. In matrix sentences
where two or more complements of V are overt and nonclitic, postverbal subjects are somewhat
marginal.
107
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(295)

a. ( quan) "F van obrir botiga a londres els lladro ].
`( when) the L.B. opened a store in London.'
+ " yes(L.B. opened a store in London) ]
b. Els Lladro pro "F van obrir botiga a londres ]. (=(293)a)
`The L.B. "F opened a store in london ].'
, 1 1 = L.B., " + " yes( 1 opened a store in London) ]
c. Els Lladro "F pro n 'hik van obrir ], de botiga , a Londresk .
`The L.B. "F opened ] a store in London.'
, 1 1 = L.B., 2 3 " +" yes( 1 opened 2 3 ) ]](in-L)(st.)
:::

:::

i

i

np  np

np

i

np  np

i

j

j

np pp

np

np

pp

7.3.3 The Negation and Q- Operators
Taking the above as background, we shall now try to derive the infrapropositional
readings in negative and interrogative sentences. The semantic meaning of sentences
(293) and (295) has remained constant, while di erent informational understandings
have been established. In other words, the logico-semantic proposition
(296)

yes" open (store, in London, L. Bros.)]

is shared by all the sentences in (293) and (295). However, each of these sentences
has a di erent informational representation, some of which have already been spelled
out in the above examples. So far, there has been no con ict in the understandings
derived from both types of meaning: the interaction between the two has null e ects.
This, however, is not always the case. To see this, let us extend the informational
representations in (294) and (295) to their negative and interrogative counterparts,
i.e., sentences where, instead of having a yes operator we have negation ( ) or a
Q-operator (Q).
Informational representations for the interrogatives are in (297) (que is the Catalan instantiation of the Q-morpheme):109
The English translations in the examples below are sort of marginal. English naturalness was
sacriced to obtain a more faithful rendering of the Catalan original. The English preposed phrase
should not be read as a `hanging topic' or full-edged English left-dislocation|LD-2 in Prince's
(1984) terms, but as an actual topicalization in a noninterrogative sentence.
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(297)

a. Que "F van obrir botiga a londres els lladro ](, pas)?
`Did the L.B. open a store in London?'
+ " Q(L.B. opened a store in London) ]
b. Els Lladro que "F pro van obrir botiga a londres ]?
`The L.B. did they "F open a store in london ]?'
, 1 1 = L.B., " + " Q( 1 opened a store in London) ]
c. Els Lladro que "F pro hi van obrir botiga ], a Londres ?
`The L.B. did they "F open a store in London? ]'
, 1 1 = L.B., 2 " + " Q( 1 opened a store 2 ) ]] (in-L)
d. Els Lladro que "F pro n 'hik van obrir ], de botiga , a Londresk ?
`The L.B. did they "F open ] a store in London?'
, 1 1 = L.B., 2 3 " + " Q( 1 opened 2 3 ) ]] (in-L) (st.)
Sentences (297)a, (297)b, (297)c, and (297)d are informationally equivalent to sentences (295)a, (295)b, (293)b (=(294)), and (295)c, respectively. They encode the
same information-packaging instruction (aside from the propositional operator110),
which in Catalan is straightforwardly represented in the surface structure of the
sentence. Each of the sentences in (297) shows the same detachment pattern as its
armative counterpart in (293) and (295). At the same time, the sentences in (297)
are all instantiations of the same logico-semantic proposition in (298):
i

i

np  np

np

i

np  np

i

(298)

j

pp

i

np  np

j

i

np

pp

j

j

np pp

np

np pp

Q" open (store, in London, L. Bros.)]

While the sentences in (297) are all logico-semantically equivalent, they are, in
contrast, informationally distinct from each other.
The same observations can be directly carried over to the negative sentences in
(299):
It is unquestionable that the propositional operator is needed in the informational representation. Not only do we need to derive the infrapropositional readings discussed in this paper, but it
is also necessary to informationally represent sentences where the a$rmation/negation operator is
the only focal element:
110

(i) She did pass.
(ii) She had to pass, and pass she did.
In these sentences the operator yes is the focus, and it must be represented as such in an informational instruction by positioning it within the scope of . These sentences are discussed in detail
in Ward 1985 and Prince 1986.
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(299)

a. neg-external reading:
( que) "F no van obrir botiga a londres els lladro ].
`( that) "F the L.B. didn't open a store in London ].'
+ " (L.B. opened a store in London) ]
b. neg-internal reading:
Els Lladro "F no pro van obrir botiga a londres ].
`The L.B. "F didn't open a store in London ].'
, 1 1 = L.B., " + " ( 1 opened a store in London) ]
c. Els Lladro "F no pro hi van obrir botiga ], a Londres .
`The L.B. "F didn't open a store ] in London.'
, 1 1 = L.B., 2 " + " ( 1 opened a store 2 ) ]] (in-L)
d. Els Lladro "F no pro n 'hik van obrir ], de botiga , a Londresk.
`The L.B. "F didn't open ] a store in London.'
, 1 1 = L.B., 2 3 " + " ( 1 opened 2 3 ) ]] (in-L) (st.)
The four sentences in (299) are informationally distinct from each other. Each of
them is informationally equivalent (except for the propositional operator) to the
corresponding lettered sentences in (297). This is shown, again, by the Catalan
surface structure. The logico-semantic structure of the sentences in (299), however,
remains constant:
:::

:::

i

i

np  np

np

i

np  np

(300)

j

j

pp

i

np  np

i

i

np

pp

j

j

np pp

np

np pp

" open (store, in London, L. Bros.)]

This is precisely what Kempson 1975, Gazdar 1979, Horn 1989, and the other partisans of the externalist approach to sentential negation argue for. In what follows
it will be shown how the infrapropositional readings can be derived without ddling
with the logical scope of negation, just as these authors propose. The readings
in question are derived by exploiting the partial-overlap interaction between the
logico-semantic and the informational representations of sentences like (297) and
(299).
Note that the informational representions for the sentences in (297) and (299)
are motivated exclusively by the information packaging they convey, just as they
were in the armative sentences in (294) and (295). Notice, incidentally, that it is
precisely the outsider terms in this sentences which are detached to nonargument
slots. Catalan clearly re ects structurally the fact that outsider terms must be
nonfocal, as observed by some of the authors mentioned above.
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A Unied Account
Let us consider, for example, sentence (299)b, where the outsider term is the subject.
The information packaging this instruction expresses is as follows: `I am instructed
to go to the address \the Lladro Brothers" and then retrieve the information of
the sentence by adding 1 not opened a store in London under the address
\the Lladro Brothers" '. The link els germans Lladro is the only ground here.
The information-packaging instruction encoded in this sentence indicates that the
speaker assumes hearers have an address `the Lladro Bros.' in their knowledge-store.
In other words, when processing the informational content of the sentence, hearers
understand that the speaker is telling them that they already have the address `the
Lladro Bros.' in their knowledge-store, and furthermore that they must `go to' it
before entering the information of the sentence under it.
Given this, it must be concluded that, while (299)b semantically expresses that
it is not the case that the Lladro Brothers opened a store in London, simultaneously
it informationally expresses that `the Lladro Brothers' are already in the hearer's
knowledge-store and are relevant at this time, i.e. their existence in the hearer's
knowledge-store is taken for granted. The subject els Lladro, while within the scope
of negation in the semantics, remains outside the scope of + in the informatics, and,
therefore, as Horn (1989:512) suggests, in some sense, outside the scope of negation
as well. In other words, the speaker communicates to hearers that it is not the
case that the Lladro Brothers opened a store in London, but, in parallel, it also lets
them know that the Lladro Brothers should already be in their knowledge-store and
that the information provided in the sentence is informative with respect to them.
As a consequence, only the focal part of the sentence is understood as `a ected' by
negation. This is how Horn's observation about the topichood|linkhood, in our
terms|of most subjects is captured. In fact, Catalan postverbal subjects, crucially,
are never understood as outsider terms.
Consider now (299)d, for instance: the ground can be described as being `the
Lladro Brothers stand in some relation to a store and to London'. The only informative part, the only actual addition to the hearer's knowledge-store at the time of
utterance, is `not opening'. Again, while the hearer semantically understands that it
is not true that the Lladro Brothers opened a store in London, s/he informationally
x
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understands that some relation holds between them and a store and London (at least
this is what the speaker is assuming the hearer knows). If both understandings are
cancelled out, we obtain that the only element left to be negated de facto is open.
The informational status of complement-of-V outsider terms, then, just like with
their subject counterparts, causes them to be understood as nonnegated. This is
represented in our informational instruction, where only negation and the verb are
within the scope of focus.
The same applies to interrogative examples like (297). In (297)c, for instance,
in the semantics, Q has scope over the entire proposition. But in the informational
component, hearers gather that the fact that the Lladro Brothers stand in some
relation with London constitutes the ground. The only nonground material is then
`opening a store', which is left as the only `questionable' part of the utterance, and,
therefore, understood as the aim of the yes/no question.
Notice that this account directly incorporates Jackendo 's `association with focus' with no explicit stipulation of it. In fact, Jackendovian examples like the one in
(289) are accounted for by our representation, as shown in (301) or its corresponding
interrogative (302):
(301)

Max didn't kill the judge with a hammer.
, 1 1 = M 2 3 " + " ( 1 2 judge
np  np

(302)

 v pp

np v

Did Max kill the judge with a hammer?
, 1 1 = M 2 3 " + " Q( 1 2 judge
np  np

 v pp

np v

3)

]] (w/ hammer) (kill)

3)

]] (w/ hammer) (kill)

pp

pp

Again, the propositional operator takes wide logico-semantic scope in both examples,
yielding the logico-semantic understandings that it is not the case that Max killed
the judge with a hammer for (301) and that the speaker inquires whether or not
it is the case that Max killed the judge with a hammer for (302). Both sentences,
however, are informationally equivalent: the hearer is informed that the judge is an
appropriate complement of the ground, where the ground consists of Max standing
in a relevant relation with the act of killing with a hammer. Given this, the hearer
is lead to understand the judge as the `object' of negation or the aim of the yes/no
question.
Crucially, the same treatment is given to subjects with existential force and
to VP-internal outsider terms. There is no need to resort to two di erent sorts
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of explanation. The trick here is in placing the sentential operator (armation,
negation, or Q) inside the scope of +. This move has null e ects when the operator
is armation, as desired, but important ones when the operator is negation or Q.
In particular, it provides us with the infrapropositional readings, i.e. Jackendo 's
association with focus, with no additional stipulation of such a rule.

Negation-in-Ground Cases
While this approach has been succesful in giving a unied account of the existence
of outsider terms in negative and Q-operator sentences, it may seem unable to deal
with sentences where sentential negation is clearly a part of the ground, i.e. where
it is not `associated with focus' in any of the ways discussed above. Such is the case
in sentences like (303), where (303)b is a literal rendering into Catalan of (303)a
(which is dialectally restricted in English):
(303)

a. My car, I haven't paid for yet.
b. El cotxe, no he pagat encara.
c. It's my car I haven't paid for yet.
In these examples `not having paid for yet' is the vehicular ground which serves
to anchor the focus car. Since there is no `association with focus' it would be
erroneous to try to give an armative ground to this sentence. In these sentences,
then, negation should be outside the scope of +. The very trick that allows us to
derive the infrapropositional readings, however, excludes these `negation-in-ground'
readings.
What needs to be done to be able to represent cases like (303) is abstract negation
away from the clause, in the same way other tail elements in (303), like pay, would be
abstracted by means of the lambda notation. This step does not seem problematic
and would allow for a straightforward analysis of sentences like (303). The details
of such an extension will not be pursued here.

7.3.4 Conclusion
The semantic analysis of sentential negation as an operator with scope over the
entire proposition has encountered two major diculties: the existential force of
most subjects and the outsider-term nature of some predicate-internal phrases. It
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has been concluded from this that in sentences with these irregularities we must
abandon the idea of a wide-scope sentential operator.
It has been argued here that, to the contrary, these long-observed irregularities in
the semantic scope of sentential negation need not be incorporated into the semantic
representation of negative sentences, but rather, that they follow independently from
the interaction of parallel but distinct simple semantic and informational representations. Our independently-motivated formal representation of information packaging,
when applied to interrogative and negative sentences, duly captures the infrapropositional readings in question with no need of additional rules like `association with
focus'.
Finally, and more importantly, the inclusion of non-logico-semantic notions like
focus in the semantic representation is rendered unnecessary. The existence of an
interaction between information packaging and logico-semantic operators has been
accounted for without requiring the presence of informational operators in the logicosemantic repesentation. Propositional operators are obviously present in the informatics but only for their value as information. Not only can it still be maintained
that informatics and logical semantics are two separate components, but in arguing
for this position, a more elegant and unied account of the existence of outsider
terms and the infrapropositional readings that accompany them has been provided.

7.4 Other E ects on Logical Meaning
It is not uncommon to nd examples in the literature where focus is invoked to
account for some unexpected e ects on logical meaning. These range from the claim
that focus a ects the interaction of quanticational operators and quanticational
adverbs to the claim that focusing disallows coreference between sentence elements.
This section contains a brief survey of two of these claims. The apparent weak
crossover e ect of focus on coreference was already discussed in Ch. 6.

7.4.1 Scope Interactions
Jones 1988 is an interesting study of wh/operator interactions. At one point, he
discusses the lack of multiple construals in sentences like (304)b, in contrast to a
sentence like (304)a:
193

(304)

a. What did everyone buy for Max?
b. What did someone buy for Max? (Jones 1988:ex. 27)
His argument is that the reading where the existential quantier takes wide scope
over the wh-element is structurally possible but pragmatically infelicitous, since it
is totally redundant (approx. `someone is someone and for this someone, what did
they buy for Max'). However, he argues, `as soon as we give semantic content to
the existentially quantied NP, and stress it, then focus changes the possibilities'
(1988:9). His example is (305),
(305)

What did the richest person buy for Max? (Jones 1988:ex. 32b)

where a wide-scope understanding of the `enriched' existential NP is possible. It
seems, however, that the change in scope in (305) is due more to the addition of
semantic content than the the fact that the quanticational NP might be a focus.
Compare (305) with (306), where the assignment of focus on someone seems impossible in any context:
(306)

#What did someone buy for Max?

In a similar vein, May (1985:161) argues that each is an inherently focused
quantier. In May's theory focused elements have a peculiar quanticational force
that makes them take scope over other quanticational elements. Thus, an example
like (307),
(307)

Which girl kissed each of the boys?

may only mean something akin to For each boy, which girl kissed him and not the
narrow-scope Which is the girl that kissed all the boys?. In contrast, (308), due to a
condition on quantier raising of objects, may only have the narrow-scope reading:
(308)

Which girl kissed each of the boys?

These intuitions do not seem to be too accurate. Consider example (309). Here the
narrow-scope reading for the each phrase is incompatible with the normal pragmatic
use of the verb marry used in the sentence, thus forcing a wide-scope reading. Notice
that there is nothing odd about this sentence, contra May's predictions:
(309)

I'm so dumb! I forgot which girl married each of the boys again!
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Instead of the predicted Which is the girl that married all the boys? we get a
favored reading For each of the boys, which girl married him?. Similarly, a sentence
like (310),
(310)

I know teenagers like kissing each other, but this is too much
Say again, which girl kissed each of the boys?
allows a narrow-scope reading for each, despite claims that foci may only take
wide-scope.
It seems that the intuitions behind these e ects on scope are due to a multiplicity
of things, including context, choice of predicate, etc. Focus, apparently, is appealed
to here without much reason. The appeal to the e ect of focus in these cases seems
to lack a sound basis.
:::

7.4.2 Adverbs of Quanti cation
More serious seems the apparently truth-conditional di erence between sentences
(311)a and (311)b, from Rooth (1985:ex. 2, Ch. 5):
(311)

a. mary always took John to the movies.
b. Mary always took john to the movies.
As Rooth points out, if Mary ever took someone other than John to the movies
(311)b is false but (311)a may still be true. And vice versa, if someone other than
Mary took John to the movies (311)a is false, but (311)b may still be true. Rooth
provides an analysis of this case of association with focus which suggests that the
meaning of a sentence like (311)a is `at every time interval where someone took John
to the movies, Mary took John to the movies'. Focus, as in the case of only, provides
a domain of quantication for the adverb, which in this way quanties only over the
occasions in which someone took John to the movies and no others.
Again, from our perspective, it should be desirable to avoid such direct interaction between logico-semantic quantiers and informational notions, and favor an
indirect `non-mingling' interaction between two separate components, each providing a di erent type of interpretation. Rooth is correct in recognizing the need for
a domain of quantication for always, but it seems that domain must be provided
independently of the focus. The argument here is parallel to the argument provided
in the case of only. Let us assume the following situation:
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(312)

a. I know that
1. Susan sometimes takes John to the movies.
2. always takes John (and no one else) to the movies.
b. I don't know that
3. =Mary
c. So I ask John's mother
Who always takes John to the movies?
An answer to this question is (313):
x

x

(313)

mary always takes John to the movies.

Notice that (313) cannot mean `at every time interval where someone takes John to
the movies, Mary takes John to the movies' since Susan also takes John to the movies
sometimes. Rather, it means `at every time interval where Mary takes someone to
the movies, Mary takes John to the movies'. The domain of quantication necessary
for such an interpretation is not made available by the focus Mary but rather by
the nonfocal John. Again, as in the case of only, it may be concluded that, if always
may get a domain of quantication from nonfocal elements sometimes, it is incorrect
to attribute the availability of such a domain to the presence of focus.111

7.5 Evaluation
This chapter has been devoted to the task of showing that all the putative evidence in support of including informational notions, especially focus, in the logicosemantic representation of sentences is inconclusive. It was shown that focus cannot
be equated to a truth-conditional exhaustiveness operator, as suggested by Szabolcsi
1981, 1983 and Svoboda & Materna 1987. The cases of direct interaction presented
in Jackendo 1972, Gabbay & Moravcsik 1978, May 1985, Rooth 1985, McGloin
1987, and Jones 1988 have been explained or explained away in terms of information packaging and its indirect interaction with logico-semantic meaning as two
parallel interpretive processes.
Rooth 1985 also provides a number of examples from Dretske 1972 where it is claimed that focus
aects truth-conditions. Rooth himself states that in many of those examples the truth-conditional
eects are not clear. In other cases, the apparent ambiguity is due to inherent vagueness of the
logico-semantic elements of the sentence in total independence of the presence or absence of focus.
111
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These ndings conrm our proposal in that there is no evidence to suggest that
the interpretation of information packaging and the interpretation of logical meaning must be carried out in the same interpretive component, in that it is possible to
conceive of two parallel interpretive components without leaving any of the interactions discussed in this chapter unaccounted for. In most cases, the close cohabitation
of both types of meaning does not cause any apparent e ects in the global interpretation of sentences. In the presence of some logico-semantic operators, however,
some indirect interactions as the ones described above may occur. The existence
of important correlations between information packaging and referential status was
shown to be an artifact of the way in which information is conveyed. It is safe to
say that the correlations between focus and only or always, and the `association
with focus' phenomena around negation and interrogation are epiphenomenal in the
exact same way.

197

Chapter 8
Conclusion
The informational articulation of the sentence, under one label or another, has long
been identied as an important factor in the structure and interpretation of sentences. Psychological articulation, progression, communicative dynamism, aboutness, dominance, assertion and presupposition, and given/new information are all
attempts to pin down the exact nature of this informational articulation. Even
though theme, rheme, topic, comment, focus, and open-proposition have been under scrutiny for decades, there is little agreement on the role these notions play in
a model of linguistic competence.
The main goal of this study was to identify the exact role played by the informational articulation of the sentence. To this end, the notion of information packaging
(e.g. Chafe 1976, Prince 1986) was adapted and described as the structuring of the
sentence into instructions with which the speaker directs the hearer to enter the
information carried by the sentence into her/his knowledge-store. Information was
dened as that part of the propositional content of a sentence that constitutes a
contribution of knowledge to the hearer's knowledge-store. The encoding of information in sentence structure is needed to avoid redundancy in the update of the
hearer's knowledge-store.
It has been shown that the component of language responsible for such encoding, informatics, is better thought of as an autonomous one, independent of
logico-semantic meaning and other pragmatic understanding. The interpretation of
information-packaging instructions is independent of the interpretation of the propositional content encoded in the sentence. Two sentences encoding di erent instructions may have the same propositional content and two sentences encoding di erent
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propositions may have the same informational structure. On the other hand, following Reinhart 1982, Prince 1988c, and Valimaa-Blum 1988, among others, further
evidence has been provided that the information packaging is not reducible to the
marking of referential status. Although both mechanisms are concerned with the
modication and update of the knowledge-store, their specic task is distinct: while
referential-status marking is responsible for the creation and activation of le cards
or addresses, information packaging is responsible for the actual update of the data
under these addresses. The autonomy of informatics is indirectly supported by the
fact that it has been possible to develop a coherent and comprehensive account of
information packaging without resorting to external aid.
The existence of several cases of interaction between logico-semantic meaning and
information packaging has also been shown not to be a problem for the autonomyof-informatics hypothesis. Several of the putative interactions between focus and
quantiers have been shown to be due to other factors, and the interaction between
focus and propositional operators like negation and interrogation have been accounted for in terms of an indirect `non-mingling' interaction, i.e. without requiring
the presence of informational notions in the logico-semantic representation.
The structure of the information-packaging instructions has been given a great
deal of attention. Four di erent instructions have been identied. These instructions
are composed by means of the combination of the informational primitives of the
sentence. The primitives used in this study are adaptations of the traditional notions
of focus, open-proposition or presupposition, topic or theme, and antitopic. They
benet from the insights of their predecessors while avoiding their shortcomings.
The sentence was informationally divided into a focus and a ground, and the latter
further divided into a link and a tail. These elements may yield the combinations
all-focus, link-focus, link-focus-tail and focus-tail. The link is an address pointer: it
instructs the hearer to go to a particular address in the hearer's knowledge-store.
The focus encodes the information of the sentence to be entered under the address
denoted by the link. Finally, the tail indicates how the information must be entered
under a given address, namely, via a mere addition or via a substitution for a gap
or an element previously there.
The denition of these notions in terms of entry into the knowledge-store removes some of their elusiveness and makes them, in principle, treatable from a
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computational viewpoint. Simultaneously, many of the intuitive and empirical observations already made around these notions|aboutness, contrast, poset condition
on preposing, existential force of subjects, sentence-initialness of subjects|can be
captured without further stipulation. Furthermore, the main problem in viewing the
knowledge-store as a le, the redundancy in the entry of data, has been eliminated.
Further support for the particular representation of information-packaging instructions provided in this study comes from the encoding of these elements in the
overt syntax, especially from Catalan. Since, unlike English, Catalan may not represent information packaging exclusively by means of prosody, Catalan surface syntax
re ects information packaging closely. The notational device of removing the ground
elements from the scope of + used in the representation of information packaging
is matched one-to-one in Catalan by overt syntactic A0-adjunctions, with the result
that the information of the sentence is the only element left within the core IP slot.
The syntax-informatics interface has also been addressed. Using a multistratal
theory of syntax, it has been proposed that an abstract level of pure informational
represention, IS, mediates the mapping between overt syntax and informatics. IS
must contain all and only those elements that are relevant for informational interpretation. It has been shown that IS cannot be merged with LF, the level of
logico-semantic meaning, and it has been suggested that IS is better viewed as derived directly from S-structure without the mediation of LF (as was the case with
the level of LF0). If an additional level of representation is accepted, our traditional
view of the structure of Grammar must be change. It seems that a single level of
meaning representation is not su ucient to feed the complex conceptual structures
it presumably feeds. It has been noted that, after the incorporation of IS into the
model, the role of S-structure in the model is closer to the view of S-structure as a
`contact level' in Chomsky 1988.
Nevertheless, the main inspiration for this study has been the desire to gain
insight into the role of pragmatics within the larger linguistic apparatus. Pragmatics,
it was pointed out, does not denote a unied component of the linguistic apparatus,
but a collection of bits and pieces. Informatics is one of these pieces. By trying to
dene the role of informatics, we contribute, much in the tradition of Gazdar 1979,
to the enterprise of removing the `wastebasket' tag from pragmatics.
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